M^ 





^ * MEMOIR 






Ufl 23 ON 

.M65 
Copy 1 

THE ^..xxuERS AND DEFENCES 



NE¥ YORK CITY 



ADDRESSED TO THE 



HON. JOHN B. FLOYD 

SECRETARY OF WAR, 



JAMES St. C. MORTON, 



F1K8T LIEUT. ENQINEEBS. 



PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 



WASHINGTON: 

WILLIAM A. HARRIS, PRINT.ER 

1858. 



<. 



X-- 



\{\l^ INTRODUCTORY LETTER. 



Washington, District of Columbia, 

September 30, 1858. 

Sir : I beg leave to lay before you the accompanying Memoir on the 
*^ Dangers and Defences of New York." 

It contains practical ideas relating to a branch of American military 
.science which has as yet been substantially overlooked or neglected by 
the Bureau to whose province it belongs. 

The branch in question, namely, the defence of our sea-board cities 
against great naval military expeditions, has indeed grown in im- 
portance of late years, with electrical rapidity; and it is perhaps 
excusable, that as yet no actual constructions are to be seen on the 
Atlantic coasts, attesting the watchfulness and promptness of our 
Engineer Department. 

But the latter should have shown before now, some indication that 
it has, at least, officially recognized and appreciated the dangers, 
which, novel in magnitude, have lately begun to threaten the nation. 

But as no warning of approaching disaster, much less any provision 
to meet it, has emanated from the proper official quarter, I conceive 
that it becomes individual officers to make the government acquainted 
with the exigencies into which it would be thrown by a war with 
England or France. 

In the first part of the Memoir I endeavor to show that America 
now lies exposed to the worst effects of a species of warfare, which 
though of secondary importance when, 40 years ago, the present system 
of fortification was adopted, has received a ten-fold development, and 
has assumed the proportions of a vital danger, since the construction 
of steam navies by the great maritime powers. 

The landing upon our shores of hostile armies in 1812 and '14 was 
productive of no greater injury than certain conflagrations, devasta- 
tions, and plunderings, which served rather to irritate than subdue 
the spirit of the people : but the campaigns which result from similar 
expeditions at the present day, exhaust the strength of first-class 
nations, and their issue decides the terms of peace. 

I do not claim originality in this part of my memoir,* for Greneral 
Gadsden, Major Chase, and Major Sanders, prognosticated, years ago, 
the worst results from the neglect to provide against hostile descents. 
If I succeed in placing their views, which coincide with mine as to 
the nature of the danger, in a striking light, I shall be satisfied; for 
by so doing I will secure to the second part of the Memoir, which 
advances an original and entirely novel proposition, an attentive con- 
sideration. 

* "With the exception that I am the first to point out tlie possibility of a foreign army 
landing on the outside of Coney Island, and on the northern shore of the Sound. 



IV INTKODUCTO&Y LETTER. 

This proposition consists of a plan or system of fortification for the 
defence of extensive lines, wliicli, based on the immutable principles of 
the science, departs from old fashioned rules, and adapts itself to the 
latest improvements in the rifle ; and which is likewise calculated on 
the supposition that the reliance of New York, in her necessity, will 
be her citizen soldiery. 

In military statements and arguments, an all-important element is 
the topography of the country or district concerned ; and in this re- 
spect I enter on the discussion with unsurpassed advantages. 

My duties as Light House Engineer of the New York district, have 
given me every opportunity to render myself familiar with every part 
of New York harbor^ and all the waters which empty into it, and with 
its shores on every side : I am also well acquainted with the Sound 
and outer shores of Long Island: I have travelled habitually over the 
latter, in every direction; and, in fine, the descriptions of the to- 
pography and hydrography of the vicinity of New York and Long 
Island, which will be found in this Memoir, are the result of thorough 
personal study and observation of the localities. 

As to the existing fortifications of New York, I have certainly a 
perfect insight into their objects and capabilities, as I was formerly 
stationed, on regular military duty, at both Fort Hamilton and Sandy 
Hook. 

In conclusion, permit me, Mr. Secretary, to express my profound 
sense of a two-fold obligation to you ; for it was your assigning me 
to Light House duty that gave me the advantages which impart to 
my opinions on this subject all the merit they possess : and your habit 
of encouraging the expression of independent views, by officers of all 
grades, has emboldened me to advance mine. 

I remain. Sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant, 

J. ST. C. MORTON, 
First Lieut. Engineers. 

Hon. John B. Floyd, 

Secretary of War. 



PART I. 



CHAPTER I. 

At the present moment the United. States present towards Great 
Britain and France an attitude which is parallel in many respects to 
that of Russia towards the same States in 1853. 

The material wealth and integral power of both this country and 
Russia have rapidly increased to Ibrmidable dimensions. 

The great extent of both countries, and their comparatively isolated 
geographical situation have been greatly relied on in each case as 
securities against foreign invasion, while both have seaports which 
have been left without adequate defences. 

Russia, as well as ourselves, has a navy inferior in size to those of 
her rivals,, and here, indeed, the parallel is least to be insisted on, for 
our sailors and officers are the best in the world, as well the individual 
vessels of our fleet, while in both material and ' ' personnel ' ' the Rus- 
sian navy is far inferior to the French or English, It may be added 
that while our immense commerce, which, according to tonnage, is 
the largest in the world, demands a large navy to protect it, that of 
Russia is small, and her navy is more designed as an aggressive force 
than to guard her merchantmen. But these points in which the 
parallel fails will be found to add additional strength to my argument, 
which^ drawn from the comparison, deduces from the policy pursued 
towards Russia in the eastern war of 1854-'56, the inference that a 
similar course will be adopted by either of, or both the allies in a future 
war with the United States. 

That policy, of attacking the extremities of the State, and paralyzing 
them, in the hope of thereby weakening and disordering its vital parts, 
does not seem to have been premeditated at the outset of the war in 
question. 

The weight and rapidity of the blows that were struck at Sevastopol, 
Odessa, Kertch, Kimburu, Bomarsund, and Sweaborg do not seem to 
have been anticipated by the allies, any more than by the Russians. 

Whether the governments of France and England were not fully 
alive to the almost incredible power which they wielded, in their yet 
untried steam navies, or whether a grand invasion of Russia seemed 
most likely to bring the Czar to terms, or whether the first proposition 
to harass the enemy into a peace was overruled by commanders who 
saw a greater prospect of glory in magnificent combined land opera- 
tions ; whatever^ in short, may be the reason for it, this seems highly 



6 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

probable ; that the policy pursued was the result of circumstances that 
took place subsequent to the declaration of war.* 

This will seem less singular when it is considered that the eastern 
war is the first in which either side has placed its entire reliance in 
attempts to ravage and destroy all the military and naval power of 
the other, that could be reached by the guns of a fleet or b}' the opera- 
tions of a land force, debarked from, and co-operating with a fleet. 

All maritime expeditions prior to this war have been either vehicles 
of invasions of magnitude, directed against the capital of the State 
attacked, or they have had in view the conquest of some province or 
colony, or the capture of some valuable stronghold, or the ruin or 
possession of important naval establishments ; in all these cases there 
is this distinctive essential to be remarked, which is, that they were 
regarded as either designed to gain a certain definite advantage which 
was to be attained for itself, without regard to its bearing on the main 
results of the quarrel, or otherwise were of so serious a nature that the 
fate of the contest turned inevitably on the issue of one invasion. 

The only exception to this is to be found in the American war of 
181 2-' 14 when was organized the policy which is lately proved to be 
the safest and most effective that can be selected, and which indeed 
was at that time practiced with terrible effect. 

It may be thought that the war referred to, and its incidents, form a 
sufiicient precedent to refer to in an American memoir ; but if I limited 
myself to it I would be obliged to discuss at length some arguments 
that might be brought against my conclusions. 

It would probably be asserted that the events of 1814 have already 
received due consideration at the hands of officers fully competent to 
produce a suitable plan for the defence of the country ; or that it is 
unlikely that in the present enlightened age we should be subjected to 
a magnified repetition of the barbarous scenes of that war ; which ob- 
jections I am in no need of meeting, by taking the more enlarged 
scope of argument which I adopt. 

It may be objected also, that we constituted, in 1812, a second rate 
power, and that any arguments drawn from the harassing mode of 
warfare then pursued towards us, and from its distressing effects on 
the country, might be answered by this objection : that we are now 
grown to be one of the foremost nations of the earth, and that we are 

« The main historical facts which support this view of the case are, the landing at Gallipoli, 
the construction of entrenchments there, and delay of the allies at this point while the 
Eussians were advancing to the Danube, likewise the protracted stay at Varna, during the 
period that the Turks were so hard pushed to maintain themselves on tlie line of the Danube, 
and in Silistria. 

These delays were considered inexplicable at the time, and seem so still, unless we adopt 
the hypothesis that the allies were at first in hopes of meeting, on Turkish soil, the entire 
strength of Russia, and that on finding that Nicholas was disposed to preserve a defensive 
attitude, they counted, at least, on being firmly opposed at the frontier by an army, the 
beatmg of which would be a serious blow to the empire; this expectation was also deceived 
by the tactics of the Russians, who plainly intended to retire before the allies, and not 
gratify their hopes of delivering a decisive pitched battle. 

Tlie vexation and disappointment of Marshal St. Amaud were excessive on hearing that 
the siege of Silistria was raised, and that the enemy was retrograding towards the Pruth. 

It seems to be at this period that the expedition against Sevastopol was planned, as a 
means of occupying the army, and as the most important part of the project of ruining the 
ports, harbors, military depots, and navy of Russia. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 7 

beyond the reach of injury from the predatory and destructive system 
which once did us so much damage. But the system which Great 
Britain initiated in 1812 has heen found eflfective, thanks to the power 
of her steam navy, even against the colossal empire of Russia, and 
hence we may reasonably expect that, in a similar conjuncture of cir- 
cumstances, it will be adopted without hesitation or delay by either of 
the Allied Powers with which in future the United States may be en- 
gaged. 

This supposition is reduced to a certainty by the nature of the addi- 
tions which are being made to the navies of the former States : the 
despatch gun-boats, the bomb vessels, the iron floating batteries, and 
the immense screw steamers, with capacity to transport thousands of 
troops, all indicate that the policy of 1814 and 1854 is now become a 
fixed idea with the governments of France and England, to be adopted 
whenever the occasion serves. 

We shall furnish the occasion or grounds of quarrel the moment 
that we indicate a design to acquire Cuba, or to extend our support to 
Mexico or the Central American States ; then it will be said that, like 
Russia, we are growing too grasping and formidable, and must be 
checked and reduced again to a level that shall not endanger the 
balance of power. 

But if our seaports are destined to receive the heaviest shocks from 
the armaments which were irresistible at Sevastopol and Bomarsund, 
at least we shall have the satisfaction of acting on the offensive in 
other quarters. 

Our policy would doubtless be to invade Canada, for the third time, 
if England were our enemy, and Cuba, at any rate, besides ; for we 
are irresistibly drawn to the occupation of that island in time of war 
with any maritime power by all possible military reasons ; and such 
a course would be sufficiently justified by necessity, as, indeed^ have 
been the precedents of the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, of Malta in 
1798, and that of the Danish fieet in 1807. 

But if we are to follow this programme, which is surely more con- 
genial to Americans than a passive resistance, however obstinate, and 
if our regular army and disciplined and enlisted volunteers are to be 
employed in aggressive campaigns, then it becomes absolutely neces- 
sary to organize a seacoast defence, by means of fortifications and 
militia, that will prevent the necessity of recalling our active armies 
from the frontier to resist a naval expedition. 

The small size, numerically, of an army, will, in our next war, as 
in the last, occasion us to resort to privateering', except where our 
ships or squadrons meet with single vessels or fleets of not dispropor- 
tionate size. We cannot, then, look to the navy for protection to our 
seacoast cities ; and^ indeed, if it were twenty times as large, it would 
be insufficient to guard so many points at once ; or even if that were 
possible, the task should not be assigned to the navy — it should rather 
be occupied in convoying transports with troops and ammunition to 
Cuba, or in fighting the enemy's ships and destroying his commerce 
in distant seas. 

It cannot be for a moment supposed that we might rely on the 
generosity or humanity of the enemy to spare our cities from bombard- 



8 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

ment. The events of 1812-14 show that it is upon our own resources 
for defence that we must depend for security. The burning of the 
Capitol, the marauding expeditions of Admiral Cockburn in the Dela- 
ware and Chesapeake, and the expedition of Packenham against New 
Orleans^ where '■'■booty and beauty" was the watchword, as well as 
their Indian allies, with the massacres and scalpings which took place 
after the defeat of Winchester's army in January, 1813, show what is 
the nature of British warfare. 

The following brief account of the atrocities committed along our sea coast during the 
war of 1812-14 can be confiimed by many of our citizens, as well as by reference to the 
histories of the war, of Thomas, Breckenridge, Ingersoll, and others. 

In February, 1831, Admiral Cockburn appeared in the Chesapeake, which he laid under 
blockade, and then commenced a series of attacks against farm houses, gentlemen's seats, 
&c. These were robbed, the cattle carried off, killed or maimed, and the slaves armed 
against their masters, or sent off to the West Indies. 

The first town attacked was Frenchtown, which was plundered by a detachment of 500 
marines, who burnt some houses and vessels at the wharf. 

In May, Havre de Grace, Fredericktown, and Georgetown, were visited similarly, and 
after being thoroughly plundered were partially burnt. During this month reinforcements 
brought up the strength of the fleet to 7 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, and some smaller ves- 
sels. On the 18th, the repulse of Craiiy island took place, and some circumstances were made 
the ground of excuse for the barbarous two days sacking of Hampton on the 25th. On this 
occasion murder and rape were added to the barbarities practiced at other points. 

In July, Cock])urn, proceeding to North Carolina, treated Ocracoke and Portsmouth as 
lie had the other towns 

In 1814 the downfall of Napoleon enabled Great Britain to turn 
more land forces against us, and her minister threatened to " chastise 
%s ivell arid to cripple the United States for Ji/ty year's to come." 

This year, at the north, New York, New London, and Boston were 
blockaded, and Saybrook, Wareham, and Scituate, attacked. At each 
of these places houses, factories, and shipping were burnt. The re- 
pulse at Stonington saved that town from the execution of the British 
commander's threat of " reducing it to ashes." 

In June, operations were resumed in the Chesapeake by the pil- 
laging of Benedict, Marlboro', Kinsale, and Tocomoco. 

In August, the British received reinforcements, and, landing at 
Benedict, marched upon Washington, gaining on the road the battle of 
Bladeusburg, (the details of this expedition are given at length in the 
chapter on Maritime Expeditions.) Having gained possession of our 
National Capital, these modern Vandals burnt the Senate House, the 
Kepresentative Hall, the Supreme Court room, the President's House, 
and, in a word, all the public buildings except the Patent Office, as 
well as some private ones. 

This expedition likewise pillaged Alexandria, where the city was 
forced to deliver at the wharves all the merchandise in the storehouses 
and all the vessels in the vicinity. 

Far from the atrocities of these campaigns being universally repro- 
bated and disavowed in England, the spirit of the British seems to 
have warmed with approbation towards the commanders who executed 
them. 

In an account of the expedition against Baltimore, written shortly 
after the war, by a British officer, the reason for the admiral's not 
persevering in the attempt against the city is stated to be, that, from 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. \i 

the distance, and want of conveyances, the hootij of the place could 
not be removed to the ships. 

As the tone and arguments of the history in question were no doubt 
congenial to the temper of the British at the time it was published, 
and as I cannot express them as forcibly as I find them, I beg leave 
to insert the greater part of the author's conclusion. Comment upon 
it is unnecessary. 

The recommendations of the author as to the policy to be pursued 
in a future war with America, are, in a word, to re-establish the sys- 
tem of 1814 on an immense scale. 

" We have long been habituated to despise the Americans as an 
enemy unworthy of serious regard. * * * * Instead of 1,500, 
had 10,000 sailed from the Garonne under General Ross how differ- 
ently might he have acted !" 

"There would have been then no necessity for are-embarkation 
after the capture of Washington, and, consequently, no time given 
for the defence of Baltimore, but marching across the country he 
might have done to the one city what he did to the other. And it is 
thus only that a war with America can be successfully carried on. 
* * * America must be assaulted only on her coasts. Her harbors 
destroyed, her shipping burned, and her seaport towns laid waste, 
are the only evils she has reason to dread. ***** 

" To the plan proposed, of making desert the whole line of coast, 
it may be objected that by so doing we should distress individuals 
and not the government. But they who offer this objection forget 
the nature, both of the people whose cause they plead, and of the 
government under which they live. 

" In a democratical government the voice of the people must at all 
times prevail. The members of the House of Representatives are the 
very persons who, from such proceedings, would suffer most severely, 
and we all know how far private suffering goes to influence a man's 
public opinions. ******* 

" By compelling the constituents to experience the real hardships 
and miseries of warfare, you will compel the representatives to a vote 
of peace. * * * Burn their houses, plunder their property, block 
up their harbors, and destroy their shipping in a few places, and 
before you have time to proceed to the rest you will be stopped by 
entreaties for peace." 

These expeditions, it will be remembered, took place when England 
was engaged in a mortal struggle in another hemisphere, and, con- 
sequently, at a time when her power was not commensurate with her 
malice ; for this, and for another reason, we may look for still more 
convincing proofs of my presages of evil in our next war. 

The maritime and military resources of England and France have 
developed wonderfully since 1815. Large fleets of screw steamships, 
of great tonnage and tremendous armaments ; flotillas of shot proof 
floating batteries, and transport vessels in any quantity, replace the 
sailing fleets of the last war. 

The eastern war of 1 854-' 5 6 astonished the world by the display 
of a colossal maritime power which surprised even the people of the 
two nations which had been accumulating it without becoming con- 



10 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

scious of its true extent ; and, by the way, it is certain that their pre- 
sent confidence of power is a strong incentive to the exercise of it. 

In a former paper, on a kindred subject, I have given tabular state- 
ments of the naval and military forces displayed by the allies in the 
war referred to. Here, it is more to my purpose to give a compara- 
tive view of the strength of the expeditions simultaneously engaged 
in during that contest, and the distance from home at which they 
operated, and the same information with regard to the most celebrated 
expeditions of former times. 



CHAPTER II, 



ON MAKITIME EXPEDITIONS. 



Before a person can consider himself competent to form an opinion 
on a weighty military question, especially when probabilities and con- 
tingencies are involved, and if he is not enlightened by some personal 
experience relating to the matter, he must at least acquaint himself 
with all the precedents which history offers. In this way he will 
guard against running into extremes, and also will naturally be led 
to discuss the case in a plain and anti-theoretical manner. 

For example : a man who has been at the pains of studying those 
parts of history which relate to invasions that have taken place across 
seas, will not believe that telegraphs and railroads protect this coun- 
try from insult better than entrenchments or forts ; neither will he 
be inclined to trust our defence altogether to gunboats, or iron floating 
batteries ; nor will he fully acquiesce in the more orthodox opinion, 
that the stone castles which dot our coast, completely provide for our 
safety. 

It does not require, indeed, any great research for a person who has 
noticed the events of the last ten years, to form some notion of the 
formidable nature of the naval expeditions that foreign powers can set 
on foot at the present day ; but it is necessary to estimate these also as 
compared with those of the last century, and still earlier times ; this 
comparative power should be considered, in order that the means of 
resistance may be proportioned accordingly. 

Ten years ago we ourselves fitted out a maritime expedition that 
was almost unexampled for the brilliancy and completeness of its^ 
operations ; and the expeditions of the British and French to China, 
the Crimea, and the Baltic, are still fresh in every one's recollec- 
tion. 

But Americans are slow to reflect on the probabilities of similar 
armaments being turned against their own country ; and constantly 
dismiss the suggestion that such a contingency may arise, with the 
argument that we beat the British at New Orleans, and that we are 
better able to receive them now than in 1814. | 

This blindness with regard to the actual situation of the country is 
attributable to the fact that we do not realize and appreciate the 
aggressive power that the steamship fleets of England and France 
possess. 

It would seem that with nations, as with individuals, wisdom must 
be bought at the price of experience ; for, with the example of Rus- 
sia before us, we remain apathetic in the matter of our coast defences. 

Russia had, perhaps, a right to suppose Sevastopol too remote to 
need fortifications on the landward side of its port ; but it would be 
inexcusable heedlessness in us to fail to profit by the lesson that 
Nicholas received. 



12 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

Notwithstanding the clearness of the case, however, it seems that 
there needs some foil or contrast, to set off vividly representations 
of it, which, alone, would fail of receiving an attentive and reflective 
examination. 

In a word, I can think of no better way of enabling the reader to 
judge of the magnitude, concentrated strength, and celerity of the 
present style of naval military warfare, than by presenting him with 
a condensed summary of the most celebrated maritime expeditions ; 
since by reflecting on the means of national aggression developed 
in these, and on the causes which influenced their success, and by 
considering afterwards the mutations which these causes have under- 
gone, especially within the present century, we will naturally come 
to conclusions that will be better founded and more certain than could 
result from inferences, however logical, drawn merely from the events 
that have passed within our own knowledge. 

I need not say that officerg of personal experience, and whose judg- 
ment has been formed in the field, may dispense with the aid which 
is offered by the following historical sketch, but I hope that the latter 
will be found interesting at least, by this class of readers. It will be 
seen that I have excluded from this sketch the expeditions of Mahome- 
dan nations ; these, though formidable and successful in many in- 
stances, such as the expeditions against Candia and Malta, have not 
been chronicled with much exactness as to numbers; and besides, 
there are perhaps more than enough to serve my purpose without 
them. As to the expeditions of ancient history, it would be pedantic 
to refer to them in this treatise. 

It will be found, upon inquiring into the impediments and causes 
of failure of maritime expeditions, that they may be reduced to 
three heads : 

Ist. The effect of winds- and weather on sailing fleets. 

2d. The attacks of the fleets by those of the enemy. 

3d. The fatal epidemic diseases of certain climates. 

As to the first cause, it has always been the main difficulty of 
maritime expeditions ; and the chances of ill consequences from it 
have been more numerous in proportion to the distance from home at 
which the descent was to take place. From the time the transports 
weigh anchor at their point of departure till the conclusion of the 
expedition, we find the winds bafliing all the calculations of the com- 
mander-in-chief. 

To guard against the contingencies consequent on the weather, and 
the inequality in the rates of sailing of the difierent ships of the 
flotilla, it has been usual to appoint a rendezvous, at which the latter 
are all to assemble, within a day or two days' sail of the point of land- 
ing. This measure of precaution, though indispensable, has not in 
€very case been successfully carried out. For example: Hoche's ex- 
pedition, the Invincible Armada, and the projected Boulogne expedi- 
tion, were all ruined by storms, which either wrecked or dispersed 
the fleets, and prevented any attempt at debarkation. 

Where the objective point has been far distant, the provisioning of 
the troops, in view of possible detention from adverse winds, has been 
a serious difficulty. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 13 

In cases where the rendezvous has been effected according to the 
intention, sailing vessels have sometimes been prevented from ven- 
turing to lie oif the beach selected for debarkation by the danger of 
being wrecked upon it, in the event of certain winds springing up, 
and making it a lee-shore. Sometimes the debarkation has been in- 
terrupted or suspended, after having commenced, from this cause. 
The length of time which must elapse between the departure of a. 
fleet of sailing vessels and their arrival off of their destination is 
necessarily considerable, because the entire convoy must wait upon the 
slowest vessel in it, and the voyage is thus rendered much longer than 
the average time. This detention will of course give the enemy so 
much additional time to prepare for the defence of the point menaced, 
and will^ besides, increase the probabilities of meeting with bad 
weather. 

The uncertainty of the weather has sometimes acted to prevent 
combinations, at a given time and place, of fleets which happened to 
be in distant parts, and which might be wanted to act in concert at a 
fixed time. In a word, the winds and weather, by their uncertainty, 
variableness, and violence, have always, previous to the invention of 
steam, been the grand cause of delay, disaster, and sometimes of fail- 
ure to maritime expeditions ; they have, also, indirectly confined 
within a certain rather low limit the strength of these expeditions, 
since the difiiculties springing from them increase in a rapid ratio 
with the number of sailing vessels required. 

But a consideration even of the few facts presented in the sketches 
of the Crimean and Bomarsund expeditions, will show that future 
undertakings of this nature will enjoy an immunity almost complete 
from difficulties and dangers arising from the winds and waves. 

The immense size* which is now given to steamships will render 
the number of vessels necessary to carry an army very small, so that 
a rendezvous can be more readily arranged. 

The enormous vessels that will hereafter be used, will also be per- 
fectly safe from all the perils of the seas, and their power and speed 
will render them independent of wind and weather. 



*The "Himalaya" steamship, which was used to carry troops to the Crimea, appears to 
have answered the purpose admirably, both as to speed and stowage of a great number of 
men ; and the success of this trial, with the demonstration furnished by the building of the 
" Great Eastern," that the same can be done on a still grander scale, will probably result in 
the construction of a few monster ships by the British and Freuch, for purposes of distant 
warfare ; indeed, the latter vessel, which can carry 10,000 troops with all their baggage, is to 
be purchased by Napoleon, for military purposes. 

The British Parliament is now considering the proposition of a Liverpool ship-builder, to 
build six " Mastodonian steamships," to be used for the transportation of troops to distant 
possessions. Each of these is to be 30,000 tons burthen, and capable of steaming 500 miles a 
day ; they are to be wind-proof, water-proof, and fire-proof, thereby making the perils of the 
seas a moral impossibility. 

The "Napoleon" (French) war steamship is a full-rigged ship with a screw-propeller. 
Her engine is 900 horse-power, and under steam alone her speed is 13i knots per hour. 

The Napoleon was found capable of towing three ships at once, one of them a three-decker, 
at the rate of over five knots. 

The " Great Eastern " steamship is capable of conveying 10,000 troops a distance as far 
from England to India, at the same time carrying 18,000 tons of coal and cargo. 



CHAPTER III. 

SYNOPTICAL ACCOUNT OF MILITARY DESCENTS SINCE 1400 A. D. 

Edward III. besieged Calais with 40,000 men, whom he conveyed 
in 800 vessels of all sizes. 

(1414 to 1417.) Henry V. entered France with an army of 30,000 
men, which were carried over in 1,500 boats and vessels, large and 
small. 

Charles V. took Tunis with 30,000 men and a fleet of 500 vessels. 

(15*78.) Sebastian of Portugal entered on his expedition to Morocco 
with 20,000 men. 

The Invincible Armada of Philip II. of Spain, numbered 337 ships, 
and carried 11,000 sailors and 20,000 soldiers, with 2,630 brass guns; 
it is well known that a violent storm wrecked half the ships and 
caused to perish 13,000 men of this expedition. 

(1630.) Gustavus Adolphus entered Germany with 15,000 or 18,000 
men, conveyed thither by a fleet manned by 9,000 sailors. 

(1660.) Louis XIV. sent an expedition against Ireland which num- 
bered 73 ships-of-war, 29,000 sailors, 5,800 cannon, and 6,000 troops: 
(this fleet was beaten at the Hogue.) 

In 1700 Charles XII. conceived and executed the descent upon Co- 
penhagen, as a diversion which should save the Duchy of Holstein, 
belonging to his brother-in-law, and invaded by the King of Denmark. 
He had 20,000 soldiers, in transports, and a fleet which kept at a 
distance that of the enemy. 

Charles' fleet anchored ofi" Humblebeck, three leagues from Copen- 
hagen, and found the Danish army, with cavalry and artillery, drawn 
up, behind entrenchments, to contest the landing of the troops. The 
Swedes, however, entered their boats, carrying with them to the shore 
a great quantity of chevaux-de-frise, and other military implements 
in flat-bottomed boats, which had been brought for that purpose. 

In this order the army approached the beach, the king himself 
leading the division of 500 grenadiers which formed the advance ; on 
nearing land and getting within wading depth, the whole army, at 
the example of Charles, threw themselves into the water, and charged 
the enemy under a violent fire of musketry and artillery ; the Danes 
were driven from their works with precipitation, and Charles, who 
received next day a reinforcement of 12^000 men, advancing towards 
the city^ made preparations to bombard it. 

The Danish king, to save his capital, consented to evacuate Hol- 
stein and to pay a ransom of 400,000 rix-doUars ; thus this entire 
campaign, which was completely successful, terminated in six weeks. 

In 1747 a British expedition was sent to capture the French fortress 
of Pondicherry ; it was commanded by Boscawen, and consisted of one 
ship of 74 guns, six of 60 and 64, five of 50, and five carrying from 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 15 

14 to 40. After 31 days of open trenches, the besiegers were forced 
to abandon the enterprise. 

In 1757 Lally's expedition sailed from Brest, to the East Indies, 
for the purpose of taking Fort St. David ; this fleet, which carried 
1,100 troops, was reinforced at Mauritius by 11 sail, and on arriving 
at Pondicherry, by 1,000 European troops and a corps of Sepoys, 
bringing up the total force to 5,000 men, a half of whom were Euro- 
peans. This expedition was entirely successful, Fort St. David being 
taken and razed. 

In 1775 Charles II. of Spain, sent an expedition to Algiers, com- 
manded by Gen. O'Reilly and Admiral Castejon. The land forces 
numbered 19,200 picked troops, and were carried in 340 transports, 
protected by 44 ships of war, manned by 3,300 of the best sailors ; 
the artillery numbered 100 large cannons, and 4,000 mules were taken 
along for its use, and that of the army generally. 

This expedition landed (July 18) on the beach in the Bay of Algiers, 
in view of 80,000 Turks, of whom two-thirds were cavalry. In the 
battle which followed, the Spaniards were forced to retreat to their 
ships, which they did under cover of a slightly built tete-de-pont. 

In 1796 Hoche's expedition to Ireland left Brest. It numbered 
16,000 men, or, according to some accounts, 25,000. The difference 
is probably the force belonging to the Dutch fleet which was to have 
sailed from Antwerp and joined Hoche. This junction did not, how- 
ever, take place. 

The expedition was composed of — 

15 ships-of-the-line, with 600 troops aboard of each; 

12 frigates and 6 corvettes, with 250 troops in each; 

A razee, with 400 troops; 

6 large vessels, with 2,250 troops; 

And a couple of ships for carrying powder and ammunition. 

The fleet eluded the British blockading fleet in a fog, and sailed for 
Ban try bay on the 16th of December. The same day a violent storm 
dispersed the vessels, and wrecked three of them. The expedition, 
however, reassembled off Cape Clear, and on the 24th had arrived at 
its destination, when another tempest forced it to leave the vicinity of 
the land. This storm was followed by others, and the expedition 
finally returned, disheartened, on the 1st of January, 1797. 

1798. Bonaparte left Toulon with 13 ships-of-the-line, 90 other 
ships-of-war, and more than 300 transports, and with 23,000 soldiers. 
A part of this expedition stopped at Malta, and took that | lace, 
(though defended by 7,000 men,) and then proceeded to join the main 
body, which had arrived at Aboukir. The signal victories this expe- 
dition gained over the Turks, prove that it would have been, but for 
the British counter-expedition, an example of a perfectly successful 
one. 

In 1799 the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland took place. It 
numbered 40,000 men, and was intended to menace the French on the 
Meuse and Rhine, and cause a rebellion in Belgium ; and, also, it was 
intended to capture the Batavian fleet of nine ships-of-the-line and 
some frigates. The latter part of the enterprise succeeded, but for the 



16 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

rest nothing was accomplished, except the driving of the French from 
their positions, and the occupying of a small tract of country. 

In October, 1800, Admiral Keith appeared off Cadiz with a large 
fleet, and with numerous land forces. At that time the city was a 
prey to a violent yellow fever, and its governor appealed to the 
humanity of the Admiral to spare it an aggravation of its misfor- 
tunes. Keith replied by requiring the surrender of all the ships of 
war in the harbor, and was about to enforce his demand by a debarka- 
tion, when he was checked by orders from home, which were the re- 
sult of fears for the health of the troops. This expedition afterwards 
formed part of the one next mentioned. 

In 1801 Abercrombie's expedition to Egypt occurred. The lan^ 
forces consisted at first of from 17,000 to 20,000 men ; the fleet, under 
Admiral Keith, was composed of 4 ships of 80 guns, 3 shij)s of 74 
guns, 5 frigates, 12 brigs, 40 other ships of war, and a flotilla of gun- 
boats. The landing was efiected on a sand beach, by means of 100 
flat-bottomed boats, each of which carried 50 soldiers, besides the 
oarsmen. It was successfully executed, though opposed by 2,000 
Frenchmen, with some artillery. The fire of some of the smaller 
vessels of the fleet protected the operation. 

In this landing 3,500 men gained the beach at once, and drove off 
the French, with a loss of 8 guns. Within two weeks Abercrombie 
gained the decisive battle of Alexandria. As he was joined shortly 
after by 16,000 more troops, from the East Indies and England, this 
expedition should be rated at 36,000 men. 

In 1807 the British were at war with Napoleon. Both these nations 
were, at the same time, in a state of profound peace with Denmark — 
a state which possessed, as its only safeguard, boast, and power, a 
fleet of 18 ships- of- the-line, 15 frigates, and 25 gun-boats ; besides 
these and their armaments, and their efficient crews, it possessed im- 
mense naval stores of all descriptions. To prevent this fleet coming 
into the hands of Napoleon, by treaty or otherwise, the British fitted 
out a secret expedition, which announced itself and the declaration of 
war at the same time. It was composed of 26,000 troops, in an im- 
mense number of transports, and protected by a fleet which embraced 
21 ships-of-the-line. Appearing before Copenhagen, Lord Cathcart 
summoned the Danish Prince to place the fleet of Denmark in the 
hands of the British ; and on receiving a refusal to this outrageous 
demand, landed his troops between Kronenburg and Copenhagen, 
drove in the Danish outposts, and planted his heavy ordnance. After 
ineffectually summoning the city to surrender, Lord Cathcart ordered 
it to be bombarded, and from the morning of the 3d to the evening of 
the 5th it was subjected to an incessant storm of shot and shells from 
60 mortars and howitzers and 52 twenty-four-pounders. In this bar- 
barous and unequal warfare some two thousand of the inhabitants, of 
all classes, were killed and wounded, and between six hundred and 
seven hundred houses were burnt, when, finally, the Crown Prince 
consented to yield to all the British demands, and so saved the city 
from being laid in ashes. 

In 1808 Sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition to Portugal took place. 
The mouth of the Mondego river was selected for the landing, because 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 17 

the French would not be apt to contest it. Between the Ist and the 
5th of August, 12,300 men, with all their baggage, artillery^ and 
materiel, were landed. On the l*7th, marching toward Lisbon, they 
defeated 14,000 French under Laborde, and on the 19th another brigade 
was landed at the Bay of Maceira, an open sandy beach, and joined 
Wellesley. And during the last week in August, Sir John Moore's 
division landed, also at the Bay of Maceira, (while a furious surf was 
beating the shore.) All these troops brought the British force up to 
25,000 effective men. 

A few remarks are here called for by the importance of this suc- 
cessful descent, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, and the 
risks that were run by Wellesley, in calculating so securely on gain- 
ing the battle which must decide the fate of his army. Napier says, 
that the coast of Portugal, from the Minho to the Tagus, presents, 
with few exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore ; all the harbors 
which are presented by the rivers have bars which render access dif- 
ficult, in most cases, even to boats. 

With the slightest breeze from the sea, a terrible surf breaks along 
the whole line of coast, and forbids all approach ; and when the south 
wind, which commonly prevails from August to the winter months, 
blows, a more dangerous shore cannot be found in any part of the 
world. 

But, as rivers and mountains, and even the Alps themselves, have 
proved ineffectual barriers to great captains, so in this case, Welling- 
ton contemplated these dangers only with the resolve to overcome 
them. 

A timid or cautious general would have been deterred by consider- 
ing that a sea breeze might spring up during the debarkation that 
would leave half his force on land, while the rest was carried off in 
the vessels, which must gain the open sea or be wrecked on the lee 
shore ; or he would picture to himself the army landed, and separated 
suddenly from its provisions and artillery by a storm which might 
drive off the transports before they could be unloaded. In either case, 
he would expect the ruin of the expedition from an attack upon the 
force landed by the main body of the enemy. 

Or, even if the landing were an entire success, the army would 
have a very uncertain retreat, or base of operations ; and, if worsted 
by the French, its entire loss might be the consequence of the con- 
juncture of that event with stormy weather ; for a gale from any 
quarter from south to northwest would have driven away the fleet. 
To gain a permanent base the British leader had to count on forcing 
the position of Torres Vedras, and capturing the forts on the Tagus ; 
thus opening the latter harbor to his vessels. 

The result, however, demonstrated the wisdom of a bold course ; 
for the weather was tolerably propitious, (though Sir John Moore's 
division wrecked nearly all its boats in reaching land,) and the French 
preferred to fight an offensive battle to receiving the attack, as was 
their best policy. 

The convention of Cintra, by which Junot agreed to evacuate Por- 
tugal, was the speedy result of the descent just described ; and cer- 

2 



18 DAJ^GERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

tainly the magnitude of the gain warranted the risks of the under- 
taking. 

In 1808, the English expedition against Antwerp and Flushing 
comprised 35 shi})s of the line, 23 frigates, and other ships-of-war, 
making a total of 155 ships and 80 gun-hoats, manned by more than 
30,000 sailors, and carrying 42,000 troops, with 160 pieces of heavy 
land ordnance, besides the ships' complement of guns. 

In the words of Napier, "above 40,000 of the finest of Britain's 
soldiers, a fleet of power to overthrow all the navies of the world com- 
bined ; marine and land forces together, more than 80,000 fighting 
men." 

That this expedition, after promptly reducing Flushing and Fort 
Bartz, was allowed to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, was not 
the result of military circumstances, but of the incapacity of its com- 
mander. 

The army of invasion organized by Napoleon at Boulogne numbered 
160,000 veteran soldiers ; it was to cross in 3,000 gunboats which 
were built expressly for the purpose, and wliich were to be protected 
from the British cruisers by 60 ships of the line ; the latter were to 
rendezvous at Boulogne after deceiving and leading ofi" the enemy's 
fleet by a feigned expedition into other quarters. 

Everything was as perfectly planned as possible, the troops were 
thoroughly drilled in embarking and disembarking with their arms, 
baggage, and artillery, and all that was necessary seemed to be the 
two days required for the crossing, when a conjuncture of unfortunate 
accidents prevented the occurrence of an event that would have been 
famous to the end of the world. 

1816. Lord Exmouth's expedition to Algiers, in 1816, is pretty well 
known, and I will limit myself to giving the more important sta- 
tistics of it. 

The fleet consisted of 1 

1 

3 

1 

2 

2 

3 

4 bomb-ketches and 10 small ves- 
sels of 2 guns each, making a total of about 450 guns, with mor- 
tars in addition* ; this force was joined at Gibraltar by the Dutch fleet 
of five ships of 36 and one of 24 guns, under Admiral Capellam, 
raising the number of guns to 652, (some writers have given it as 
"about a thousand.") 

Sailing into the Bay of Algiers, this formidable fleet came to anchor 
opposite the fortifications, and poured upon them an incessant fire ; 
no less than 50,000 solid shot, or more than 500 tons of metal, and 
960 ten and thirteen inch shells, together with rockets, were showered 
upon the works and city within about six or eight hours. 

The fortifications were ruined and the city nearly destroyed, while 

* Blofeld's Algeria. 



i\0 


f 108 guns^ 




104 " 




74 " 




50 " 




40 " 




36 " 




16 " 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 19 

the loss of life, both in the Algerine troops and the inhabitants of the 
place, was enormous. 

The entire Algerine fleet was, in addition, burnt or sunk at its 
moorings in the harbor. 

1830. After a year's blockade of Algiers, the French finally resolved 
to take the city, and on the 25th of May, 1830, an expedition sailed 
against it from Toulon ; it tarried some time at the bay of Palma in 
Majorca, but finally arrived in the bay of Torre Chica on the 14th of 
June. 

The number of land forces amounted to 30,000 men, all of whom 
were landed between 4 and 12 o'clock. 

The landing was protected by the fire of two steamers, which aided 
in repulsing the attacks of the Turkish cavalry, but the French sufi'ered 
some loss from the fire of certain batteries which were served for several 
hours against them. 

Three days after the landing, the French were attacked by 40 or 
50,000 Turks, but repulsed them with loss, as they did also on the 
24th and 25th. 

The French then advanced on Algiers, and after a short seige, took 
the place. It contained 1500 brass guns, and money to the amount 
of $10,150,000, and in its port were 12 vessels of war. 

1854. I shall enter more into detail concerning the allied expedition 
to the Crimea than any former one, for the reason that it presents 
what I believe to be a presage of the events which will follow the next 
declaration of war which may be exchanged between this country and 
England or France. 

Nations are hardly more apt than individuals to profit by any ex- 
perience but their own ; but experience of this kind is so dearly 
bought, that it is worth considering whether a portion of the price 
might not be advantageously invested as an insurance against the 
payment of the whole. 

In August, 1854, the allied generals resolved upon the expedition 
to the Crimea ; the army had been concentrated at Varna since May, 
and tired of inaction, made its preparations with great rapidity. 

The French constructed barges for the disembarkation of their ar- 
tillery ; each one would carry two pieces complete, with 12 horses and 
18 gunners, and drivers. They were to be towed by towboats, and 
the arrangements were such that in 15 minutes from touching the 
shore the guns might open fire. 

The English provided for the same purpose, platforms which were 
to rest upon two boats which were to be lashed together. 

On the 1st of September, the troops embarked and sailed for the 
first rendezvous, which was the island of Baltchik : at this place 
there were assembled 250 vessels of all kinds, having on board 60,000 
soldiers in addition to the sailors and marines. 

On the 5th the French sailing vessels left Baltchik, and on the 7th 
the steamships and the British fleet ; the general rendezvous was the 
Isle of Serpents, Three fast steamships were sent in advance to re- 
connoitre the coast and select a landing place. 

On the 11th the British fleet was assembled twenty miles to the 
north of Cape Tarkeen, and the French fleet opposite the cape, ten 



20 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

leagues off shore ; the next day the reconnoitering vessels returned, 
and their report caused the point called "Old Fort," near Eupatoria, 
and only a few miles from the present position of the fleets, to be 
chosen for the landing. 

The shore at that place presented a low strip of beach, which is 
separated from the shore by three sheets of water of say a mile in 
length by half a mile in width, and which is joined to the main land 
by two natural causeways between these sheets of water. 

Behind these rose a plateau, which was, however, easily accessible 
at the distance of a couple of miles from the landing place. 

On the 12th the fleets and convoys, which covered a space of seven 
leagues, sailed for Old Fort; but a squall occurring during the night, 
the fleets anchored in the bay of Eupatoria, and waited there for the 
steamers to tow up the convoys. 

The 13th was consumed in bringing in the convoys, and the land- 
ing took place next day. 

The movement of the vessels commenced at 2^ a. m., and by 7^ 
a. m. they were anchored in their respective positions. 

The French ships were drawn up in three lines, each a mile long, 
in the bay below Old Fort, and the British ones in the next bay, 
nearer to Eupatoria, farther in or off, according to the draught of the 
vessels. 

Each of the three French divisions was in a single line of ships, 
and their boats were distinguished by different colored flags ; on the 
arrival of the first boats, the ground to be occupied by each division 
was marked by its flags. 

No Russian troops appeared to contest the landing ; but as a pre- 
caution, the boats of the 3-deckers were sent ashore first, filled with 
troops, and provided with Congreve rockets ; five vessels were also 
moored close to the shore, with their broadsides bearing on the beach, 
and enfilading the road by which the enemy's artillery must approach 
to annoy the troops. 

At 8.30 a. m. the French commander gave the signal for debarka- 
tion, and the British one followed in about a half an hour ; it would 
appear that the latter did not arrive in any designated order, but their 
landing was quite as rapidly effected as the French. 

With regard to the latter, the entire first division was set ashore in 
one trip of the boats ; making a force of 9,0*70 men, 9 guns, and the 
borses of the general officers, and with provisions for four days, which 
was transferred from the ships to the beach in fifty minutes. 

By noon all the French infantry had landed, and 40 pieces of artil- 
lery, and by nightfall the entire debarkation had been effected, all but 
part of the horses and artillery. The landing of the latter was inter- 
rupted at dark by a storm of rain, which put a stop to the operation. 
On this day the 4th French division and a detachment of British 
troops, that had on the previous day been making a feint or diversion 
at Katcha, returned ; they had been conveyed in steam-frigates. 

On the 15th these troops were all landed, as well as the horses and 

artillery, in spite of a severe surf which beat upon the beach. As an 

nstance of its violence, the boat which carried General Forey and his 



BANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 2 1 

staff was capsized in the breakers, and the officers saved themselves 
only by swimming. 

The force thus thrown, in a little more than a single day, upon an 
exposed beach^ and one which was likely to be defended by a powerful 
Russian army, consisted of over 60,000 men and 137 cannon. 

The official accounts state the numbers as follows, viz : 

English of all arms 27,600 men and 65 guns. 

French of all arms 27,800 men and 72 guns. 

Turks of all arms 6,000 men. 

Total 61,400 men and 137 guns. 

After one day — the 16th — spent on the beach, the French army was 
ready to march upon Sevastopol ; but, to the great chagrin of St. 
Arnaud, was compelled to tarry for the British, who were so much 
encumbered with baggage that they did not complete their prepara- 
tions before the 18th. 

On the 19th the allies took up the line of march, and on the 20th, 
or on the sixth day from that which saw their fleet cast anchor off the 
Russian coast, they attacked the enemy, under Menschikoff, and forced 
them from the redoubtable position of the Alma. 

As I shall refer to this battle in my remarks on descents, it is worth 
while to give the statistics of it, as furnished by the French, English, 
and Russian official accounts. 

The Russians were encamjied on a position which crossed the great 
road about 2^ miles from the sea ; their front was two miles in extent 
and protected by the river Alma, which, though generally fordable, 
had steep banks ; the troops were posted on the slopes of the hills in 
rear of the river ; and on the summits, which varied in altitude from 
350 to 400 feet, was their reserve. A heavy covered battery flanked 
the whole of the right of the position, and artillery was also posted 
so as to command the passages of the river and the approaches gen- 
erally. A trench some hundred yards long, half way down the slope 
on the right, afforded cover against an advance. 

The Russians had 42 battalions and 16 squadrons, a force estimated 
by St, Arnaud at 50,000 men, and by Lord Raglan at from 25,000 to 
50,000, and they had 82 guns. 

The battle, as is well known, was decided by the turning of the left 
of the position by Bosquet's division, and the Russians retreated be- 
hind the Katcha ; their loss amounted to 4,500 men, and that of the 
allies to 3,300 men. 

Of the campaigns which succeeded this memorable descent it is not 
my province to speak, but it is important to my argument to mention 
the sum total of the troops who were, during the eleven months siege 
of Sevastopol, thrown upon the shores of the Crimea : 

The French troops sent amounted in all to - - 309,268 men. 

English - 99,618 " 

The Sardinians amounted to 10,000, and 7,000 Turks 

were landed September 14 - - - - 17,000 " 

Total 425,886 '' 



22 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YOEK CITY. 

excluding what Turkish reinforcements were sent, which brought 
their numbers to over 8 battalions at a late period of the siege. 
The French losses, from all causes, amounted to - 69,229 men. 
Those of the English to _ . - - 32,290 ^' 

Total - - - - - 101,519 '' 



It will be observed that losses sustained by the Allies by sickness at 
Varna or at Gallipoli do not enter into the above table. The entire 
forces sent by the Allies to the East amounted to a greater figure than 
the above ; for example, the British sent to the East 107,040 men, of 
whom 70,910 returned with their regiments, the balance being made 
up of killed, invalided, prisoners, and some deserters. 

However, the table above is restricted to an accurate exposition of 
the power of the expedition, which had for its object the capture of 
Sevastopol ; by its strength, the distance from home at which it 
operated, the rapidity and certainty of its movements, and by the 
•entire success with which it was crowned, after encountering the 
utmost rigors of winter, and a defence almost unparalleled for bravery 
and obstinacy, and unequalled in point of engineering skill, by every 
criterion; in fact, this expedition far surpasses any previous one in the 
history of the world. 

; 1854. While the expedition to Sevastopol was assembling at Varna 
another grand descent was being made upon the Russian establish- 
ments in the Aland islands, in the Baltic. This latter expedition con- 
sisted of a combined French and English fleet, (which must have been 
of great power, though I have been unable to find the exact number 
of vessels and guns,) carrying a land army of 10,000 French and a 
small force of British troops. The Freuch army was in two brigades, 
with 200 artillerymen and 150 sappers. The embarkation of the 
latter took place at Calais, and the fieets rendezvoused first at Faroe 
sound, then at the anchorage of Ledsund, and finally appeared before 
Bomarsund on the 7th of August, 1854. They anchored just beyond 
the range of the guns of the fortress ; on the 8th the debarkation was 
effected by placing the troops in launches, which were towed by row- 
boats manned by sailors ; the main landing was at a point 6 miles 
southwest of the works, while a body of 3,000 landed 9 miles to the 
north, to facilitate the investment. 

The siege was conducted by land exclusively, except that some ves- 
sels (on the 15th) cannonaded the place from a distance of 1^ mile, a 
range at which many of their shells, even, fell short of the walls ; and 
on the 16th the place surrendered. 

The result of this success was the capture of 2,400 troops, of 200 
guns, and considerable supplies of powder, balls, and provisions. 
The Russians likewise lost the costly works that had been built to 
insure possession of the Aland isles; for, previous to leaving, the 
allies reduced the main fortress and the towers of Bomarsund to a 
heap of ruins. 

This expedition, in itself, was a great exhibition of power ; but 
when we consider that it was conducted at the same time with the 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 23 

gigantic and unprecedented one to the Crimea, a vivid idea will be 
formed of the military and naval resources of France and England. 

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONS. 

In 1739, England having declared war against Spain, a combined 
expedition, under Admirals Anson and Vernon, sailed from England 
and Jamaica to acquire possession of the richest portions of Spanish 
America. The fleet of the latter took Portobello in November, and 
afterwards Fort Chagre, on the isthmus; but Anson's squadron, that 
was to have co-operated on the opposite side, at Panama, had been 
scattered by storms off the Horn, and Vernon returned without result. 

In 1740, (October,) Lord Cathcart's expedition left England, and 
assembled at Jamaica, where it was joined by a body of colonial troops. 
It then numbered 29 ships of the line, 80 smaller vessels, and 15,000 
sailors, besides 12,000 land forces, equipped with all sorts of warlike 
instruments and every kind of convenience. This expiKlition attacked 
Carthagena, the strongest town in Spanish America, and demolished 
its fortifications. The excessive mortality in the expedition caused it 
to return to Jamaica without further effect, in November, 1741, after 
losing about 20,000 men. 

In 1742 the Spaniards collected a large fleet and numerous land 
forces in Cuba, and made a descent in July, with 36 vessels, upon 
Forts William and Frederica, on the St. Mary's. They were repulsed 
by Gov. Oglethorpe. 

In 1745 the Louisburg expedition took place. It consisted of 100 
vessels, which rendezvoused at Canseau, where they were joined by 
the squadron of Admiral Warren, from Antigua. After besieging 
the place by land and sea for six weeks, during which several men-of- 
war joined the blockading fleet from England, the place capitulated. 

In 1746 a large fleet left France under d'Anville, but it effected 
nothing, having been wasted by storms and shipwrecks. 

In 1747 a French fleet sailed with troops for Canada and Nova 
Scotia, but was encountered by the British fleet under Anson and 
Warren, and what ships were not taken were forced to retreat. 

In 1755 the French sent reinforcements to Canada in 12 ships-of- 
war, under Dieskau; two of which were intercepted and taken by Ad- 
miral Boscawen. Braddock's expedition arrived in America, from 
England_, the same year. 

In May, 1758, Amherst's expedition sailed from England, and ren- 
dezvoused at Halifax. The fleet was composed of 22 ships-of-the-line 
and 15 frigates. The army numbered at least 10,000 effective men. It 
sailed against Louisburg, the French naval station, and arrived in 
Chapeau Rouge bay, where it waited for six days, whilst a storm 
rendered a landing impracticable. During this time the French 
strengthened and extended their lines of field-works and abattis. 

On the 8th June the surf was still dashing heavily, when the de- 
barkation took place under the cover of the fire of the frigates. Not- 
withstanding the French batteries and the capsizing and destruction 
of several of the boats by the surf, the landing was effected, the 
French lines taken, and Louisburg invested the same day. In less 



24 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

than two months the place was reduced to ruins, and capitulated; 
5,600 troops and sailors became prisoners, and five ships of the line 
and four frigates were captured. The rest of the French fleet (five 
vessels) had been burnt or taken previously. 

In January^ 1759, Admiral Pococke attacked Martinico with 10 
line-of-battle ships and 6,000 effective troops. Being repulsed from 
that island, he sailed for Guadalupe, which island he took after a 
struggle of three months. 

In June, 1759, the expedition destined to take Quebec rendezvoused 
at Louisburg. General Wolf commanded the land forces, amounting 
to about 8,000 men, carried in numerous transports. The fleet, 
under Admiral Sanders, numbered 20 ships of the line and as many 
frigates and armed vessels. 

On the 26th June the landing took place on the isle of Orleans. 
On the 29th batteries were erected on the main land opposite Quebec ; 
but though the town was injured by their fire the citadel was beyond 
their range. 

In July, Wolfe attempted to gain a footing on the opposite shore of 
the St. Lawrence, above the Montmorenci, but was repulsed, with the 
loss of 400 killed alone. 

On the 13th September, having deceived the French as to his in- 
tentions, Wolfe crossed to the north shore, above the town, and 
gained the battle of the Plains of Abraham, which Montcalm preferred 
to deliver, rather than throw his army into Quebec. 

The French, second in command, was obliged on September 17th, 
from the want of provisions, to surrender the city. 

In January, 1762, General Monkton and AdmiralRodney appeared 
off Martinique, the richest of the French colonies, with a fleet of 16 
ships-of-the-line and 13 frigates, and transports containing 12,000 
troops ; this island was naturally strong and was well fortified, but 
was taken in about five weeks. The same expedition took Grenada, 
St. Lucia, and St. Vincents. 

In May, the same expedition, having received reinforcements of 
troops and supplies from the North American colonies and from Eng- 
land, received orders to attack Havana. The land forces now 
amounted to 11,000 effective English troops, besides the quotas from 
New York and New England ; 2,500 negroes from Jamaica and the 
Leeward islands, were also enrolled, and subsequently used in the 
labors of the trenches. After twenty-nine days of open trenches, the 
Moro Castle was taken by storm, and on the 11th ot August the city 
capitulated. 

The fruits of this expedition were the most important naval and 
military station of the West Indies, 9 ships-of-the-line, and 4 frigates, 
besides an immense booty, of which the property of the Spanish king 
alone amounted to $10,000,000. 

It succeeded in spite of all the difficulties of a tropical summer, the 
yellow fever, and a difficult position, improved by strong and well 
defended fortresses. 

In 1769 an expedition set out from Cuba, and arrived before New 
Orleans with 3,000 chosen troops on board ; the commander took 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 25 

possession, in the name of the Spanish government, of the whole 
valley of the Mississippi. 

(In the preceding year the French inhabitants had rebelled and 
•declared their intentions of joining the colony to France as a depen- 
dency, or otherwise of forming an independent republic.) 

On the 25th of June, 1776, Sir William Howe arrived oflf Sandy 
Hook ; Admiral Howe arrived on the 12th July ; General Clinton 
arrived soon after, as did also Admiral Hotham, with troops from 
Charleston and England. 

The army thus united amounted to 24,000 men, English, Hessians, 
and Waldeckers ; they were ready to open the campaign in August. 

The battle of Flatbush followed, and resulted in the retreat of the 
Americans on the night of the 29th. 

February 11, 1780, Sir Henry Clinton arrived at John's island, 
thirty miles from Charleston, having sailed from New York the 26th 
December. Charleston was defended by General Lincoln, who built 
a chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries from the Ashley to the 
Cooper river ; these mounted eighty pieces of artillery, and on all sides 
of the town where a landing was practicable, batteries were erected 
and covered with cannon. 

On the 21st the British fleet crossed the bar, and in a few days the 
€ity was invested by sea and by land. 

In April, Clinton received a reinforcement of 3,000 men from New 
York and took Fort Moultrie. 

On the 12th of May the city surrendered. 

In July, 1780, the French fleet, under the Chev. de Ternay, arrived 
at Rhode Island; it had two ships of 80 guns, one of 74, two frigates 
of 40, a cutter of 20, an armed hospital ship, and 32 transports with 
6,000 men, under Rochambeau. 

In August, 1781, De Grasse's fleet of 28 sail of the line, appeared 
in the Chesapeake, from the West Indies, and landed 3,200 troops 
under Marquis de St. Simon, to assist in the siege of Yorktown. 
Eight more ships-of-the-line arrived soon after, under De Barras,from 
Rhode Island. 

In February, 1794, Admiral Jervis landed at Martinique with 
6,000 troops, and took possession of the island, with the exception 
of the forts, which were occupied by Rochambeau with 800 men. 
The British were subsequently driven ofi", a reinforcement having 
arrived of 1,500 French, from Brest, and the blacks having been 
enrolled by the latter. 

In 1795-'96 Abercrombie retook from the French the island of St. 
Lucia and Deraerara. 

In 1802 Leclerc's expedition sailed from France to St. Domingo ; it 
consisted of 20,000 men, who were afterwards reinforced by 15,000 
additional troops, making a total of 35,000 soldiers. The fleet num- 
bered 30 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates. The failure of this expedi- 
tion was due partly to the vicious plan of operation, but chiefly to the 
yellow fever which committed dreadful ravages both in the land and 
naval forces. The army of Toussaint did not exceed 20,000 men, 
but was exempt from the sickness which carried oft' almost the whole 
of the invading troops. 



26 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

1814. The English expedition, in 1814, againstWashington was com- 
posed of Admiral Cockburn's fleet in the Chesapeake, reinforced by a 
squadron with General Boss' army, which embarked at the Garonne 
river, in France. 

The latter fleet comprised thirteen armed vessels and three trans- 
ports, and carried 2,500 troops: arriving at Bermuda it was joined 
by three men-of-war, which had on board 1,600 troops ; continuing 
the voyage the combined fleet joined that of the Chesapeake, which 
consisted of three line-of-battle ships, several frigates, and some 
sloops-of-war and gun-brigs. There were in this fleet 700 marines 
and a division of marine artillery, bringing up the land forces to 
about 5,000 men. 

On the 19th and 20th of August the latter were disembarked at 
Benedict, about fifty miles southeast of Washington. On the evening 
of the 20th a flotilla was sent, under Cockburn, up the river to attack 
that of Commodore Barney, which was, however, blown up by the 
Americans. General Boss, in command of the army, proceeded to 
Upper Marlborough, where he arrived on the 22d, having marched 
forty miles in three days. Here he was joined by Cockburn, and the 
united forces of the expedition marched, the night of the 23d, five 
miles nearer to Washington. 

On the 24th the advances to Bladensburg took place^, and our army 
was beaten. The capture of Washington, and the atrocious treatment 
our capital received at the hands of the British, are still fresh in the 
recollection of our citizens. 

The attack upon Baltimore, during the ensuing month after the 
above occurrences, was made by the same expedition, which, having 
received on board the army, again disembarked it at North Point, on 
the Patapsco, thirteen miles from the city. 

I'he repulse of the combined attack of the enemy on this occasion, 
and their retreat to the ships, are well known ; and I will take ad- 
vantage of the circumstance to conclude my reference to this expedi- 
tion, the main facts relating to which 1 have already given, viz : the 
numbers of the vessels and land forces, and the distance from which 
they came. 

1815. The expedition which had performed the exploit of burning the 
American Capital proceeded from the Chesapeake to Jamaica, (two 
ships only excepted, which were sent to England with wounded and 
prisoners.) Here they were joined by a fleet of men-of-war and trans- 
ports carrying 2,500 infantry, six companies of rifles, two squadrons 
of dismounted dragoons, detachments of engineers, artillery and 
rockets, and also recruits for the regiments that had served in the 
Chesapeake. Major General Keane arrived in this fleet, and took 
command of the whole. 

Having set sail from Jamaica on the 20th November, the expedition 
reached the mouth of the Mississippi, or rather they anchored oppo- 
site the Chandeleur islands, near the entrance of Lake Borgne. Here 
the plan of attack was concerted. 

Considering it impracticable to reduce the forts which commanded 
the navigation of the river, and as the ships could not pass up unless 
this were effected, it was decided to land on the banks of the lake, 



DANGEKS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 2T 

and make a push for the city before any strong defences could he pre- 
pared by the Americans. 

The troops being got on board, the lighter vessels entered the lake 
on the 13th of December. They were opposed by the American gun- 
boats, which were, however, captured by a flotilla of fifty launches 
and barges. 

The vessels now penetrated as far as their draught allowed, and on. 
the 16th began to debark their detachments upon a sandy strip called 
Isle au Poix, at the mouth of Pearl river. The vessels had to send 
their boats for this purpose nearly thirty miles, and the soldiers 
underwent great hardships from the total want of tents or fuel. 

The entire force was not debarked until six days had elapsed, and 
the whole week was consumed in the operation, in organizing the 
troops into divisions, and assembling boats, packing ammunition,, 
stores^ &c. ; and it must be recollected that the British were as yet 
only in possession of a barren island. 

The debouches of Bayou Catalan or Bienvenu into the lake, about 
thirty miles, or a day's sail from the island, was selected as the point 
of landing, and the advance guard of 1,600 men and two guns was 
sent there to seize on a favorable spot. These surprised the guard, 
and then pushed up the river to Villere's canal, where, having en- 
camped, they sustained a severe attack from our troops under Jackson 
and General Coffee, who were aided by the fire of the schooner Caro- 
line, under Commodore Patterson. 

The whole British army hastened at the sound of the cannonade to 
effect its landing, and by the 24th it was all in the position first occu- 
pied by the advance guard. 

General Jackson, finding that his attack on the advanced guard 
had rendered the enemy cautious, and would prevent an immediate 
march upon the city, decided to improve the time by entrenching 
himself, and selected the position which lay in rear of the Rodriguez, 
canal. This position was 1,620 yards in extent, resting its right and 
left on the river and on a swamp respectively, and was protected in 
front by the canal. 

The entrenchments consisted simply of a parapet of earth running, 
in a right line from the river to the swamp, where it took a square 
turn to the rear ; an unfinished redan was just beyond the ditch, at 
the junction of the line with the river. 

The canal formed a wet ditch for the entrenchment. It had five feet, 
of water in some parts, but in others was very shallow ; its banks 
were, however, very slippery and soft, from the effect of rain and the 
opening of the levees. The defenders of the position amounted at this • 
time to about 2,000 men, and this force repelled (as will be mentioned) 
the first attack of the British. In the grand attack, the army under 
Jackson amounted to 3,500 or 3,700 men, as he was joined on the 4th 
by 2,500 Kentuckians, of whom about 1,500 were detached to garrison 
the battery on the right bank. 

The British army now landed had, on entering the ships, amounted 
to about 8,000 soldiers, and it seems probable that, with Lambert's 
reinforcement and with the marines, the number that took part in the 
battle of the 8th of January was about 10,000. 



28 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

While the Americans were fortifying their position, and the main 
army of the enemy was concentrating in advance of it, the British had 
thrown up batteries, which, firing hot shot at the Caroline and Louis- 
iana, had burnt the one and dislodged the other from her position, 
which had prohibited an advance along the levee. 

The way being now clear, the British advanced on the 28th, and, 
on approaching the American line, opened a fire of cannon, bombs, 
and rockets, which they followed up by a violent attack, which lasted 
seven hours, resulting in the repulse of the enemy. 

At this juncture the British were reinforced by 1,600 infantry under 
General Lambert, who thus arrived in time to assist in the decisive 
battle of the 8th. 

General Pakenham, who had also arrived from England and taken 
command just previous to the advance, now concluded to abandon the 
idea of storming the American lines, and to commence his attack by a 
heavy cannonade, which should breach the works and silence their 
artillery. Accordingly thirty heavy guns were brought up from the 
ships, and were mounted, on the 31st, in six batteries, which opened 
fire next day. 

The delay caused by bringing up the guns was improved by Jackson, 
and the American batteries were so strong by this time, that they 
silenced the British fire and drove the artillerists from their pieces. 
This success was greatly contributed to by the flotilla and by the 
battery which Jackson had thrown up on the opposite side of the 
river, both of which took the enemy's line in flank. An attempt to 
turn the American left, by an attack from the swamp, was also 
defeated. 

The success of a future attack seemed, therefore, to depend on 
silencing the battery across the river, and there was no way of doing 
so but to take it. To this end General Pakenham, who displayed 
certainly much energy, ordered Villeres' canal to be deepened so as to 
admit of passing the boats upon the Mississippi from the bayou, which 
should carry a detachment to the opposite shore. The canal being 
finished on January 6th, Pakenham ordered Colonel Thornton to 
Cross the river on the night of the 7th, and take the important battery. 
The capture was to be announced by a signal rocket, when the main 
body was to commence its attack on Jackson's line. This programme 
of attack was very simple, and its failure in execution was not due to 
any ill-conduct of the British troops. 

The battery on the opposite bank was carried by 500 British, and 
was held during the main attack by Colonel Thornton, while the army 
of Pakenham performed prodigies of valor in the attempt to storm 
the works, but, as it is universally known, the courage of the troops 
sufiiced only to increase their losses. 

My object has been chiefly to exhibit clearly the difiiculties of the 
landing ; and to bring the enemy from his ships to the point where 
the result of the expedition depends upon the fate of a battle on land; 
the chances, at this crisis, of the success or failure of the expedition 
may be calculated on general principles, seeing that all the marine 
probabilities which are especially under consideration, and at the out- 
set of the expedition counted against it, are by this time eliminated. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 29' 

It is sufficient, therefore, to state that in this short campaign the 
British lost near 5,000 men. In the battle of the 8th January Gen- 
eral Lambert reported a loss of 2,070^ and Colonel Haynes of 2,600. 

The result of this tremendous defeat was the retreat of the whole 
force, and their re-embarkation, an operation which was conducted 
with great energy, and without serious loss. It was rendered tedious 
by the necessity that now existed of constructing a brush road over 
the swamp to the place where the troops must re-enter the boats. 
This road took nine days to construct, and it was not till the night of 
the 18th that the beaten army was ready to evacuate its position. 

It regained the point of embarkation by a stolen night march, and 
finally found itself once more aboard the fleet, though the operation 
of transferring the troops to the vessels lasted several days, owing to 
the prevalence of foul weather, and the distance of the vessels, which 
were about a day's pull, in boats, from the shore. 

While the points of this history remain unconfused by the accounts 
of more powerful expeditions, it will be well to deduce some conclu- 
sions from it that it will be useful to refer to in the sequel. 

In the first place, it appears that a force of about 10,000 men suc- 
ceeded in overcoming all the difficulties of concentration at one point, 
although starting in detached corps from the Mediterranean, France,. 
England, and the West Indies. Next, they accomplished their de- 
barkation at a place perhaps the worst adapted in the world for such 
operations, owing to the shallowness of the water and its muddy 
shores, and the contracted avenues to the objective point. Third, 
their advanced guard had actually reached the highway to New Or- 
leans, and had but to disperse or defeat an army of about its own 
numerical force, and composed of irregular troops alone, in order to 
complete the success of the expedition. 

That it did not do so must be imputed, cceteris paribus, to a want of 
military tact in the commander-in chief, or his neglect of his duty ; 
for had he informed himself of the number of his enemy's forces, it is 
plain that every rule of warfare would counsel him to attack at once, 
without giving time for entrenchments to be built and reinforcements 
to arrive. 

That the expedition was not successful appears, therefore, to have 
been due first to the bad generalship of Pakenham, and secondly to 
the genius and heroism of Jackson, who used to the uttermost the 
time, the locality, the resources at his disposal, and the militia under 
his command. 

I repeat, that the expedition was successful in so far that the result 
of it depended on military operations entirely disconnected with the 
fact of its being a maritime expedition ; and that even in these opera- 
tions the probabilities, as they would be estimated if the numbers and 
tactical positions of the armies were alone considered, and the genius 
of Jackson left out of consideration, were greatly in favor of the 
invaders up to the very moment when the retreat of the British hegan. 
Even after the blunder of not marching at once on New Orleans; 
after the dilatory and undecided conduct of the British general 
between the 24th December and 8th January, which gave Jackson 
time to consolidate his lines and batteries^ and to double his army 



30 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

and after the terrible slaughter of the British in the battle of the 8th, 
there was still an even chance at least, for the commander-in-chief to 
reckon upon, provided only he had judgment and decision enough to 
appreciate and make use of it. I allude to the success of the enemy 
on the right bank, which would have been enough in the hands of a 
general like Jackson, had the British such a one, to insure the forcing 
of the American lines ;* after that, the British would have been 
superior in numbers, artillery, and discipline; and if they were beaten 
in the open field, it would have been for want of a leader equal to the 
illustrious warrior whom Providence assigned to the command of our 
army. 

This speculation upon the abstract probabilities which related to 
the battle of the 8th of January is offered merely as an exercise, as 
I may say, to assist the reader in understanding the general discussion 
in hand: it no more reflects on the imperishable glory of our arms to 
say that Jackson was out-flanked at New Orleans, than to say that 
General Taylor was surrounded at Buena Vista. In both cases the 
disadvantages under which the generals labored, enhance their repu- 
tation. 

1847. The expedition which under Scott subjugated Mexico is still 
80 fresh in the minds of Americans that I shall not refer to any other 
pages of its history than those which relate the manner in which the 
landing was efiected. 

As a military operation the landing will always be a model for 
imitation, both as to the arrangement of the plan, and the details of 
its execu^^ion ; the enemy were to the last moment in doubt as to the 
place selected for the debarkation, but even if they had divined it, or 
been secretly advised on the subject, the nature of the locality and 
the measures adopted by the general to cover the operation would 
have insured its success, though opposed by the whole disposable 
Mexican force. 

The expedition, as is well known, rendezvoused at Lobos, where 
the army was organized ; the troops detached from General Taylor's 
command had assembled by the end of January at Brazos St. Jago 
and Tampico, and were sent from thence to Lobos, a distance of about 
€0 miles ; the rest of the troops arrived at the rendezvous from New 
Orleans. 

On the 2d of March the transports all sailed for Anton Lizardo, and 
preparations were made for the landing, which General Scott decided 
to effect on the sandy beach, at a point west of Sacrificios island, 
and about three miles south of the city and castle of Vera Cruz. 

One hundred and forty-four surf boats had been ordered for the 
"[anding, but 65 only had arrived ; these were to be towed behind the 
ships from Anton Lizardo to the landing place, when the troops were 
to enter them, and make the shore under cover of the guns of the 
smaller vessels, which would be so disposed as to sweep the beach by 
their fire. 

"'■■ In support of this view, see Jackson's despatch to the War Department, in which he 
says that "The enemy now occupied a position from which thej' might annoy us witliout- 
hazard, and by means of which they might have been able to defeat, in a great measure, 
the effects of our success on this side tlie river." 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YuRK CITY. 31 

On the 9th, Worth's division was put on board of the men-of-war 
and steamers, and those of Patterson and Twiggs, after filling up such 
vessels of the squadron as were not occupied by Worth's, were put 
into transports, which were towed by the steam vessels of the fleet. 

The expedition, advancing in the above order, arrived about noon 
at the selected spot ; the surf boats were immediately filled by the 
troops of Worth's division, which, upon gaining the beach, formed 
and marched forward to the sand hills, where they took up a position 
to protect the operation from any attack of the Mexicans, 

The surf boats continued their trips with alacrity, and before next 
morning the entire army was established on the shore. 

The landing of materiel and baggage continued without interruption 
until the 12th, when a heavy norther sprung up, causing such a surf 
that the operation had to cease entirely ; this norther blew constantly 
(except a lull of a few hours on the 13th) until the 17th, when it abated, 
and the landing of stores and artillery was recommenced ; the whole 
of the army materiel was not, from this cause, got on shore till the 
the 24th, having been interrupted the third time on the 23d. 

The army in the meantime had advanced on the city and completed 
the investment of it ; a parallel and several batteries had been con- 
structed, and on the 22d the bombardment commenced ; the city was 
overwhelmed with shot and shell for four days, when its governor 
offered to capitulate. 

Thus in eighteen days from the time the expedition anchored ofi" 
the beach it had accomplished the preliminary and all-important 
measure of the campaign. 

The Mexicans Avere deprived of the strategetical advantages which 
were offered by the fortress both in its character of a retreat for troops 
and harbor of refuge f'T privateers ; the army also gained a secure 
base of operations, and was enabled to march on the capital by the 
paved road which leads to it from Vera Cruz. 

In this descent an army of about 12^000 men was landed on an open 
beach, exposed to the most violent winds, and only three miles from a 
fortress and 'castle of the enemy. The landing of the provisions, 
artillery, and baggage was repeatedly interrupted by severe storms, 
but in spite of all these difficulties the expedition achieved, in a little 
over two weeks, a success which had been pronounced an impossibility 
by foreign military critics. 



CHAPTER IV. 



CONCLUSIONS. 



A few important general conclusions may be drawn from the 
facts of Chapter HI, and from the accounts in history, of the descents 
made prior to 1400. 

It appears that the seas have never proved a sufficient barrier to the 
aggressive spirit of powerful maritime states, even when the art of 
ship-building was comparatively in its infancy, and almost before the 
science of navigation came into existence; and that, when the compass 
was still uninvented, not to speak of the epochs when oars were the only 
propelling force employed, formidable expeditions, both as to num- 
bers and equipments, have crossed seas and oceans, and have landed 
successfully on hostile shores. 

In proportion as successive improvements in the construction of 
vessels have diminished the dangers which such invasions must 
hazard, before the debarkation has reduced the chances against them 
to the usual ones of land warfare, there appears a constant tendency 
in maritime nations towards exerting more of the national integral 
strength in this sort of warfare, and also a more frequent resort to it^ 
both in schemes of conquest, and as a means of distracting the enemy 
from the land warfare in which he may be simultaneously engaged. 

The constant communication of an invading army with its ships, 
and by means of them with its own country, appears to be essential 
to the prosperous issue of these expeditions; and the chances for ful- 
filling this condition of success are directly influenced, like the 
probabilities in favor of a satisfactory landing, by the nature of the 
vessels at command — their sea-worthiness, speed and size, as well as 
number. Accordingly there can distinctly be traced^ in the History 
of Maritime Expeditions, an increased probability of the success of the 
latter in proportion to the improvements in ships and navigation. 

If these views are strongly sustained by the events of trans-oceanic 
warfare previous to the invention of steam, they are proved to be 
correct beyond dispute by the almost incredible impulse which that 
motive power has given to the aggressive spirit and military prepara- 
tions of France, England, and Russia. Steam has done as mucli 
towards aggrandizing the aggressive strength of France and England, 
and the distances at which they can exert it, as the invention of the 
mariner's compass did towards enlarging the area of navigation. 

Without much exaggeration it may be said that steam has so con- 
tracted and bridged the Atlantic that we are ten days march from 
England and two from Halifax ; but, if this expression conveys a fair 
idea of the speed and certainty of the voyages of steam fleets, it is 
inadequate to represent the ease with which the journey is performed 
by the troops, and the facility with which the baggage and artillery 
are transported. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 33 

The Atlantic telegraph, also, whenever it is made serviceable, will 
be of immense advantage to the British. The intended movements 
of our squadrons can be indicated in England simultaneously with 
their departure from our ports, and the operations of their fleets or 
expeditions directed against them; or our sea-board cities can be guided 
from home with a double advantage as to time, 

^ It may be said that the arguments I adduce only prove that our 
navy should be increased ; but we must view the case as it is. Our 
navy is not only insignificant in size compared to those of France and 
England, but is likely to continue so. 

Even, however, if it were equal in size to those of our rivals there 
would be enough for it to do in distressing our enemy's commerce and 
fighting his squadrons on the high seas, without leaving any force to 
spare for the passive defence of our coasts. 

Besides, is not England, with her immense navy and powerful 
channel fleet, in constant apprehension of a descent by the French ? 
Did not Wellington repeatedly caution the government against the 
dangers of invasion ? 

It seems certain that the chief difficulty to be provided for by the 
French, in their plans for invading England, is the uncertainty of 
keeping up the communications of the army landed, with home. This 
is, as before remarked, very necessary, both for supplying reinforce- 
ments and against the contingency of a retreat. 

The isolation of the invading army, and the impossibility of its 
making a retreat in case of failure, are therefore staked on the issue 
of a naval battle ; and it is fair to presume that it is this risk which 
delays the order for the execution of a design which must be cherished 
by every French soldier and sailor. 

In our case, however, this dissuading reflection is wanting to pre- 
serve our coast from insult ; but the reader will need no assistance in 
making up his mind on the point immediately in question if he will 
glance over the subjoined condensed account of the British and 
American navies. 

Indeed, there seems to be no necessity for insisting any further, 
even upon the main case which I have endeavored to make appear. 

The conclusions that an unprejudiced reader of the account in 
question will arrive at, with regard to the military attitude of this 
country, cannot fail to be identical with those which I have, to the 
best of my ability, advanced and supported. 

On the one hand there is given, in a late number of the Washington 
Union, the following statement of the United States naval force on 
active service. 

Active service. 

Line-of-battle ships 10 None serviceable. 

Frigates 10 3 serviceable. 

Sloops 21 All fit for active service. 

Brigs 3 All in service. 

Schooners 1 Useless. 

Screw steamers, 1st class 6 5 readv for service. 

3 



34 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

Screw steamers, 1st class 2 Building. 

Screw steamers, 2d class 6 1 serviceable, 5 building. 

Screw steamers, 3d class 4 Inferior. 

Screw steamers, 4tli class 1 Inferior. 

Side-wheel steamers 7 Effective. 

Actual available force. 

Frigates 3 150 guns. 

Brigs 3 16 guns. 

Sloops, screw 1 13 guns. 

Paddle steamers 7 39 guns. 

Sloops 21 388 guns. 

Frigates,, screw 5 172 guns. 

Light screw 2 11 guns. 

42 789 guns. 

Thus it will be seen that the government is prepared to send to sea 
at once, in case of war, only 42 vessels, sail and steam, of all classes, 
carrying 789 guns. In addition to these, it has at disposal 5 or 6 
small steam vessels in the revenue and coast survey service, none of 
which, however, are fit for war purposes, except the Harriet Lane, a 
new paddle cutter of 650 tons. 

On the other hand, the British navy is described as follows : 

Great Britain has some 90 vessels of the line, carrying from 72 to 
190 guns, the majority of them screw steamers. Her sailing vessels 
of the line are most of them in disuse, being used for receiving, store, 
and transport ships. Her screw propellers of this class carry long 
32^8 and 8-inch guns, and one 10-inch pivot gun. She has some 30 
large screw frigates, carrying heavy guns, most of them 8-inch. She 
is also building a class of steamers^ several of which are in the water, 
designed to cope with our own new vessels of the first class. 

Her present class of screw sloops are large vessels, of from one 
thousand two hundred to two thousand tons, carrying from twelve to 
twenty-four heavy 8-inch guns, with one pivot gun. She has about 
two hundred and fifty light steam vessels, all screw, divided as fol- 
lows : Despatch vessels of six hundred and fifty tons and three hun- 
dred horse power each, carrying two or four 32-pounders and two 
pivot 8-inch guns ; a class of vessels of about four hundred tons and 
one hundred horse power, carrying two howitzers and one 8-inch 
pivot. 

Her third and most effective class of vessels are small screw gun- 
boats, ranging from two hundred to three hundred tons burden, with 
from twenty to sixty horse power, carrying a light 8-inch gun or long 
32-pounder and one or two 24 or 32-pound howitzers. Besides these 
she has between forty and fifty paddle steamers of various sizes : from 
the Terrible, of one thousand eight hundred tons and twenty guns, to 
the Pigmy, of fifty tons and one gun. 

From this statement it will be seen that if she has men to man 
them, Britain can place thirty screw steamers of the line, twenty 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 35 

screw frigates, forty screw sloops, and one hundred and fifty ligliter 
steam vessels on the Atlantic coast, without decreasing the strength of 
any one of the fleets on other stations, and still have a large force to 
hold in reserve. In this enormous navy we find combined, to an 
almost incredible extent, the main requisites which I have shown to 
be essential to the success of naval military expeditions, viz : rapidity 
and precision of manoeuvres and of combinations, as well as of voyages; 
speed and certainty of communications, and capacity and concentrated 
power in the vessels. 



CHAPTER V. 

On reviewing hastily the four chapters just concluded the following 
points will be found to have been incontestably established : 

1. That the United States being, above all the powers in the world_, 
in a condition to defy any other sorts of attack, will be, in any future 
war, subjected to a series of naval-military expeditions which shall 
have for object the destruction of the government naval establish- 
ments and the ruin of our commercial cities. 

2. That these expeditions will be on a most immense scale, and 
formidable, as well from the late scientific and military improvements 
in warfare, as from the numbers of the troops and the rapidity and 
certainty of the descent. 

3. That these expeditions will follow immediately upon the decla- 
ration of war, be isimultaneous with it^ or even be themselves the only 
announcement of hostilities, may be inferred from the usage of na- 
tions, and of Great Britain especially, during the last 50 years. 

4. And, lastly, it will certainly happen that those of our seaboard 
cities will be first attacked which offer the richest prizes, and which it 
would affect the country most to ruin (commercially or materially) 
and which possess the least capacity of resistance. 

5. These expeditions may be of an entirely naval character* or they 
may be. descents in which the fleet would co-operate with the land 
forces, either offensively or merely as forming and protecting the com- 
munications and retreat f of an army of debarkation ; or it may 
serve in both of these capacities. | 

It is against attacks of our seaports by fleets alone that the seacoast 
fortifications of the United States are intended ; this appears from the 
nature of the works themselves, which are mostly stone castles looking 
upon entrances § to harbors, or on roadsteads, where they merely pre- 
vent an enemy's fleet from effecting a rendezvous or taking shelter or 
making their station || for blockading purposes. This, also, is the 
theory which is stated expressly in the written reports of the Chief 
Engineer of the army, and it is especially laid down in the assemblage 
of letters by several of the highest officers of the Engineer Corps, 
which is to be found in General Totten's Eeport on the National De- 
fences of 1851. 

6. I therefore propose, as a supplement to the oflicial system of 
American fortifications, a plan for defending the seacoast cities from 
naval descents, of which the essential features are — 1st, the use of 



'■' Such as Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt ; French attack on San Juan de Ulloa ; attack 
on Copenhagen in 1801 by Nelson and Parker ; projected attack on Cronstadt; bombard- 
ments of Odessa and Kimburn. 

t Pakenham's and Washington expeditions. 

I Sevastopol, Bomarsund, and Kertch. 

§ Fort Warren, Fort Sumter, Fort Delaware, Fort Richmond, Fort Schuyler. 

II Castle Calhoun, fort at Sandy Hook, Fort Taylor, and fort at Ship Island, Fort Jefferson, 



DANGEKS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 37 

fortifications of a cheap description and adapted to the range of the 
Minie rifle or its equivalent, the new regulation United States rifle 
musket ; and 2d, that the main reliance, in the defence of these works, 
is the militia and volunteer regiments belonging to the city which 
may be attacked. 

The city of New York — with its great material wealth in private 
and public buildings and stores, its navy and ship yards, its factories, 
machine shops, and foundries, and its other workshops of all kinds — 
is, in itself, a worthy object for a grand expedition ; but the incentives 
to an enemy to attempt such an enterprise would include, besides, the 
hope of paralyzing, to a certain extent, the trade of those great dis- 
tricts of country, of which New York is the commercial centre. 

But although the loss to the country in general which would spring 
from the bombardment and conflagration of New York would be 
severe, (the manner in which that event would be felt it is unneces- 
sary to explain to practical business men,) I need not dilate on it 
here ; for the readers to whom I address myself are especially New 
Yorkers, who ought not to need any additional stimulus to interest 
them in the matter, than the possibility of lasting injury to the city 
which their boldness, enterprise, and perseverance, have placed first 
among all competitors on the western continent. 

I say lasting injury, for it is certain that the country at large would 
recover from the shock of a blow struck upon New York much sooner 
than could the latter, individually, which must remain for a long time 
a maimed member of the general system ; while, to carry out the 
analogy, the vital streams of trade which now circulate through it^ 
being directed into other channels for the time, would so aggrandize 
the neighboring ports, that their rivalry might be of material hind- 
rance to the restoration of the city in its former pre-eminent position. 

The citizens of New York have always shown themselves solicitous 
for the safety of their port, and in every case where the necessity of for- 
tifications has been pointed out by engineer officers, they have been 
prodigal of their efforts to secure appropriations for the building of 
them. 

They have done their share towards the work of making the city 
perfectly secure from all foreign aggression, and it must be with great 
difficulty that they will listen to the unwelcome assertion that the de- 
fences which they have been assured are all sufficient for the purpose 
are far from being so ; that their powerful protection from attacks, in 
one quarter at least, is an illusion; that, supposing an enemy's army 
landed on Long Island, the immunity from a bombardment is to fol- 
low from certain scientific and strategetical influences (which the forti- 
fications are to exert) which shall deter him from approaching the 
city by roads which are entirely unprotected. 

It will be enough for a man of common sense to be informed that 
the barriers to an enemy's advance are not material and visible for 
him to despise them ; and certainly if an enemy does not see any 
ahead of him, he will not be as apt, as a less interested party, to 
listen to an argument showing that it is highly dangerous for him to 
advance and prosecute his enterprise. 

Here is a prize worth more than Sevastopol, Copenhagen, Bomar- 



38 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

sund, Kimburn, or Kertch, as booty to an enemy; and which would 
be double the loss to this country that it would profit its destroyers ; 
and it lies as open to attack, from several quarters, as if not a cent had 
been spent on its defences. A chain is no stronger than its weakest 
link; and any one opening by which the city can be approached, 
is as good as two, or three, or as a free entrance in all directions. 
I will not, at present, discuss the question, whether, or no, the castles 
which are set on the banks of the water avenues to the city will alto- 
gether bar the passage of any foreign fleets and flotillas ; but, taking 
it for granted that heavy guns and mortars cannot be brought 
afloat against the city, will proceed to demonstrate that they can be, 
and very readily, by an enemy which should rendezvous at Halifax, 
voyage for forty-eight hours in steam vessels and in transports towed 
by steam if necessary, and, arriving in Long Island Sound, disembark 
in one of the numerous harbors of that quiet lake, and march upon 
Brooklyn with a force of say 70,000 or 100,000 men, and with a train 
of light mortars and howitzers, by which the entire city would be re- 
duced to ashes by firing across the East river. As an alternative, the 
city might be required to give up as prizes of war the naval stores and 
ships-of-war in the harbor, the American merchant ships in port, and 
furnish, in addition;, a contribution of as many millions of dollars as 
the pressing necessity might make the loss preferable, to the other 
threatened evils. 



CHAPTER VI. 

DEFENCE OF NEW YORK AGAINST A NAVAL-MILITARY EXPEDITION. 

The 0§icial Theory and Practice analyzed and criticised. 

In the report, to the Secretary of War, of General Totten, chief en- 
gineer, of 1840, which is substantially repeated, in essential respects, 
in his '' Report on the National Delences^" of 1851, we find that the 
theory of the defence of New York, according to which all its fortifi.- 
cations have been and are to be made^ is as follows : 

1. To prevent a fleet from appearing before the city and bombard- 
ing it ; to this end there are a certain number of castles built on the 
shores of the bay and East river. 

At the Narrows are forts Lafayette, Hamilton, and Richmond, and 
batteries Hudson and Morton. Across the channel, at this point, is to 
be stretched a strong boom, which shall stoj) an enemy's fleet, or de- 
lay it long enough to give the forts time to cripple or destroy it. A 
work on the site of Fort Tompkins, and a battery to rake the beach, 
are in construction. The former is to remedy the ill location of Fort 
Richmond, and the dislocated arrangement of the whole system on 
Staten Island. 

In second line behind these, on this approach, and close to the city, 
are forts Columbus and Castle William, and South Battery on G-ov- 
ernor's Mand, and a trifling work on Ellis' Island. These were 
originally built to effect all the purposes of the works below ; but are 
now chiefly of value as tending to discourage an enemy from running 
the gauntlet of the lower works, with the idea of receiving their fire 
without reply, and revenging himself on the city. 

To close the avenue presented by the East river, there are two forts, 
opposite each other, on Throg's Neck and Willet's Point. (One of 
these is not yet begun.) 

2. To prevent a hostile fleet from taking position in the lower bay, 
(Sandy Hook bay,) and thence blockadiug this entrance of the port, a 
castle is to be built on Sandy Hook. 

3. To prevent an enemy from disembarking on Long Island, or 
on the main land, and marching on the city, with a train of mortars 
and howitzers, to bombard it, we have nothing but the same works, 
which are said to effect this purpose, totally distinct from the other, 
by the following theory: To prevent a hostile fleet from landing an 
army at Gravesend bay, below the Narrows, the (unbuilt) fort on 
Sandy Hook is supposed to suffice, because it bears on the main ship 
channel within cannon range. This power of being capable of firing 
on the enemy' s ships while they are traversing the distance of 2 miles 
within 1^ miles of the fort is supposed, as it appears from General 
Totten's report of 1856, sufficiently formidable to hinder the concep- 
tion of the enterprise. Other engineer officers yield the point that 
Sandy Hook might be passed, if not by day, at least by night, by such 



40 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

an expedition, or that the fleet, instead of passing by Sandy Hook, 
might, as urged by Major Chase, take the East, or the 14-foot chan- 
nel, and arrive at Gravesend bay without coming within range of the 
fort ; but they say that, even if arrived here, the enemy could not land 
his troops, owing to the fire of the forts at the Narrows. 

On the East river, General Totten supposes that the landing would 
be stopped, or its object frustrated, by the works at Throg's and Wil- 
let's Points, owing to the following causes: The enemy would not 
land on the main land below Fort Schuyler, because he would have 
more than 20 miles to march on New York, and would have to cross 
the Harlem river. He would, it is pretended, be prevented from 
landing on Long Island by the fort on Willet's Point, which has a 
strategetical hearing on his advance on Brooklyn. This is a fair state- 
ment; for, in General Totten's report of 1840, we find — 

"But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving 
parties in suitable positions with a view to prevent our crossing the 
river and falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having 
no obstacle in his front. 

"To prevent this efiectually, and also to accomplish other objects, 
a work should be erected at Willet's Point, opposite Throg's Point. 

"This work * * would involve a march against the navy yard 
from this quarter in great danger, since all the forces that could be 
collected on the New York side might, under cover of this work, be 
crossed over to Long Island and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting 
off his communication ivith thejleet." 

In short we have the works of New York built on the following 
theory : 

1st. To stop fleets from sailing up to the city, forts, castles and 
batteries, which oppose the passage by their fire, and which are to be 
aided by the material obstacle of booms stretched across the water. 

2d. A work to prevent a fleet from making a resort of Sandy Hook 
tay. 

3d. To prevent an expedition from marching on the city, after 
landing on the main land below Throg's Neck, the natural barrier of 
the Harlem river is to be defended by troops in the field. 

4th. To prevent an expedition from marching on the city, after 
landing on Long Island, below the work on Willet's Point, reliance 
is placed entirely on his fear of attacks on his rear by troops issuing 
from that work. 

5th. To prevent a landing in Gravesend bay, within 10 miles of 
Brooklyn, it is supposed that the fleet must pass within range of a 
projected, but yet uncommenced, work at Sandy Hook, and that it 
would be deterred from doing so by fear of the damage it would sus- 
tain. And I will here add the opinion of individual officers, that, 
even if it did pass, the anchoring and landing in Gravesend bay would 
be so cannonaded that the operation would be impossible. 

The above is a fair and accurate exposition of the entire system of 
the fortifications of New York. 

It has always, however, been considered by some eminent ofiicers 
of the corps that the system is faulty in theory, and it is so, in mj 
opinion, both in theory and execution. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 41 

Avoiding discussion for the present of the first three points, let us 
consider the fourth and fifth, to which this memoir relates. 

It has always been asserted by Major Chase, and by the late Major 
Sanders of the Engineer Corps, that a landing in Gravesend bay is 
perfectly practicable; the sailing past Sandy Hook at night by the 
large ships is easy enough, and the losses would be far from checking 
the progress of a powerful fleet of vessels, capable, as ships-of-the- 
line and frigates are, of receiving a great number of shots, and sus- 
taining the fire of forts for hours. Smaller vessels can enter New 
York bay by the East channel, which does not lie within range of 
Sandy Hook, and gun boats can pass within a stone's throw of the 
point of Coney Island. But this main ship channel might, as Major 
Chase insists, be avoided altogether ; for, provided the expedition were 
altogether conveyed in light draught vessels, it might take the 14-foot 
channel, which leads to Gravesend bay, without passing under the 
fire of Sandy Hook ; there is, indeed, no doubt of the practicability 
of either of these passages. 

As to the anchorage and beach of Gravesend bay being within and 
under the fire of the works at the Narrows, that would appear, if so, 
to be an accidental circumstance, from the following considerations : 
Fort Hamilton, the nearest one, is built in a hollow, and is prevented 
by a ridge of land, which lies between it and Gravesend bay, from 
seeing the latter, except from the upper or barbette battery of the 
side which bears upon it; now, this side^ like the side fronting on the 
Narrows, is casemated, and its scarp wall is pierced with embrasures 
for guns, so that if the fort, identically as it stands, had been built 
on top of the said ridge, a hundred yards to the southward of its 
present site, instead of behind it, there would have been, in addition 
to the nine or ten barbette guns that can now be directed on Graves- 
end bay, a complete tier of guns in casemate, which latter have always 
been valued by the Engineer Department at a much higher rate than 
guns in barbette. As, however, this advantage, which, at a time when 
bomb-proof floating batteries were unknown, was really of great im- 
portance, was neglected, for no sufficient reason, and for no cause, as 
far as the shape, construction, or cost of construction of the work was 
concerned, we must conclude that the action of Fort Hamilton upon 
Gravesend bay, as prohibiting or interfering with debarkations, was 
not an element of the design of the fort. 

This view is strengthened by considering, that, when the fort was 
built, our largest guns were 32 and 42 pounders, with an extreme 
range of about 1,900 yards, obtained with the maximum charge and 
elevation ; now, if the work were furnished only with an armament 
of these, the farther beach of Gravesend bay would be a mile beyond 
the range of its guns, even if it were seated on the ridge above- 
mentioned. 

Another argument in support of the opinion that the works at the 
Narrows were not originally intended to prevent debarkations on 
Gravesend beach is to be found by examining Fort Lafayette, which 
stands just in advance of Fort Hamilton, on a shoal in the Narrows. 

This fort is square, and one face has a view down and one up the 
Narrows ; an angle is thus left bearing across the Narrows, so that its 



42 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

guns cannot be directed square across ; this is probably because of the 
works in that quarter on the opposite side, which might otherwise be 
in danger from chance shots from this work ; but another angle bears 
nearly towards Gravesend bay, and thus no guns could be mounted, 
except the two in the angle itself, having a bearing in the necessary 
direction to interfere with a debarkation on its beach, and what 
renders this view still more evident is that the face which bears most 
directly on the said beach is not provided with embrasures for cannon, 
but is merely loop-holed for the use of musketry. 

As to the redoubt behind Fort Hamilton, one face of it sees the bay, 
but it has no more guns on the side which bears in this direction than 
on either of the other three, viz : three guns, one at each end of the 
■face, and one in the middle, the redoubt mounting in all 8 guns. 

If, to get General Totten's opinion on this subject, we consult his 
^'Reports" of 1840 and of 1851 to the Secretary of War, we find the 
following recommendations, which relate directly to it. In the first 
place, he recommends the construction of works, one on the east 
bank, a shoal to the eastward of the channel, and one on another 
called the middle ground, as " an outer barrier at the very mouth of the 
harbor :" to prevent access to the inner harbor, and thus to render a 
close blockade of the harbor impossible, and obliging an enemy, dis- 
posed to debark an army, to land at or near Rockaway, on the beach 
exposed to the ocean and storms. 

He says expressly, that without some '"'outer barrier" of this sort, 
a squadron would land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, within 
*7 miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its commanding heights, and of 
the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any sort. 

"This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of 
war, to be as fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on 
the rumor of an expedition being in preparation in England, 27,000 
militia were assembled to cover the city from an attack of this sort. 
It is apparent that the defences near the city and those at the Narrows, 
indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot be made to pre- 
vent this enterprise." 

General Totten subsequently admits, that there is great doubt 
whether the shoals mentioned are stable enough to warrant building 
upon, and says that "all other means failing, works may be erected 
on Sandy Hook, which will have a good action on the channel, and 
under cover of which bomb-ketches, or steam batteries, or both, may lie. 

" With such an arrangement, there would be little probability of 
the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station." 

To sum up. General Totten substantially admits, 1st, that the 
works at the Narrows will not prevent a landing at Gravesend bay ; 

2d. That it requires works that shall close the exterior mouth of the 
harbor, to prevent such a landing ; 

3i. He proposes to do ivhat he can towards this by a work at Sandy 
Hook. 

Now the East channel runs in a convex line with regard to Sandy 
Hook, and its nearest edge at the closest point is 6,000 yards from 
it, or a mile beyond any possible range of our heaviest ordnance. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 43 

This channel is deep except where it crosses the bar, where there is, 
at low water, always 19 feet. 

By this channel, transports could enter freely, even supposing the 
fort at Sandy Hook built, while their protecting fleet of liners and 
frigates could either enter at night or hastily by day, by the main ship 
channel. 

According to General Totten's own showing, therefore^ the landing 
at Gravesend bay, is a thing to be expected in our next war. 

It is worth while, however, at this point, to endeavor to ascertain 
for ourselves how the case really is : whether the forts at the Narrows 
can prevent a debarkation in Gravesend bay or not ; and this will not 
give us much trouble since we have only to consider the distance of 
the forts from the anchorage and beach, and compare this with the 
distance that the heaviest guns in our service will carry. 

Forts Hamilton and Lafayette are the nearest works to Gravesend 
beach, lying on the same side of the Narrows: the distance from these 
to the point of Coney Island, which is the nearest part of the further 
half of the beach, is 2f miles, while it is 2^ miles to the furthest part 
of the same half, which is the edge of Coney Island itself; so that 
there is a quiet landing place of some two miles in extent, none of 
which lies closer to Fort Hamilton than 2f miles, and the greatest 
part of which is nearly 3 miles from the same point. As to the works 
on Staten Island, Battery Hudson, on the side of the high bank which 
forms a point into the bay, and which is the nearest point of Staten 
Island to Gravesend bay, is 2^ miles from the further edge of the 
channel where it passes Coney Island and the entrance to Gravesend 
bay, and is 3^ miles from the beach of the latter on the near or inner 
side of Coney Island. 

The 10-inch columbiad, with a charge of 18 lbs., and firing a shell 
of 100 lbs., will carry, at the angle of greatest range, 35°, (see 
Thiroux, page 351,) as far as 4,828 yards, according to the Ordnance 
Manual. 

But, lately, it has been found that this charge is too heavy for the 
piece, which is very apt to burst with it ; and by a recommendation 
of the Ordnance Board, approved by the Secretary of War, the charge 
for 10-inch columbiads is restricted to 14 lbs. at the utmost, with the 
additional restriction of not firing solid shot from them. 

Likewise, the 8-inch columbiads are restricted, by this regulation,, to 
charges not exceeding 8 lbs. Their maximum charge was formerly 
15 lbs., which, with a shell, and at the elevation of 2 Yi°, gave a range 
of 4,468 yards. 

What is the diminution of range that follows from a reduction of 
the charges of 10-inch and 8-inch columbiads, respectively ^ and ^, 
(nearly,) I am not able to say ; but we may suppose that it will not 
be less than ^ and ^ of the ranges of the respective pieces. 

This will fix the maximum range of our 10 and 8-inch columbiads 
at 4,225 and 3,351 yards, or in other words, they will not carry as far 
as 2| or 2 miles, respectivel3^ 

It must be recollected that there is, with these ranges, owing to the 
elevation, no ricochet; and, also, that there is no sort of accuracy of 



44 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

fire at high elevations. On this point, Sir H. Douglas says that, 
"elevation is, inversely, the exponent of accuracy." 

At 2^ miles from the battery, therefore, an enemy's vessel cannot 
be reached at all ; and for, say, a half mile inside of this distance, she 
runs very little risk of being struck.* 

Now, the distance from Staten Island to the further side of the 
main ship channel, where it passes in front of the anchorage of Graves- 
end bay, behind Coney Island, being 2^ miles, and it being 3^ miles 
to the shores of the bay, it is a matter of certainty that the largest 
men-of-war can come to an anchor, in a line parallel to the shore in 
question, and protect the landing of an army by their heavy guns, 
being themselves out of the reach of army annoyance from the bat- 
teries on Staten Island, and in perfect safety also from storms ; the 
shallower waters of the bay would admit all sorts of gunboats and 
light draught vessels, and the launches, &c., of the men-of-war. 

The large vessels lying, as sujiposed, opposite Coney Island would 
also be 2^ miles from Forts Lafayette and Hamilton, and consequently 
out of the range of their guns, while the gunboats, flatboats, or launches 
used in the debarkation, could land the troops, all along the inside 
sheltered beach of the island, without running more than a trifling 
risk. This would occur in passing by the point, which lies just inside 
of the extreme range. Immediately beyond this, however, the beach 
retreats so as to be altogether out of reach. In short, the debarkation 
of a foreign army at Gravesend bay is at this moment entirely feasible. 

After the pains to which I have put the reader that he may con- 
vince himself of the fact that a debarkation on Gravesend beach is easy, 
and not to be greatly incommoded, much less prohibited, by the fire 
of any existing or projected fortifications, he will be surprised to learn 
that, even if the beach in question were under the fire of some of our 
works, or if from any other reason there should be objections, on the 
part of the supposed expedition, to the landing of the army upon it, 
there are equal facilities for the latter, out of sight, as well as out of range, 
of all our forts upon the outer or seabeach of Coney Island. 

To explain this, I must briefly describe the lower bay of New York, 
which is not to be judged of (except by persons used to the sea) by 
looking at the charts. 

This lower bay is an immense sheet of water, which has the shape 
on the map of on equilateral triangle, with sides of 15 miles each, the 
points being at Amboy, the Narrows, and the Highlands. Two sides 
are bounded by Staten Island and Jersey ; while the third side, which 
lies due north and south, is partly limited by Coney Island and by 
Sandy Hook, opposite each other, while the intervening space of 7 
miles is open, apparently, to the ocean. 

I say apparently, because '' the bar," which is at two places dry at 
low water, stretches entirely across the space, which, lying between 
Coney Island and the Hook, seems to admit freely the waves of the 
Atlantic. 

There are several channels across the bar, by which vessels find an 

o While on this subject it may be noted that these facts show that the 10-inch seacoast 
mortar is equally effective iu range and accuracy with the columbiads. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 45 

exit, more or less round about, according to their draught of water ; 
the heaviest class being obliged to follow down along the inside of it, 
in a due southerly course, till they come nearly opposite the Hook, 
when they turn suddenly square to the east, and so stand out to sea. 

The track thus followed by the heaviest vessels is called the main 
ship channel, and it is, and is constantly being used, as a harbor ; 
vessels of all sizes anchor in it, and it is considerably smoother in 
easterly weather than the regular quarantine anchorage off Seguine's 
Point, because the latter, which has the same shield from the waves, 
namely, the bar, is more remote from it. 

In an east or southeast gale there is, on the east bank, (which is 
that part of the bar which stretches three miles from Coney Island 
without any channel, and which is, at one point, bare at low water,) a 
continuous line of breakers, which are so violent that they can be 
seen dashing and throwing up foam, from Fort Hamilton ; and the 
force of the sea is thus altogether spent, so that on the inside or west 
of the bank there is no more than a regular swell, in which vessels of 
all tonnage can safely ride at anchor, especially as there is good hold- 
ing ground of mud and sand.* 

The only difference that would be felt by this harbor, if Coney 
Island, instead of the east bank, sheltered it on the east, would be, 
that it would be protected from the force of the wind as well as waves ; 
but, with good holding tackle, the wind can do no harm, and a vessel 
properly provided with it can lie behind the east bank as safely, if 
not as comfortably, as in the North river. 

The landing would be, of course, effected in fine weather, (and 
there are, indeed, few days in summer when the weather is heavy 
enough from the eastward to prevent,) and might take place with 
perfect safety on the outer beach of Coney Island. Along this beach 
there are no breakers in moderate weather, and the swell is mostly 
stopped at the outside of the east bank, so that flatboats and launches 
could make short and easy trips between the ships and the shore. 

The whole operation would be entirely out of the reach of the guns 
of any of the forts, and the beach itself is hidden altogether from the 
latter by the row of sand hills which form the high part of the 
island. 

There is, therefore, a certainty that a foreign army can' be debarked 
on the outer beach of Coney Island, and that it may maintain com- 
munication with its fleet, (the latter having a safe anchorage,) and 
with Halifax, Bermuda, or England, by means of the 14-loot and 
the East channels, without possible molestation from any works that 
are now built, or that have been projected or named by the Engineer 
Bureau. 

But the peril from another quarter is still more evident, and there 
is, if possible, still less to say for the oflScial theory of the defence. 

« This reference to storms must not lead to the impression that they are to be expected 
in summer weather, which is the time when an expedition would probably appear off our 
coasts ; on the contrary, the whole season may pass without a single violent gale; but I 
have said enough to show that even the worst weather would not damage a hostile fleet 
which should station itself just below Coney Island, to land an army, and to keep up 
communications with it and the sea. 



46 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

Long Island Sound is practically an immense roadstead, and on 
the Long Island side there are smaller bays and harbors which offer 
every facility for landing troops and stores. 

Such are Smithtown bay, Huntington bay. Oyster bay_, Hempstead 
harbor, and Manhasset bay, at 40, 30, 20, and 15 miles from New- 
York, respectively. 

It cannot be denied, and in fact it is essentially taken for granted 
by General Totten himself in the report (of 1840) that a landing 
may be expected in one of these bays. 

What, then, is to prevent the enemy from marching on Brooklyn ? 
Nothing according to General Totten' s plan, unless the commander- 
in-chief of the expedition has his head so filled with obsolete military 
science, that he will not " leave a fortress in his rear." 

It is entirely to the chance of the hostile expedition being com- 
manded by a man who has notions exploded sixty years ago by 
Napoleon_, that New York depends for safety. 

Should nothing more be done than I have been able to find recom- 
mended officially to check such an expedition, we will have as a con- 
solation for the plundering and destruction of the cities of New York 
and Brooklyn and the navy yard, the honest but fruitless justification 
of the Austrian, Melas : " This Bonaparte violates all the rules of 
scientific warfare." 



CHAPTER VII. 

CONSIDERATIONS BEARING UPON A NEW DEFENSIVE PLAN. 

Something more effectual than is yet proposed by our Chief Engineer 
is requisite to stop the approach upon New York of a great military 
naval expedition, with all the appliances of modern war, and counting 
its 50,000 or 70,000 men. 

That we must be prepared for such a contingency cannot be denied 
in the face of the facts and numbers of Chapter III, and it follows 
that it is proper to decide at once what is the plan which shall offer 
us the most chances of success in the short but severe campaign which 
we may soon, perhaps, be engaged in, in the protection of the soil, of 
our commerce, our public works, and our dwellings, from the fate of 
Washington and Copenhagen. 

In arranging such a plan of action we must consider : 

1. The nature of the army that is to be resisted ; 

2. That of our own troops ; 

3. The topography of Long Island, including the probable landing 
points ; the line of march of an invading army, the positions to receive 
the attack in ; 

4. The choice of positions for the defence, and the manner in which 
localities may be taken advantage of to increase the chances in our favor ;. 

5. Finally, the best manner of combining artificial, permanent, and 
field works with the natural advantages of ground, so as to attain; 
enough strength without excessive expense. 

An attempt to depreciate the citizen soldiery of America, her best 
safeguard, would be as incompatible with my feelings as it is remote 
from my intentions. 

I need not be reminded of the victories that our militia and volun- 
teers gained in the late war over veteran troops, recently drafted from 
the splendid peninsular army of Wellington ; nor of their successes 
in Mexico, which rival in daring and romantic brilliancy the exploits 
of the soldiers of Cortez, and which they did not decline to purchase 
with losses almost unparalleled in warfare.* 

What our citizen troops have done, they can perform again. Such 
armies as were victorious under Jackson, Scott, and Taylor, are un- 
doubtedly competent to meet in the field any foreign ones of equal force. 

But our history offers no precedent of engagements between armies 
of European proportions ; and the experience of other nations proves, 
that in proportion to the numbers engaged, discipline and unity of 
action become more and more indispensable to success. When bodies 
of 50,000 or 100,000 on a side meet in the open field, individual 
bravery, even when stimulated by patriotism, is less to be prized than 
perfect mutual and reciprocal confidence between the troops, their 
ofiicers, and their commander; and this cannot be infused at once 
into an army, but requires for its development years of active service, 
which perfect each man in the knowledge of his duties, give him the 

« I refer of course to the proportion of the killed and wounded to the number of troops, 
engaged . 



48 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW TORK CITY. 

habit of implicit obedience, and confirm his respect for his superiors. 

It is, no doubt, by tbis principle that Wellington would have jus- 
tified his boast that, " with 70,000 such troops/' as he commanded in 
the peninsula, " he could go anywhere and do anything." 

History offers examples where armies, not wanting in courage,, 
have found their very numbers a disadvantage in battle, and the oc- 
-casion of immense losses in retreat.* 

The British and French troops of the present day are not inferior 
to any that have been heretofore opposed to our arms. Their cam- 
paigns in India, Algeria, and the Crimea, have tempered them to the 
highest pitch of efficiency. 

As to numbers, it is reasonable to count upon a hundred thousand 
such being thrown at once upon our coast ; while in point of arms 
and equipments, we may expect that an invading expedition would 
be amply provided ; for their recent experience has shown our rivals 
exactly what is needed, and in what quantity, in undertakings of 
this sort. 

If we fancy such a force, fresh from the ships, with their arms, 
clothes, and shoes in good order, and with only a day or two days' march 
to perform in order to behold their point of destination, stimulated 
too by the promise of plunder and prize money, we have surely a 
picture calculated to excite uneasiness, and give us cause to cast about 
for the most certain means of safety in such an emergency. 

In calculating beforehand the chances of a battle, there must be 
considered not only the probabilities of victory, but the result to be 
derived from it, and the consequences of defeat. 

If in the battle which will perhaps decide the possession, for exam- 
ple, of Long Island, our arms should be successful, the fruits of vic- 
tory, beyond the glory acquired, would be of a negative kind, being 
limited to the keeping of what we have already got ; for the losses 
would be about equal, and the enemy's ships would receive his beaten 
troops, and protect by their broadsides their embarkation. If, on the 
contrary, our troops should be beaten, there would be no possibility 
of preventing the enemy from advancing without delay to Brooklyn 
heights and the shore of the East river, and there erecting a few 
mortar and howitzer batteries, with which to either burn down New 
York, or compel the alternative of a ransom that would impoverish 
the city ; as to the navy yard, it would be a fair object for destruc- 
tion. 



■■■'•Take the battle of Narva, for instance, in which 80,000 Russians, behind entrench- 
ments, were beaten by the advanced guard of the army of Charles XII, composed of 
4,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, or 8,000 men in all. The Russians lost in this battle 
18,000 men in killed, besides a great number who were drowned in attempting to retreat 
over the bridge of the Narva ; their left wing, also, which had not been engaged, laid 
down its arms the next day when the Swedes prepared to attack it in turn. Charles thus 
made 30,000 prisoners, but he contented himself with ordering them home. 

Charles had landed with 20,000 men ; but was so impatient to raise the siege of Narva, 
that he pushed on with his best troops, routed three Russian corps on the way, and on 
the third day appeared before the Russian lines. His artillery immediately played upon 
and breached the earth-works on the right, when he led his fatigued troops, after a short 
test, to the assault. Voltaire gives the Russians of that time the same character for 
bravery that the Eastern war has since rendered indisputable, and attributes this defeat to 
rheir want of discipline and the habit of warfare. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 49 

In a word, an American defeat on Long Island would involve the 
greatest misfortunes that could occur to New York and Brooklyn ; 
while, on the other hand, a victory would be rewarded with no sub- 
stantial and material gains. 

In this game, where the stakes are so disproportioned, we should at 
least endeavor to have great odds in our favor. 

If, therefore, we could even calculate on opposing to a foreign army, 
landed on Long Island, a force equal in numbers and discipline, or 
which should make up in numbers for any inferiority in discipline, it 
would still be desirable to favor our troops with every advantage that 
can be derived from fortification ; and if the aids of the engineer are 
not to be disdained in this hypothesis, how much ought they to 
be prized in the actual case ; for it is certain that we shall never 
see a disciplined American army of 80,000 or 100,000 men, on Long 
Island ; and it is equally true that no number of raw troops that 
could be collected on the island would be a match, in the field, for 
80,000 or 100,000 veteran troops. 

Considering that the maintaining of large regular armies is pro- 
hibited by the nature of our institutions, it happens fortunately that 
imperfectly disciplined troops pre so well adapted as they are to the 
defence of entrenchments and fortifications : indeed, in this sort of 
warfare, they have, in many instances, surpassed regular troops, in 
obstinacy and devotedness. 

Irregular or undisciplined troops in large masses fail in the field 
because such is the natural course of events ; but place the same men 
behind entrenchments, or otherwise, in such a manner that the duty 
of each consists in defending his post, and you eliminate from the ad- 
verse chances all those which follow from the impossibility of using 
the army on the battlefield like a tremendous machine ; concentrating 
at one point, perhaps, and feigning retreat at another — extending or 
contracting the order of battle, surrounding, outflanking, or surprising 
the enemy — in short, if irregular troops, composed of brave and good 
marksmen, do not, defend entrenchments against odds, even of the 
best soldiers, it is the fault of the entrenchments, or of the manner in 
which they are disposed in them, or of their commander. 

It has, therefore, been the custom of generals in command of raw 
levies, to accustom them to war, by engaging them constantly in small 
affairs; or, if compelled to accept battle, to select a strong position 
that cannot be attacked except in front, and entrench it as much as 
possible ; in arranging the troops care is taken to obviate the necessity 
of changing materially their posts during the engagement. 

The general who is charged with the defence of Brooklyn will, 
therefore, look about him for a favorable position, which shall, besides 
offering facilities for fortification, be situated directly in the path of 
an enemy, landed on any probable part of Long Island, and which 
cannot be outflanked. 

This selection involves of course a thorough personal examination 
of the general features of the coast, its harbors and beaches, and with 
the topography of the island, its hills, plains, and roads, its towns 
and villages, from one end to the other. 
4 



PART II. 

CHAPTEE I. 

DESCRIPTION OF LONG ISLAND. 

Long Island is about 100 miles long ; its outer or southern shore is 
a sandy beach, protected from the direct effect of easterly storms by 
keys, or sandy strips, which inclose between themselves and the main 
land extensive bays ; these last, though shallow, have some deep 
channels, which permit small coasting vessels to navigate them. The 
largest of these bays are Jamaica bay, Great South bay, and Great 
West bay. 

On the north shore we see, instead of level sandy plains, bounded 
by bays of the south side, high bluffs or grassy hills, with clean 
gravelly beaches at their base ; the general line of shore is indented 
by several safe and extensive harbors, which admit ships of the largest 
class. The principal of these are Huntington and Oyster bays. 

The whole sound may in fact be regarded, as far as large vessels 
are concerned, as one harbor, tor there is good anchorage and plenty 
of water throughout it, and it hardly ever happens that there is in 
summer such a storm on it as to oblige vessels to seek shelter ; besides, 
when such is the case, shelter can always be obtained by running 
across the sound to the windward side of it, and anchoring under the 
lee of the land. 

The eastern end of the island is forked, and* the broad expanse 
between the two points, Montauk and Oyster Pond, is so protected by 
these and by some islands, that there are numerous safe bays and 
harbors. 

Gardiner's and Peconic bays, with Sag and Fort Pond harbors, are 
the principal of these. 

To describe Long Island with regard to the facilities it offers for a 
landing by a foreign armj^, it may be said that in the summer months 
a landing is practicable everywhere round its shore. In case of severe 
easterly weather, which may be looked for in winter, and occasionally 
in the spring and fall, the outer beach is covered by breakers, and the 
inlets into the bays on this side are dangerous to enter ; but in all 
weather, except north, northwest, and northeast storms, which need not 
be expected except in the fall or winter gales, a landing can be effected 
on the north side ; and during these gales, when we will suppose a 
fleet separated for a couple of days from its land force, it can find 
shelter, within a short distance, under the north shores of the sound, 
whence it can return and resume its communications, with the force 
debarked, the same day that the storm ceases. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 51 

As to the east end of tlie island, the facilities are perfect for landing 
and keeping up communications with the force landed, except in 
extraordinary weather. 

At the west end, Gravesend bay and Coney Island offer every facility 
for debarkations.; but of this a practical proof was given us in '76 by 
the British, and I have before discussed their capacities. 

The topography of Long Island needs but a short description. 

A chain or ridge of hills runs from Gravesend bay to Oyster Pond 
Point. These hills are perhaps from 130 to 170 feet high, with well 
wooded or grassy slopes. The hills are of gravel, with some clay. 

On the north side the slopes of the hills descend, covered with green, 
to the waters of the sound ; at their foot is a narrow beach of sand 
and gravel, which goes off suddenly into deep water. 

At a few points the hills have been undermined by the waves, and 
present steep gravel banks with boulders at their base. 

On the south side the hills terminate in a fine undulating plain, 
which becomes flat and sandy as it approaches the ocean. 

The only exception to this rule is at Great West bay, where a range 
of low hills commences, and continues so as to form the eastern fork of 
the island, which terminates at Montauk Point 

The farms on Long Island are, on the average, of a fair productive- 
ness, and these would no doubt be taxed to the utmost to aid in the 
support of a foreign force occupying the island. 

The topography of Long Island is therefore such as to lend itself 
easily to all sorts of military operations and manceuvres, and the 
roads which traverse the country, especially the longitudinal ones, 
favor the latter to a considerable degree. 

Thus we have the Long Island railroad, which joins Brooklyn to 
Greenpori ; and there are numerous plank roads and macadamized 
and shell roads, all terminating in Brooklyn, and favoring combined 
concentric marches of several columns upon that city. 

The essential facts of a military nature that relate to Long Island 
may be summed up in a few words : that it is perfectly easy for a 
foreign army to debark on its shores at any time and march upon 
Brooldyn, keeping up constant communication with its ships, and 
supplying itself, to a certain extent, with provisions from the country. 
The great extent of coast open to attack and the natitre of the shores, 
which are, unfortunately, exposed everywhere to the broadsides of 
men-of-war, render it extremely improbable that an American army 
could anticipate and repel the attempt of a grand expedition to debark 
a land force. 

The overwhelming batteries of a fleet, the uncertainty as to the 
time or place of the attempt, and the harassing nature of the move- 
ments of a defensive army which should endeavor to show front to a 
fleet in all its manoeuvres; all these considerations, render it extremely 
impolitic to trust to the repelling of an attempt to land an army on 
Long Island. The other alternative is, that of fighting the enemy 
after he has landed ; and a defensive battle is indicated as offering the 
most chances of success by the nature of our troops and the necessi- 
ties of the occasion. 

If a defensive battle is decided on^ it is of the highest importance to 



52 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

select, in advance, the position on which it is to be fought, and this 
leads us at once to inquire whether there is any one position which 
will interdict the approach of an enemy upon Brooklyn, no matter 
what point of the island he has landed at? 

I believe I can indicate a position which not only satisfies the above 
condition rigorously, but also combines unusual military advantages 
with the property, of capacity of being rendered almost impregnable 
by a few permanent works. 



CHAPTER II. 

DESCRIPTION OF TUB DEFENSIVE POSITION WHICH I PROPOSE TO STRENGTHEN 

BY FORTIFICATIONS. 

In order to form a correct idea of this position I recommend the 
reader to take a " county map of Kings and part of Queens county" 
and look over it, at the same time following my description of the topo- 
graphy ; that is unless he can look at the place itself, which of course 
a military man would do, if possible, before forming an opinion, or 
unless he knows it already _, as is the case with many New Yorkers, 
who are in the habit of driving for pleasure over the fine roads which 
traverse the beautiful district lying between Brooklyn and the sea- 
side. 

The large Coast Survey map, in four sheets, of New York harbor 
and the vicinity, embraces, indeed, this extent of ground ; but since 
this map was made the city of Brooklyn has been built out a great 
distance. The villages near it have become towns ; paved and graded 
streets are to be found where hills and valleys are indicated in the 
map ; hills have been cut down and low spots filled in ; several ceme- 
teries and the Brooklyn reservoir occupy parts of the chain of hills 
which the map indicates as wooded, &c. In a word, this map is alto- 
gether behind the times. 

As to the county maps, they omit the delineation of hills, and con- 
sequently require to be assisted by the description which follows. 

The west end of Long Island is nearly detached from the rest of it 
by the waters of Jamaica bay on the south, and of Flushing bay on 
the north sides ; these penetrate towards each other so much as to 
leave only five miles of land between them. 

The tract of country which is thus partly detached contains nearly 
eighty square miles. It is divided into two nearly equal parts by the 
chain of hills before referred to, which commence at the Nar.'-ows and 
run northeast to about the middle of the space between Flushing and 
Jamaica bays, where they branch, the highest branch keeping on, and 
the lower one turning square to the northwest, and following Flushing 
creek to its outlet in Flushing bay. 

To the north of these hills lies the city of Brooklyn, with the towns 
of Williamsburg, Astoria, Newtown, and Bedford. 

Having now sketched the outlines of the picture, it remains to fill 
in the details of that part of it with which we are particularly con- 
cerned. 

The range of hills forms an important feature in a military respect, 
and besides offers an excellent panoramic view of the district lying 
between itself and the sea, which is the part of the country to which 
I particularly invite attention. 

This range beging with a high hill overlooking the Narrows and 
Fort Hamilton. 



54 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

Standing on the summit of this and facing to the right, we look 
down upon the regular lines of grassy embankment, and the rows of 
casemate chimneys, which indicate Fort Hamilton ; and upon the red 
streak, which a little closer, but still three-fourths of a mile off, marks 
the masonry parapet of the redoubt. The purple hills of Staten Island 
and the intervening glistening strait of the Narrows, form the back 
grounds of the picture. 

Looking directly forward, that is, in a southerly direction, we see a 
gently undulating cultivated plain, which, with the exception of a 
slight wooded rise at the village of Bath, on the water side^ sinks 
insensibly to the level of the sea. The belt of blue water beyond, 
fringed at its shallow edges with brown, which, limiting the plain on 
the right, extends itself diagonally to the front and left, is Gravesend 
bay, where the British landed in 1776. The thin strip of white 
sandhills beyond the bay, and separating it from the sea, is Coney 
Island. Beyond this again lies a broad strip of blue ocean ; the faint 
line on its surface, which looks like a low beach or island, is Sandy 
Hook, and the indistinct hills which bound the view and appear to 
overhang the Hook, are the highlands of Neversink. 

Turning gradually towards the left, or eastward, we observe that 
Coney Island, after it ceases to form a breakwater, protecting Gravesend 
bay from the breakers of the Athmtic, extends itself far to the east, 
being separated from the mainland by meadows and marshes, and by 
a narrow creek. 

The view which presents itself, if we turn still further to the left, 
can be seen to better advantage from our next stand-point, which is 
more elevated than the present one, and which faces more to the east. 

This point is Ocean hill, in Greenwood cemetery, the highest or 
next to the highest point of land on Long Island ; to reach it we will 
follow the ridge, observing that the latter subsides almost to the level 
of the plain before we arrive at the limits of Greenwood, and that 
this cemetry is seated upon the opposite declivity, and is sufficiently 
extensive to cover the whole side of the hill which culminates at the 
spot already referred to. 

From Ocean hill we can see, in a southerly direction, the Highlands, 
Sandy Hook, and the ocean, in nearly the same relative positions as 
they appeared to take when seen from our first elevation ; but the 
view of Gravesend bay and Coney Island is intercepted by a slight 
rise of land, on which is the village of New Utrecht. Looking east- 
erly, a slight rolling plain is spread before us, reaching so far that we 
can hardly make out in the distance the houses and spires of Flatlands, 
and beyond that village the broad expanse of Jamaica bay, flattened 
into a thin belt; while the sandy key, which separates it from the blue 
ocean horizon, is almost indistinguishable. 

This key, which is called Rockaway beach, stretches almost as far 
to the eastward as we can see from this point, for there is a high spot 
on our left which limits the landscape in this direction ; we notice, 
however, that the bay does terminate within the segment of the 
horizon, which is open to our view, since our attention is attracted by 
the white hotels at Rockaway, which, reflecting* the sun strongly. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 55 

look nearer tliau they really are, and mark where the beach joins 
the land. 

Looking more downwards, we see, close by, the village of Flatbush, 
which gave the name to the defeat of our troops in 1776, and exam- 
ining the country in the vicinity more carefully, we distinguish several 
plank roads leading to Canarsie, Batli, Gravesend, and Coney Island, 
as well as some country roads. 

Quitting Ocean hill, and proceeding still further eastward on the 
ridge, we shortly arrive at Mount Prospect, where we see the same 
picture as that just described, from a slightly different point of view ; 
in front, and close by, lies the town of Flatbush ; and the passes forced 
by the British in 1776 are also in sight before us. 

As we follow the ridge eastward from Mount Prospect it subsides 
considerably, and, at the point where it is crossed by the railroad, it is 
almost lost ; immediately to the east of this low place, however, is a 
high hill, which is occupied by the cemetery of the Evergreens. 

A short distance beyond the Evergreens cemetery, and on the summit 
of the ridge, is the new Brooklyn reservoir, and immediately next to 
it is a cluster of cemeteries, of which the principal one is that on 
Cypress hill. 

On the highest point of this hill is an observatory, which affords a 
magnificent view of the entire horizon ; ascending it and turning our 
backs on the North prospect, which embraces the cities of New York and 
Brooklyn, the North and East rivers, and the noble bay, we see in 
front a handsome undulating plain, dotted with houses, spreading 
out till it loses itself in meadows and marshes, which are limited by 
the waters of Jamaica bay. The village of East New York and the 
plank road to the town of Jamaica are seen in the foreground. 

Jamaica bay, which is rather a network of creeks and islands, is 
also fully overlooked from this hill ; the sand strip which protects it 
from the ocean, and Rockaway inlet, through which the creeks all 
issue out, are likewise in full sight, as well as a broad strip of the sea, 
which alone bounds the view. 

Proceeding from Cypress hill still eastward, Ave find the ridge con- 
tinuous, and maintaining a considerable altitude ; at the distance of 
three miles, and after crossing the Myrtle avenue and Williamsburg 
plank roads to Jamaica, we arrive at a summit which deserves especial 
mention — I refer to the one overlooking the source of Flushing creek, 
which is a meadow called the " Head of the Fly." 

Looking southward from this hill we see the plain limited by 
Jamaica bay, as in the view from Cypress hill ; turning eastward we 
see the ridge prolonged as far as the eye can reach, but at our feet is 
a hollow or depression in it_, which in a manner divides the range at 
this point. (This hollow is traversed by the road from Newtown to 
Jamaica, which last lies three miles off" in an easterly direction.) 

Turning to the north we see the flat, reedy meadows, and swamps, 
in which Flushing creek rises ; below them, occasionally, the windings 
of the creek itself; beyond, the waters of Flushing bay. into which it 
empties, and finally the East river. 

The valley down which we have just looked, and which, with 



56 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

Jamaica hay, more than half cuts the island in two, is limited on 
either hand by high sloping banks. 

The western bank, which is the most important to this description, 
is admirably adapted for the posting of troops or the locating of forti- 
fications, for the purpose of interdicting tlie passage of the meadows 
or creek to an invading army. 

For a mile in advance of these heights there is nothing to obstruct a 
clear view of the creek and its marshy borders, and following the bank 
down towards the bay we arrive shortly at a hill which lies on this side 
of a small creek, which maybe considered the limit, in this direction, 
of the position which needs to be occupied to cut off the eastern part 
of the island from Brooklyn. I propose it for the limit, because here 
the natural obstacle to an enemy's march, formed by the creek, be- 
comes so considerable, that a position behind it would be strong 
enough without fortifications, provided it were properly watched and 
guarded. 

If the reader has now gained a good idea of the topography of the 
west end of Long Island, he will be able to follow the route I will 
now indicate as traversing the line which I propose to fortify. 

Commencing at the abovementioned hill, on the west side of Flush- 
ing creek, to proceed up the creek, along the heights which border it 
and the meadows in which it rises, to the hill above the " Head of the 
Fly;" here the line goes obliquely down the last named hill, preserv- 
ing its southerly course, and gaining the plain ; it then passes the 
Union and Centreville race grounds, and joins the marshes of Jamaica 
bay at a certain creek, near Torbell's landing. 

This part of the line I shall call its eastern division. The line now 
turns an obtuse angle, and runs southwest, along the meadows, till 
it reaches Flatlands, near Bergen Island ; this part of the line is the 
centre division. 

From Flatlands the line turns at another obtuse angle, nearly equal 
to the first, and runs east to Fort Hamilton, ascending obliquely the 
lofty hill which is mentioned in the first part of this description. 

The whole length of this line is 14^ miles, counting between the 
extreme points that need to be fortified ; and I propose to locate upon 
the line seventeen permanent redoubts, to be built immediately ; the 
spaces between these to be closed, when the occasion arises, by earth- 
work entrenchments. 



CHAPTER III. 

GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF FORTIFICATION THAT ARE: 
APPLICABLE TO THE DEFENCE OP BROOKLYN. 

I have two reasons for incorporating into this memoir the synopti- 
cal and analytical description of certain celebrated lines of fortification, 
which will be found in the following chapter. 

In the first place, I wish to prevent unprofessional readers from 
forming the opinion that my proposition for the defence of Brooklyn 
is visionary and impracticable, owing to the extent of the line of 
works of which it involves the construction. 

This extent of 14 miles will appear reasonable in every point of 
view, when^ after a perusal of this chapter, the reader shall compare 
the projected line with the others described ; he will find that the for- 
mer is not only shorter, but vastly more susceptible of an obstinate 
defence, in proportion to its development, than several famous lines, 
which have, in both recent and more remote wars, been of the great- 
est service to generals in embarrassing and perilous circumstances. 

The proposition that a given extent of position can be more strongly 
fortified by the system of works here advocated than by any other 
which has ever been adopted, except, indeed, the Russian lines at Se- 
vastopol, which are models for study and imitation, (and, to a cerlain- 
degree, the French lines at the same place,) may be demonstrated by 
an argument which in brief amounts to this: 

The two most essential requisites in lines have always been, as they 
are at present, the presenting everywhere, to obstruct the advance of 
the enemy, difficult material obstacles, which shall be rendered as near 
impassable as possible by the fire of its defenders ; (this involves, evi- 
dently, the disposing of the troops in such a manner that their mus- 
ketry shall reach every portion of the space directly in front of the 
lines.) And secondly, that the troops must not be so scattered along 
the entrenchments, in order to fulfil strictly the first condition, as to 
render any point of the line weak, and powerless to resist a violent 
attack by a large column which should attempt to surprise or storm 
the works. 

These two conditions are now, and have hitherto been, universally 
recognized, but have been, oiuing to the limited range of the musket, 
difficult to combine in the same lice. Thus we find in history exam- 
ples where each has been altogether conceded to the other, according 
to circumstances ; among which the most prominent in influencing the 
general's decision have been the nature of the country, whether inac- 
cessible or level, and that of the troops at his command, whether 
regular soldiers or undisciplined. 

There are also instances of a general's having been enabled, by- 
making good use of the advantages of a position, and profiting by the 
excellence of his troops, to satisfy both conditions in his defensive ar- 
rangements ; for when the works can be assailed but from one direc- 
tion at a time, and, if the troops are accustomed to manoeuvres, a suit- 



58 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

able force can be amassed on that portion which is indicated by the 
enemy's movements as the point of attack. 

But this inherent difficulty, which, in former times, has thus ham- 
pered all sorts of schemes for the defence of extended positions, has 
been dissipated by the invention of the Minie rifle, which, by expand- 
ing the range at which infantry fire is effective, in an immense degree, 
gives the engineer the fullest latitude of conception, and renders easy, 
both of design and execution, plans which may combine in themselves 
every desirable defensive property, and which are adapted as well for 
undisciplined troops as for regular soldiers. 

I must here enlarge a little upon the several points of the foregoing 
argument, more especially for the purpose of making it evident that 
the range of the infantry musket is the guiding element of all projects 
of fortification, and so explain the possibility of so great an improve- 
ment, in the construction of lines, being consequent upon the invention 
of Captain Minie. 

The lines that have been actually constructed may be divided into 
three varieties, which correspond with the three cases mentioned above; 
being respectively adapted to the fulfilment of either of the two es- 
sential conditions of defence, independently of the other, and to the 
c6mbination of the two in the same project. 

The first variety includes all lines Avhich consist of uninterrupted 
entrenchments, which present no gaps except where roads lead through 
them. The second comprises those composed of redoubts, or detached 
independent works of any kind, which are expected to prohibit the 
enemy's crossing the position they occupy, by their musketry and 
artillery fire ; and, finally, there are lines which combine the two 
sorts of entrenchments just mentioned. 

Continuous lines are weakest, from the fact that, if the enemy suc- 
ceeds in forcing his way through them at any point, even should no 
more than a single battalion effect an entrance at first, a way is 
cleared for the main columns. The entire system of entrenchments is 
taken in the rear, and the defenders find themselves in one of the 
most perilous situations that can occur, namely, with their line of 
battle pierced, and either of the two parts of the army, or both, liable 
to an irresistible flank attack. 

It is noticeable that the very pains which may be taken to guard 
against minor attacks or false attacks, by garrisoning equally every 
point of the line, render this catastrophe more imminent ; for the evil 
is thereby incurred, of presenting everywhere only a feeble rank of 
troops to meet the attack of the overwhelming columns of a concen- 
trated attack ; so that an army posted .behind such entrenchments, 
even though superior in numbers to its assailants, would probably be 
disastrously beaten if the latter should attack in heavy masses at dif- 
ferent points at once ; preventing the defenders from concentrating on 
these points by false attacks, as well as by such celerity of action as 
should leave them no time to effect the requisite manoeuvres. A 
striking exemplification of this remark is to be found in the forcing 
of the French lines at Turin in 1706, where Marshals Feuillade and 
Marsin awaited the attack of the Austrians under Prince Eugene and 
the Duke of Savoy, who, although with an inferior army, carried the 
entrenchments and totally defeated the former; the immediate fruit of 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 59 

which victory was the capture of the French artillery and baggage, 
and the raising of the siege. In the attack Eugene divided his army 
into eight columns, and directed them against the weakest part of the 
French lines. 

The second variety comprises all arrangements of detached works, 
whether enclosed or open at the gorge, and in a single line or in 
quincunx order, which aim at preventing the passage of the enemy by 
their fire alone, or by the additional resistance of troops in the field. 

Detached works are better adapted than continuous entrenchments 
to the strengthening of a tolerably extensive position, particularly if 
regular troops are to be had for its defence ; for in this case the works 
may be regarded merely as auxiliaries, and as sheltering, to a certain 
extent, manceuvres effected in their rear ; or they may defend particu- 
lar important points, and so advantageously take the place of large 
bodies of troops which might be better employed elsewhere. 

I can think of no example better calculated to illustrate my remarks 
on this head than is afforded by the battle of Pultawa, where Peter 
the Great gained his first but inestimable victory over the Swedes ; a 
victory which resulted in a considerable degree from his judicious loca- 
tion of detached redoubts, and from his exact appreciation of their 
intrinsic merits, and of their precise sphere of usefulness in a defensive 
battle. 

The Czar not only originated on this occasion this modification of 
defensive works, but brought to perfection the theory and practice of 
them, as combined with field operations. 

He established his cavalry on the right of his line, placing it in the 
intervals between seven redoubts, which were well supplied with 
artillery. His infantry were behind slighter entrenchments of, I 
believe, the continuous order. 

Charles XII had decided on attacking the Russian right with his 
cavalry, (and had, to favor this manoeuvre, despatched Greneral Creutz, 
with 5,000 cavalry, the night before, with orders to make a detour 
and fall upon the flank of the same wing simultaneously with the 
general advance ; this body had, however, lost its way, and failed to 
•co-operate.) The assault of the Swedish horsemen was completely 
successlul, and the Russians were driven from their redoubts in confu- 
sion. However, the latter now opened their fire of artillery, and irom 
this cause (and the non-appearance of Creutz' s division) Charles' 
troops were checked, and the Czar found means to rally his c ivalry, 
which, charging in turn, forced their former assailants to retreat, 
after experiencing great losses. 

This seems to have been the decisive action of the day. The Rus- 
sian infantry immediately issued from their lines and attacked the 
Swedes, while their cavalry, dashing to the rear, cut off their commu- 
nication with Pultawa, and cut to pieces the reserve of 3,000 men. 

This may be called the first period of the battle, the result of which 
is well known. Charles' irremediable defeat was owing in part to the 
enemy's superiority in numbers and artillery, for he had but 21,000 
troops in the field and 4 guns, against the 70,000 men and T2 pieces 
of the Russians ; and the failure of Creutz was also against him. But 
the serious check which his cavalry received, and which spoiled the 
plan of attack, and gave the Czar an opportunity for his subsequent 



60 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

brilliant manoeuvreSj was independent of the disparity of numbers^ 
and was due altogether to the redoubts on the right flank. 

It must here be recollected that the redoubts in question were in 
the first place strictly auxiliaries, and that Peter's disciplined troops 
gained the victory by a counter attack, and also that the position de- 
fended was of small extent. 

It is a different affair when a position of many miles in extent de- 
pends principally upon lines of works for its strength, and especially 
in case the defenders are other than veteran troops. 

The battle of Fontenoy (1745) furnishes another instance in point. 
On this occasion the French line was strengthened on the right by 
the village of Antoin, next by that of Fontenoy, and on the left by 
the wood of Barri, which had been fortifi(>d, in order to render it 
equally defensible with the villages, by three redoubts. 

The Duke of Cumberland, after the Hanoverians had been twice 
repulsed before Antoin, and the English three times before Fontenoy, 
decided to attack the left wing, and ordered General Ingoldsby to 
carry the redoubt which lay nearest to Fontenoy. 

The general, however, on approaching it, declined to assault it 
before he should receive a battery of cannon ; and as much time was 
thus lost, the duke ordered the advance to be made in column between 
the redoubt and the village, and under the fire of both. 

The indomitable bravery of the British enabled them thus to pene- 
trate the French lines, but it was with immense losses, which, though 
insufficient to stop the advance, still must have had a great effect on 
the troo})S, and prepared their commander for giving the order to 
retreat, which followed the counter attack executed by the " Maison- 
du-Roi," or household troops of France. 

That Marshal Saxe himself attributed a considerable share of bis 
glory to the redoubts mentioned, appears from his speech to the king 
after the victory. He said: " 8ire, I have to reproach myself with 
not having placed another redoubt between the wood and Fontenoy; 
but I did not believe any general would risk passing through the 
interval." 

I adduce the above example merely to give force to my remarks 
concerning the proper sphere and adaptation of detached works. 

In discussing the merits of lines composed of these latter, as they 
have been employed, or could have been employed, previous to the 
introduction of the long-range infantry rifle, the following considera- 
tions occur : 

To impede sufficiently the advance of the enemy through the gaps 
between them, the redoubts should not be further apart than double 
the range of musketry. On this account, and because of the limited 
distance at which the musket is effective, the number of redoubts 
must be great to enable them to supfiort a long line properly. The 
consequence follows that each one must be small, and have a weak 
garrison, and hence there is little reliance to be placed on the indi- 
vidual resistance of these redoubts, and but a slight effect can be 
expected from their fire. 

The above consideration leads us to an estimate of the minimum 
number of inclosed works that can form a defensive system, for they 
must be within 500 or 600 yards of each other, at the furthest, if the 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 61 

ordinary infantry musket is the arm of the troops ; but whenever the 
fortifications have been regarded as the main reliance of the defence — 
and this is the case we are investigating — the redoubts^ or lunettes, 
have been placed within 250 or 3U0 yards of each otlier, so that the 
difficulty, thus touched upon, becomes very doubly serious, and has 
this consequence : that to derive the greatest benefit from inclosed 
works alone in the defence of extended positions, they must be few in 
number, and the intention must be abandoned of forcing the enemy 
to pass under their fire, and experience great loss, in order to cross the 
lines. 

As there is no material obstacle between the works to retard the 
columns of attack, this conclusion amounts to placing the aid derived 
from the fortifications, when they are of this sort, in a subordinate 
estimation, coraj)ared to the active defence which is expected from the 
troops in the field. 

It is plain, therefore, that the system of defence for long lines, which 
involves the use of detached ivorks only (unless, indeed, the country 
is of a very rugged and mountainous or otherwise broken and inac- 
cessible nature,) is worse fitted than continuous systems for a defence 
by irregular troops. 

Here the reader will please to rtcoUect the abstract of the argument 
in hand, and note that ths above reflections, which are suggested by, 
and refer to, only those lines that have been constructed (in actual 
warfare) before the eastern war, do not apply in such a degree to simi- 
lar works that may hereafter be thrown up, because of the improve- 
ments which have within a few years been made in the habitual fire- 
arm of the infantry soldier, an element in warfare which forms the 
very foundation of ail plans of fortification, whether temporary or 
permanent. 

The smooth-bore musket, (which had not indeed received much im- 
provement, in regard to range, since Peter the Great and Turenne de- 
fended with it the entrenchments of Pultawa and Dunkirk,) was con- 
sidered by military writers of the date of Wellington, and up to the 
time when the Minie rifle was invented, to be effective — that is, be 
tolerably accurate of aim, and to cause mortal wounds, at ranges inside 
of two hundred yards ; and three hundred yards was the furthest 
limit at which deadly effects were expected from it. 

It is by a comparative estimate that the prodigious effects of the 
Minie rifle may be judged of by those who have not had the advantage 
of witnessing its performances ; and such of my readers may, by re- 
ferring to the tables in my first " Memoir on Fortification," assure 
themselves of the correctness of the following statement : that the 
Minie rifle, or the new United States regulation rifle musket, is four 
times as accurate at six hundred yards, as the musket (smooth-bore) is 
at three hundred yards. As to the force of the elongated projectile 
of the new piece, it is sufficient to say, that at one thousand yards it 
will pierce through and through a pine plank of three inches thick. 
At Bomarsund a French battery was " exceedingly annoyed" (in 
the language of the official account) by the fire of some Finnish rifle- 
men, who were stationed in high points of the Keep, although the 
range was 900 yards. During the siege of Sevastopol the allied bat- 
eries were repeatedly silenced by the Russian riflemen in the " rifle 



62 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

pits," which were between six hundred and seven hundred yards dis- 
tant ; and the effects of this fire were so severe that the pits were or- 
dered to be taken at any hazard ; the great losses sustained in the 
execution of this order is a proof that the necessity for it must have 
been great. 

It may, therefore, he considered perfectly demonstrated by experi- 
mental practice, and by actual warfare, that the detached works, which 
may be thought accessary to strengthen future defensive positions, may 
be placed more than twice as far apart as in former times, and still 
fulfil the desirable condition of perfectly sweeping by their fire all the 
ground over which they are distributed. It follows from this, that to 
protect a given extent of country, and form a defensive system, half as 
many redoubts as were formerly requisite will now suffice ; and hence, 
the number of troops disposable for their garrison remaining the same, 
each one may be made larger, more capable of defence individually ^ 
and constituting more of an impediment to the enemy ; and, in fine, 
such a system may be made to combine every desirable requisite a& 
constituting a highly del'ensive artificial military position, with the 
sole exception of not presenting a continuous material obstacle to the 
enemy. 

If, therefore, we combine a continuous line with a system of large 
detached works at 1,200 or 1,400 yards intervals, we shall have as 
perfect a system of fortification as is possible or can be desired. 

The preceding discussion on continuous and on detached lines has 
been longer and more elaborated than I intended ; but as it has de- 
veloped fully all the military elements of the problem of defending 
with undisciplined troops, or with inferior numbers, an extensive po- 
sition, we can, in considering the third class of lines, spare ourselves 
the pains of theoretical analysis, and form a correct judgment upon 
the lines which I propose for the protection of Brooklyn and New 
York, by simply submitting the scheme to the test of the general princi- 
ples already elucidated, having the data of a knowledge of the topo- 
graphy and extent of the position, and a description of the system of 
fortification which is to be adopted. 

But, though a theoretical consideration of the third class of lines is 
here superfluous, an example will be of use as serving to fix definitely 
the notions which the preceding reflections give rise to ; and I will, 
therefore, briefly refer to the wonderful lines by which Todleben ena- 
bled the garrison of Sevastopol to resist so long the most tremendous 
maritime expedition that the world ever saw. 

These works, which are described by many authors, should be studied 
by every officer who professes to reflect upon the principles of his art. 
Nothing can surpass them in boldness of design ; and never will there 
be seen a more masterly adaptation of detached works, and continuous 
entrenchments, to the topography of a position. In this instance it 
was the location of the works alone which gave the line any strength ; 
for the different fragments of it were, from the short time allowed for 
their construction, of no more than a minimum strength, and formed, 
intrinsically, insignificant obstacles. Nothing, also, can more promi- 
nently display the military genius and originality of the modern 
Vauban, than his having seized the opportunity offered by the arm.ing 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 63 

of the Russian infantry by the Liege rifle, to expand the scale of for- 
tification at once to four times the dimensions which it had been re- 
stricted to by the contracted range of the smooth-bore infantry musket. 

[The report of Capt. G. B. McCleUan, accompanied by a map, gives 
the best description of the lines in question that I have seen ; and I 
am indebted to it for the following abridged special account :] 

I will refer my readers to this, for definite information relating to 
the topography of the ground occupied by the lines ; for my present 
purpose it is sufficient to state that they formed a semi-circle resting on 
the harbor at both extremities, and having an extent of over tour 
miles ; their site is varied by hills and valleys, running on the west 
side parallel, and on the east, perpendicular to^ the general direction of 
the works. 

The line fortified may be divided into seven fronts — that is, units — 
each one being composed of a continuous_entrenchment, resting at each 
end on strong detached works ; the first is from the left of the line to 
the Little Redan, its length being nine hundred yards ; the second 
from the latter point to the MalakhoiF, seven hundred yards ; the 
third lies between the Malakhofif and Great Redan, and is one thousand 
one hundred and sixty yards long ; the fourth reaches from the Great 
Redan to the Flag- staft' bastion, and is one thousand six hundred and 
seventy yards long, or almost a mile; the fifth is from the latter point 
to the Central bastion, five hundred and fifty yards ; the sixth ex- 
tends to the Quarantine bastion, one thousand four hundred yards ; 
the last front is one thousand yards long. 

The familiar names of the Malakhoff, Redan, &c., refer to the- 
works which were first constructed by Todleben when he undertook to 
fortify Sevastopol, on the land side, in the shortest possible time. 

He commenced by occupying the important points by detached 
WORKS GENERALLY CLOSED AT THE GORGE. The first efforts of the garrisou 
were directed toward giving these sufficient strength to resist assault; 
afterwards, they were connected by re-entering lines of a weaker pro- 
file, which served to enfilade the ravines and flank the main works. 
These lines were generally, though not always, continuous. 

As to the theory of the defence, the Russian engineers appear to 
have relied upon the collateral works for flanking defences, and ar- 
ranged so as to obtain a sweeping fire from these over the ground 
lying in front of either of the independent detached works, 2)referring 
to take their chance of stopping the enemy, by heavy losses, before 
he arrived at the ditches, rather than devote their means to the im- 
mediate flanking, at short range, of these ditches.* 

*The most interesting details connected witli these lines are, the rifle-pits and the bomb- 
proofs. 

The latter were ample in number. They were sometimes under the rampart, some- 
times under the second line of defence, often under special traverses, and occasionally 
entirely imder ground, and even hollowed in the solid rock. The underground ones are 
considered by Captain McClellan the best, as in that position they would afford no cover 
or other advantages to an assailant who might gain a temporary footing in the salient of 
the work. 

The lifle-pits consisted sometimes of a little pile of stones, or baskets of earth, enougb 
to shelter one man ; while the largest were semi-circular excavations that would hold forty 
men. These were arranged, in front of the Volhynian redoubt, in two lines, forming a 
salient aagle 250 yards in advance of the work. 



CHAPTER IV. 

SYNOPTICAL ACCOUNT OF SOME CELEBBATED LINES. 

It is unnecessary to go very far back into history to get enough 
•examples of extensive lines to serve to deduce general principles from. 
It is, however, certain that the most celebrated generals of all ages 
have relied upon them to extricate themselves from positions of great 
danger. 

It was by means of strong lines that Ctesar resisted a much superior 
army of Gauls at Alexia. Turcnne made use of double lines at the 
jsiege of Dunkirk. Prince Eugene covered his army, while besieging 
Lille in 1704, from the attacks of the Duke of Burgundy by lines. 
The French lines at Turin, in 1706, have an unfortunate celebrity, 
from the facility with which they were stormed by Prince Eugene; the 
ill arrangement of the works, and their weakness, combined with the 
bad generalship exhibited by Marshal Feuillade in attempting to 
defend entrenchments that were intended, like most lines of circum- 
vallation, only to resist surprises by small parties, to cause the defeat 
of the French and the raising of the siege. 

In 1709 the French lines at Malplaquet were forced by the allies 
under Marlborough and Eugene ; but so terrible were the losses of the 
latter, that they experienced all of a defeat but the name. 

As it was, the lines were incomplete, and the position itself was ob- 
jectionable on account of its separating the French army into portions 
which must each depend on its own resources, as it could not be suc- 
cored if driven back. 

There were some hollow ways, also, by which the position could be 
approached, and certain passes through the forest in front which had 
not been well defended. In addition, the French had not outposts in 
this woods beyond the abattis, so that their general was ignorant of 
the movements of the enemy till the latter had approached near the 
position. 

With regard to the nature of the entrenchments themselves, much 
fault is to be found with them for being open in the rear, and also 
presenting intervals by which the enemy could penetrate ; this weak 
disposition was not strengthened, as it should have been, to make it 
consistent with the intention of a " line with intervals," by strong 
enclosed works ; on the contrary, none of the latter were used. 

Above all the position was susceptible of being turned, and in the 
battle (which was conducted by Eugene with great skill) it was turned ; 
this circumstance alone would have decided the French to retreat, but 
they did not do so till after night, and the allies were not aware of 
their having lelt the field till next morning. 

The latter were, however, too much weakened and disordered by 
their losses to pursue. 

In 1710, the French armies having been reduced to a sirictly defen- 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 65 

sive policy, Marshal Villars fortified and occupied, as a frontier defence, 
the line extending from the sea, at the mouth of the Oanche river, to 
the Meuse ; first following the Canche, then across a divide to a river 
flowing into the Scarpe, at Arras, and down the Scarpe to the Scheldt, 
at Valenciennes ; from this across a divide to the Sambre, and down 
this to the Meuse, at Namur. 

The enemy was in advance of the left of the centre, besieging the 
fortified town of Betteune. 

The object of the greater portion of the line was to prevent maraud- 
ing expeditions of the enemy, and for this purpose the rivers, where 
they existed, formed a sufficient obstacle^ if defended simply by patrols ; 
and between Valenciennes and Landrecy a continuous line of field works 
served equally well ; the patrols, or "flying camps,"' were furnished 
and supported by the fortified towns along the line. 

The^ portion extending from the Canche river to Arras was unpro- 
tected/by any natural obstacle, and was directed in front of the enemy ; 
it was here the French army encamped, and the line was of, say, six- 
teen or twenty miles in length, formed by a series of redans, located 
with regard to the configuration of the ground, and strengthened by 
redoubts and by marshes formed by backing up the streams. 

This part of the line was chiefly intended to protect the French 
army in its manoeuvres to the right or left, for the purpose of opposing 
the allies in their attempts upon either of the fortified places of the 
frontier. ******* 

The "lines of the Queich" were first fortified in 1743, when they 
consisted of detached works, in the location of which but little atten- 
tion was paid to reciprocal support. 

During the seven years war, in 1760, the line was re-established, 
and the general arrangement and ensemble of the works were very 
much improved. 

During the war of the French revolution, in 1797, the line was 
again put in a defensive state, but on a plan not exactly the same as 
in 1760. 

The following is a description of the lines as they existed in 1760: 

To comprehend their object, it is necessary to state that they were 
situated so as to close the passage into France which lies between the 
Vosges mountains and the Rhine ; being thus a complete barrier to 
an invading army coming from Mayence, or the Palatinate, above that 
city. 

The extent of the line was about fifteen miles ; its left was the town 
of Anweiler, which was surrounded by a loopholed wall, and which 
closed the debouche through the mountains, by which, otherwise, the 
line might be turned on this flank. 

The right rested on the Rhine, was protected in front by a large 
marsh, and was strengthened by a village^, which was fortified with 
care. The centre was protected by the fortified city of Landau. 

From Anweiler through the mountain valley of the Queich were 
fortified posts, strengthened by inundations effected by dams thrown 
across the small tributaries of the river. 

At the point where the mountains subside into I he plain was a vil- 
lage, which was fortified and surrounded by seven redoubts ; between 
5 



66 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

this and Landau the line was protected by the Queich, which could 
be raised by mill-dams so as to inundate its banks, and received addi- 
tional support Irom a canal in rear of the latter ; hence no entrench- 
ments were thought necessar}^ on this portion, especially as they were^ 
for some distance, under the fire of the artillery of Landau. 

Below, or to the right of Landau, the first mile and a half was 
formed of a continuous redan line, which was so disposed as to ri^tain 
the waters of the river and create a wide marsh in front ; a lunette 
and a redoubt were stationed in advance, and a mill and an entrenched 
village strengthened the position. 

For a thiidof the distance from this to the Rhine, the line was 
formed of slight entrenchments preceded by small inundations, on the 
farther side of which two entrenched villages and two enclosed works 
were situated. 

From the last point indicated, to the right, the position was pro- 
tected by field works of the nature of a cremaillere line, adapted care- 
fully to the ground, and laid out with great skill, so as to supply the 
want of a natural strength equal to that of the other positions ; the 
continuous line was strengthened by advanced detached works. The 
extreme right was upon high ground, with a steep ravine in front, 
which was occupied by redoubts and strengthened by abattis. The 
marsh in front has already been mentioned. 

There was every facility througliout the line for communication 
from one end to the other, by good roads running the whole length 
of it, in its rear ; and on the left half of it there were several parallel 
roads, so that communications would not be interrupted by the enemy 
even if he should gain a footing inside of the line. 

This line is a highl}' instructive iustance of a frontier barrier, 
adapted not only to resist the invasion of a large army, but also cal- 
culated to secure the country in the rear from marauding j^arties, 
which might otherwise enter for purposes of plunder. 

The continuous riature of the line was intended to effect the latter 
object, and it was expected that the fortified villages and redoubts, and 
especially the Place of Landau, would (like the inclosed works I re- 
commend in my project for the fortification of Brooklyn) enable an 
army of defence, by occupying them strongly, and calculating on 
meeting the enemy, at any point of the line that might be forced by 
him, with a reserve, to repel a much superior army. * * * 

In 1761, Frederick the Great found himself reduced to the greatest 
extremities ; he was hard pushed by the Austrian and Russian armies; 
the great disparity of forces forbade his receiving battle, and to retreat 
would be to lose Schweidnitz, and otherwise greatly imperil the cam- 
paign, which was a critical one for Prussia. 

From this danger, the greatest he had ever encountered, Frederick 
saved himself by a stroke as daring as it was well combined. He 
occupied and entrenched the position of Buntzelwitz, near Schweidnitz, 
where liis army could receive an attack with every chance of success ; 
at the same time he prevented the investment and siege of Schweid- 
nitz, covered Breslau, and kept within reach of his magazines. 

These famous lines formed a sort of oblong, with six salient angles; 
these last were located on projecting and commanding hills or spurs ; 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 67 

he whole position was formed by a cbain of hills of different declivi- 
ties, varying from steep to gentle, and separated from each other by 
several brooks ; the two principal of these covered the front. The 
perimeter of the camp measured from twelve to seventeen miles, ac- 
cording to an estimation, around the most salient and detached works, 
or round the more continuous line in the rear. The ground inclosed 
was a fine plain, adapted to manoeuvres, and a wood, which stood in 
front, had the effect of hiding the latter in a great degree from the 
enemy's view. All the hills were strongly entrenched by works 
which held a numerous artillery, and slighter lines connected these 
points. The whole perimeter of the position was also surrounded by 
abattis, trous-de-loup, and fougasses ; and though put in a respectable 
attitude of defence by ten days and nights' incessant labor, directed 
and supervised by the King himself, the Prussians did not cease to 
improve their lines during the whole time they were menaced by the 
enemy. 

On arriving in front of these lines, the Austrian general, Laudon, 
was for attacking them, but would not do so without the co-o[)eration 
of the Russian army. Failing to persuade the commander of the lat- 
ter to approve his plan, both armies decamped after spending twenty 
days before the lines, Avhich had by that time attained an almost 
impregnable strength. ****** 

The Spanish lines of Boulou, in April, 1794, are an instance of a 
strong and extensive, position, strongly entrenched, but which fell 
easily, in consequence of an oversight or blunder on the part of the 
designer of the works. These lines were occupied by a Spanish army, 
to prevent the French revolutionary .army of 35,000 men from enter- 
ing Spain by way of Bellegarde. The camp was traversed by the 
Tech, and separated from the plain of Vallespir by a chain of hills, 
and was fortified with exceeding care. The line was in the form of a 
right angle, the point of which was towards the front and right. The 
right side commenced at a hill, strongly entrenched, on the far side of 
the river, and, crossing the narrow valley, ran up the mountain on 
the hither side, resting finally on the castle of Montesquiou, near the 
summit, and around which it was not supposed the enemy could pass. 
The left lialf of the angle, or the front of the position, ran on the far 
side of the river, and finally, turning short, crossed it, resting on the 
height of La Guardia, which commanded the bridge of Ceret. The 
arc thus fortified had an extent of 11 or 12 miles. The weak point 
of this position was the extreme right, which could be turned, owing 
to the omission to fortify the highest peak of the mountain which lay 
to the right, and in rear of, the castle of Montesquiou. The French 
general accordingly attacked the camp by sending 10,000 infantry 
and 800 cavalry to seize the height in question, which they did with- 
out opposition, while the main body made demonstrations in front. 
The result was that the Spaniards considered themselves lucky in 
being able to retreat by an improvised road over the mountains, 
(leaving all their guns, 150 in number,) their line of retreat by Belle- 
garde being overlooked by the same height which enabled the French 
to gain the rear of their Avorks. * * * * 

During 1794 and 1795 the French had been constructing on the left 



68 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

bank of the Rhine, strong lines, for the purpose of blockading Mayence, 
which city they expected to besiege, Mayence, being built on both 
sides of the river, formed a tete-de-pont for the Austrians, and the 
latter unexpectedly issued from it, (Oct. 29, 1795,) broke through the 
lines, and thus took up an extremely advantageous position between 
Jourdan's and Pichegiu's armies, the latter of which was especially 
threatened, and might have been disastrously beaten if this successful 
attack on its left wing had been vigorously followed up. Owing to the 
attack being unforeseen, the garrison of the lines consisted at the time 
of but 3,000 men ; and of these a certain proportion had just arrived, 
having been detached from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and 
were not, from their little acquaintance witli the localities, or with 
their duties, much better than spectators of the combat. 

The lines were composed altogether of open works, the main defence 
being a continuous line of curtains, flanked by redans and bastions, 
and located on the edge of the heights looking towards Mayence. In 
advance, and in some parts in rear also, were fleches and lunettes, but 
nowhere redoubts, so that the whole line could be turned by the forcing 
of any weak point of it. In addition to this defect, the works were 
nowhere strong enough to resist the attack of large bodies of men, and 
also presented a weak point at their right extremity ; which, instead 
of being connected with the river, left a wide meadow, which might 
be used to turn the flank of the whole position. This oversight was 
the more fatal as the line of retreat of the centre and left wing would 
be menaced in case of the successful attack of, or turning of, the right. 

The Austrian General Clerfayt, having a perfect acquaintance with 
the French lines, attacked them in three columns, putting his greatest 
strength into the attack on the French right. In this he was assisted 
by a flotilla, which landed two battalions in the rear of this end of 
the line. The attack on the right and centre being successful, the 
French left had to retreat, though its defence had been successful, and 
the whole army retired in disorder on the Pfrim river, in order to get 
nearer to the main body. In this battle the Austrian soldiers scaled 
the works, musket in hand. The immediate results were the capture 
of all the French heavy artillery, and great stores of siege materials 
and provisions. * * * * * ^ 

Wellington's lines of Torres Vedras (1810) are justly celebrated for 
their vast extent, their natural strength, and the admirable manner 
in which every resource of the engineer was called into action in 
adapting the defence to the site, the means disposable, and the neces- 
sities of the case. 

Not less wonderful are these lines for the complete manner in which 
the labor of their construction was repaid by the invaluable results 
obtained by their means. 

No less a stake than the possession of Portugal'depended on their 
strength ; and, indeed, if they had been forced, the consequences 
might, like those of the capitulation of Baylen, have been propagated 
in a manner to be felt throughout Europe, 

But for these lines there can be little doubt that the victorious Mas- 
sena, with his 110,000 veteran soldiers, who had pursued the British 
to this contracted cul-de-sac, would have driven them into the sea, or 



DAISGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 69 

at least forced them, like Sir John Moore's army, to end a disastrous 
retreat by seeking safety in their ships. 

This supposition is corroborated by all the circumstances of the cam- 
paign, but especially by the excessive solicitude exhibited by Welling- 
ton in hastening the construction of the works, and incessantly laboring 
to augment their strength during the entire year that seemed likely 
to witness an attack upon them. 

The lines were two in number, concentric, and extending from the 
sea to the Tagus ; and, as the British fleet and gunboat flotilla had 
the entire possession of both these barriers, the position could not be 
turned. 

Thus shutting off Lisbon from the rest of Portugal, they afforded 
an unequalled position for a defensive battle, with every chance of 
success ; and even if beaten, which must be with great loss to the 
attacking army, the defenders could still retreat into their fleet ; an 
operation which was assured by the entrenched camp, or tete-de-pont, 
which, isolating the extremity of the peninsula, would effectually 
protect an embarkation. 

The total force under Wellington's command amounted at the least 
to 130,000 men, British and Portuguese together; of these 60,000 
were detailed for permanent garrisons for the forts and redoubts ; the 
remaining 70,000 were the best troops, and were designed for ma- 
noeuvres. 

The first line was originally intended to serve as a check to an 
attacking enemy, and the second was to be the main reliance ; if this, 
too, was forced, the army was to take refuge in the entrenched camp, 
and enter the ships under its shelter. 

The first line, however, became so strong, by dint of constant labor 
upon it, that Wellesley finally made his calculations to take a decisive 
position behind it. 

The first line was 29 miles in extent^ and beginning at Alhandra, 
upon the Tagus, crossed the peninsula, following, on its western slope, 
the Zizandre, and finally terminating where that river empties into the 
ocean. Beginning on the right, (at Alhandra,) the first five miles of 
works were upon a ridge which liad naturally been steep, but was now 
scarped for a height of 15 or 20 feet, so as to be almost inaccessible. 
The next five miles were laid out upon two mountains which were de- 
fended by redoubts. The centre of the line was occupied by field 
works, (strengthened by an immense redoubt mounting 25 guns,) all 
seated upon the lofty Mount Agraca, which, besides the strength 
afforded by its height, presented a view of tlie whole line of works on 
either hand, and of the approaches to them. 

Of the 10 or 12 miles on the left, the first seven were lines well 
seated behind obstructed ground, and with the river Zizandre flowing 
in front of them ; the remainder of the line was protected by inunda- 
tions, and the field works were strengthened by many redoubts and 
forts, one of which was of enormous size and mounted 40 cannon. 
A paved road ran behind this part of the ground, and contributed to 
strengthen it by facilitating manoeuvres from one wing to the other. 

A feature of the ground, that was very advantageous to the British,, 
was this : that in front of the line, opposite Mount Agraca, rose the 



70 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

towering Monte Junta, whicli could only be crossed at some miles 
distant from the front, and which, therefore, would prevent the French 
from attacking hoth wings of the British line at once ; also, the for- 
mer must be very cautious iu attacking the left, even singly, as the 
latter might sally from their lines, during the passage of the moun- 
tain, and attack the front or rear of the column en route, thus taking 
it at a great disadvantage. 

The second line was laid out at from 6 to 10 miles behind the first, 
and extended from Quintella to St. Lorenzo, a distance of 24 miles— 
without giving a description of it, let it suffice that it was stronger 
than the first, and that in it, still more than in the other, redoubts, 
forts, water-cuts, scarps, abattis, and entrenchments of all sorts, were 
constructed without regard to labor or expense. 

To give a proper idea of the pains bestowed on the works of Torres 
Vedras, the following description of the defences of the outpost line of 
Arunda is given: 

Across the ravine on the left of Arunda, a wall of dry stone was built, 
30 feet high and 16 feet thick ; across the valley of Arunda an abattis 
was constructed of full grown oaks and chestnuts, which had to be 
dragged several hundred yards, and were so reset and crossed as to 
be perfectly impenetrable, while a breast-work, in the rear, afforded 
cover for troops. Along the ridges for three miles ran a stone wall 
six feet high and iourteen feet thick ; altogether it was considered 
that the single division tliat guarded this post could defend it against 
20,000 men. 

The entrenched camp or tete-de-pont had an extent of 3,000 yards 
and was seated near by the permanent fort of St. Julians, at a dis- 
tance from the second line varying from 24 miles to two days' march 
in its rear. 

Before Massena arrived in front of the lines he was altogether 
ignorant of their strength ; a reconnaissance of them induced him to 
change his first intention of storming them immediately, and, upon 
a closer examination, he despaired of doing so until he should receive 
reinforcements. It then became a question of time, whether he could 
remain long enough to give the latter time to join him ; for the coun- 
try in his rear was not fruitful enough to afford subsistence for a great 
length of time to his numerous army. On the other hand the anglo- 
Portuguese forces, and the inhabitants of the inclosed district, were 
in equal straits for food ; the latter much the most, for in the strug- 
gle of endurance which ensued, and which lasted through the winter, 
40,000 persons died of want within the lines. 

During the blockade, however, the lines continued to increase in 
strength ; and the storming of them, which had appeared hazardous 
at first, became at last an impossibility ; the reinforcements did not 
arrive, and the French had exhausted the country of every sort of 
subsistence that would support life. 

Finally, after displaying in the highest degree the obstinacy which 
characterized him, Massena was obliged to retreat, baffled, not bythe 
army, but the Imes of Wellington. * * * * 

Soult's lines on the Nivelle form an instance of a strong position 
of great extent, but badly fortified and ill-defended. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 71 

In fhe latter part of 1813 Soult found himself stationed on the 
Spanish frontier of France, with about G6,000 soldiers ; his task was 
to prohibit the passage of the combined army of 90,000 men under 
Wellington. He decided to take his stand in the triangular district 
which is bounded by the sea, by the Nivelle river, and the mountains 
on its left bank, and by the Nive, from its source to the Mondarin 
mountain, which last commanded the bridge over it, and which could 
not be turned. 

Both flanks were thus secure, and the front was strongly seated on 
mountains and strengthened by a river ; in its centre, and on a com- 
manding height, was a large redoubt, called the signal redoubt ; in 
front of it, on the slopes, were numerous field works, and in advance 
of these, trenches and abattis. Three large redoubts lay towards the 
left, and on the extreme right inundations had been effected, which 
formed a great obstacle to an approach on that side. 

The whole extent of front to be defended was 16 miles. Soult spent 
three months in entrenching this position, but the works were ill- 
planned, being mostly open works, and easily turned by the gorge. 
Many of the redoubts that were commenced were incomplete when 
attacked, and some were so placed that the garrisons could not depress 
their pieces enough to bear upon the attacking columns. Their re- 
vetments, of dry stone, were readily climbed by the British, but most 
cf the works taken were entered by the gorge. The troops were de- 
prived, by the broken nature of the ground, and the want of roads in 
rear of the works, of the power of mutual support ; so that however 
strong an attack might be experienced by either wing, it could not be 
reinforced from the centre. 

In the attack of these lines, which took place in November, Wel- 
lington profited by all the defects of his opponent's arrangements. 

His main attack was against the left of the centre, the key of the 
position, and he threw 44,000 men upon the 15,000 French who 
guarded the works near this point, holding in check a division of 
12,000 men in another quarter by 6,000 British. The works were not 
found a serious impediment by the attacking columns owing to the 
defects above mentioned ; one fort especially was so ill situated that 
the defenders were driven out of it by a battery of horse artillery 
which galloped up an unfortified hill in its rear and opened a jDlung- 
ing fire into it. 

With all the disadvantages of bad communication it seems probable 
that the defeat of the French, and their retreat from the position, 
would have been obviated by the use of redoubts instead of open 
works ; by giving them a strong profile, and by a judicious location 
of them among the hills and between the lines of field works. 

This view is borne out by the stubborn resistance which the signal 
redoubt offered ; it held out after the whole line had retreated, and 
withstood three attacks with a loss of but one man killed, while the 
British lost 200 in killed and wounded ; the redoubt finally capitu- 
lated, as further resistance could be of no service to the defence of the 
position. ******* 

As the two remaining examples of lines that I have examined have 



72 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

not had the merit of being tested by actual attacks, I will dispose of 
them briefly" : 

The first is the entrenched camp (as it was called) of Drissa, con- 
structed by the Russians in 1812, on the occasion of the grand inva- 
sion of their country by Napoleon. Without going into detail, it is 
worth mentioning that the works were laid out on an arc of five miles, 
which corresponded to a chord of 3\ miles. 

On the front, and distributed over an extent of 7,000 yards, were 
ten redoubts ; at the two extremities this line rested upon the river. 
Between the redoubts open batteries of artillery were established. 
Each redoubt was covered in front by low field works, of 220 yards 
development, and laid out at 130 yards in advance. 

Before the left of the line there was a wooded marsh ; and to pre- 
vent the enemy from profiting by this, some of the trees were "cut 
down, and used in forming an abattis, which was of about 2,000 yards 
extent, and over 420 yards in advance of the line of redoubts. 

Between the seventh and eighth redoubts there was built a large 
bastion-shaped work, with a gorge of about 320 yards, which commu- 
nicated with the redoubts by a sort of curtain of 140 yards in length. 
Behind the centre of this bastion, and about 200 yards in rear of it, 
was located another redoubt. 

A second line of works lay at a distance of 360 yards behind the 
front of the first — it was composed of five redoubts ; and finally, at 
900 yards in rear of the centre of this second line was another redoubt, 
making seventeen in all. 

The bastion and nearly all the redoubts liad their ditches palisaded, 
and were surrounded by a triple row of trous-de-loup. 

This defensive camp, or lines rather, is worthy of much study, and 
I shall offer it as a strong support to my argument. At present it is 
only necessary to remark, that the general disposition, in this case, 
is evidently formed on a wish to have the defence accumulated in a 
few inclosed works of great strength, which, being situated at an 
average of 750 yards apart, from centre to centre, will each have a 
flanking fire over the nearer half of the intermediate entrenchments. 

It is also probable that the latter were arranged to facilitate counter 
attacks by the garrison, in case the enemy should be repulsed. * * 

The lines of circumvallation of the allies at Sevastopol were con- 
structed with the single view of shielding the army from a Russian 
attack. The usual object of lines of circumvallation is chiefiy to pro- 
hibit the entrance into the besieged place of reinforcements of troops, 
ammunition, or provisions, which might otherwise elude or break 
through the investing force, and make a dash for the gates of the 
place. But here the investment was only half complete, which is the 
same thing as entirely neglected. 

The Russians could enter the fortifications on the south side in any 
force, large or small, by crossing the bay, or by marching along the 
shore. Consequently the lines from Inkerman to Balaklava were 
purely defensive. It is to be remarked, also, that these extensive 
works were not judged necessary at first, but that the allies were in- 
duced to adopt them, and afterwards to continually strengthen them 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 73 

by receiving severe admonitions and demonstrations of their value, 
especially in the battles of Balaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya. 

The lines were double ; the first one extended from Inkerman to 
Balaklava, along the northern and eastern boundaries of the plateau 
of Chersonese, and along the Tchernaya, and behind the canal, (which 
forms a second obstacle to an attacking army,) and so along to the 
hilly ground of Balaklava. The total extent of this first line was 
over six miles. Its object, as stated before, was to protect the right 
of the besieging army and its depots at Balaklava, and its line of 
communication with the latter point. 

That the advanced line fully effected this purpose is proved by the 
resistance which it enabled the French and Sardinian troops, who de- 
fended the position attacked, to offer to the Russian attempt of August 
16, 1855. 

On this occasion the enemy's forces, consisting of 6 divisions of in- 
fantry, 3 of cavalry, and 15U guns, and estimated in all at from 40,000 
to 50,000 men, made an obstinate attack on that part of the lines 
which lay in the vicinity of the Traktir bridge over the Tchernaya. 

They were repulsed with the loss of 3,329 killed alone. The num- 
ber of wounded is not stated, but the French took care of 1,600 of 
them, besides those who were carried ofi" by their comrades. 

This signal repulse was effected by 12,000 French and 10,000 
Sardinian troops; and the result is to be explained only by admitting 
the great defensive value of the lines as an adjunct to the naturally 
strong position. 

This conclusion is made positive by the fact that, after the battle of 
the Tchernaya, the French took greater pains than ever to add to their 
works^ which they rendered almost superfluously strong. 

The second line ran across the peninsula, from Streletzka bay to the 
sea, in a southerly direction, following the elevated ground ; the extent 
of it was about 8,000 yards, the works were continuous, and strength- 
ened at various intervals by eight redoubts, in the shape of bastions 
closed at the gorge. These bastions were of great size, and probably 
quite strong. 

The object of this line was, like the third line of Torres Vedras, to 
provide against a ruinous defeat of the allied armies, which should 
necessitate a retreat into some secure position, wliere they could await 
reinforcements, or from which they could, if fortune should continue 
against them, re-embark into their fleets and leave the Crimea entirely. 

The second line was therefore laid out so as to be defensible by a 
small part of the army, while the maiti body might be transferred to 
the ships. 

In my propositions for the defence of New York I shall have occa- 
sion to refer to this last line, which is, in several points, analogous to 
the one I suggest. The chief features of resemblance are, its extent, 
the closing of the gorges of the bastions, the connecting them by con- 
tinuous lines, and the variable distances at which they are placed, 
together with the great average distance which is flanked b}^ each. 



CHAPTER V. 

PRINCIPLES RELATING TO LINES DISCUSSED AND APPLIED TO THE PARTICULAR 

CASE IN POINT. 

First. Each extremity of a fortified line should rest upon an obstacle 
which may he considered impassable by an enemy, and wliich the 
latter should be unable to outflank or march around. Large rivers^ 
the sea, rugged mountain ranges, such are the indispensable supports 
to the flanks of an extensive entrenched position. 

Thus the lines of the Queich rested upon theEhine and the Vosges; 
the French lines of the Nivelle upon the sea and upon the inaccessible 
Mondarin mountain, updn which were works that commanded the 
bridge over the Nive river, passable only at that point for the enemy. 

The lines of Torres Vedras extended from the Tagus to the sea. 

The French lines of circumvallation at Sevastopol rested at each 
flank on the sea, and the English, or advanced ones, upon the sea and 
on the strong position of Inkerman. 

The lines at Mayence might have been made to rest at both ends on 
the Rhine, but the right flank was not joined to the river, and the 
neglect of this precaution was the cause of the Austrians forcing the 
position. 

At the lines of Boulou a similar neglect, in not securing the moun- 
tain summit, which formed the extreme right of the position, caused 
the loss of it to the Spanish. ***** 

Second. The lines should present a continuous uninterrupted bar- 
rier of a profile not easily to be clambered over. Gaps in the line are 
as good for the enemy as breaches ready made by his artillery or sap- 
pers, because the moment the artillery of the delences is silenced, and 
the troops are driven temporarily from the parapets of the flanks, the 
assaulting column can enter at a run, without any impediment to give 
the defenders time to resume their fire. 

It must here be understood that, though uninterrupted, the en- 
trenchments should not be simply of the kinds commonly called con- 
tinuous; that is, of a series of curtains, flanked by any or all of the 
elementary field works which are open at the gorge. It was such a 
line as this which caused the defeat of the French at Turin, and such 
will always involve the ruin of their defenders, owing to the following 
reasons : 

The army which guards an extensive, continuous line, ]must find its 
safety in completely prohibiting the enemy from crossing it at any 
point; should they succeed in passing the line at the centre for example,, 
they could concentrate their forces, and, marching to the right or left, 
attack in flank the defenders, who must receive their reinforcements 
from the wings by piecemeal ; and, as is always the case when the flank 
is surprised^ the latter arrive too late to be of service, and in time only 
to be beaten in detail. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 75 

But if, to guard against the lines being forced at every point, the 
general posts his troops so as to render the entire length of the works 
equally strong throughout, he renders his defeat a matter almost of 
certainty; for the dissemination of his forces, which is thus produced, 
renders it impossible, with the largest army, to have enough troops 
everywhere to resist the onset of a column which perhaps is made up 
of the main body of the enemy. 

Manoeuvres of the troops for the purpose of accumulating them at 
the point attacked are not practicable, for the forcing of a fieldwork 
insufficiently garrisoned is the affair of a few minutes; and, besides, 
the attention of the defenders will be distracted, by several false 
attacks, from the decisive one. * * * * 

Third For these reasons the [technically called] continuous lines 
have seldom been resorted to without being strengthened by strong 
redoubts, or star forts, situated at intervals either in front or in rear 
of, or forming a portion of the line. 

At the same time it is apparent that the same reasoning that has 
just been given will apply in a certain degree even when the lines are 
supported by redoubts ; I should say that it has been susceptible of 
application until the recent improvements in the soldier's musket, 
which, by vastly increasing its range and accuracy, afford an oppor- 
tunity for reconciling those clashing conditions which as I have just 
shown are not to be harmonized at all in continuous lines, and which 
it hitherto required great skill to reconcile, even with the assistance of 
inclosed works. To make clear the point in question, it must be 
stated that writers on the subject of field fortification generally fix 
the limit of effective range of the musket, in actions of this nature, at 
less than 200 yards — it will carry further, but with no exactness — 
and at 300 yards the force of the ball is spent. The exceptions to ■ 
this rule are few : the greatest variation is found in the practice of 
Vauban, who calculated the lines of defence of his field-works (in 
which he exhibited as much genius as in his permanent fortresses) so 
as to count upon the extreme range of the musket ; tbat is, he fixes- 
the distance from the flanking parts to the salients at 300 yards; but 
(as St. Paul justly observes) the musket ball cannot be relied on at 
this distance, either for penetrating power or accuracy; and in addi- 
tion, the fire of the flanks ought to reach to some distance in front of, 
and beyond the salient defended by them, so as to give a cross fire on 
the enemy before he arrives at the ditch. This basis fixes the length 
of the single front of continuous lines of different kinds, as follows: 

Redan lines, at the maximum .>. 240 yards.. 

Tenaille lines, with large salients 320 " 

Tenaille lines, with small salients 240 " 

Bastioned lines, (maximum) 240 " 

The disadvantages of the tenaille lines when made of the maximum, 
dimensions, the chief of which is the exposure of the lines to ricochet 
fire, cause the length of 240 yards to be made the rule. 

Now, basing the calculation on the same range of the musket, if, 
the continuous line is to be strengthened by redoubts, either these 
will not be close enough to support the whole line, or there will be a< 



76 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

great number of them. For example: a line of redoubts, to protect, 
by tbeir fire, each other and the intermediate spaces, must be double, 
and arranged in quincunx order. Dr. Sellon estimates the distances 
in each line at 440 yards from centre to centre, which will amount to 
one redoubt for each 220 yards. 

A line formed of detached lunettes, with a second line of redans in 
the rear, (all rendered enclosed works by stockades,) has spaces of 
250 yards at the farthest. In case, therefore, that the latter alterna- 
tive is chosen, the redoubts will require for their garrison, a great part 
of the reserve, which ought to act independently of the works ; and 
also the garrison of each one must be small, and the work itself must 
be small, and consequently weak ; the consequence would be that, so 
far from improving the defence of the continuous line, they would 
aggravate the disadvantages of the defenders. For this reason re- 
doubts, supporting lines, have generally been placed at wide inter- 
vals, and made of large size, strong, and capable of holding a large 
number of troops. Frequently star forts have taken the place of 
redoubts, as being intrinsically stronger. This arrangement has been 
the best one possible, in consideration of all the circumstances ; the 
deficiencies of it have been inevitable results of the short range of the 
smooth-bore musket. 

These deficiencies, to recapitulate them briefly, have been : 

1st. That the inclosed works have not protected by their fire the 
whole length of the open entrenchments which closed the interval 
between them, thus leaving weak points in the line. 

2d. That for a still stronger reason, they have had no power of 
mutual support b}^ reciprocal flank flre. 

It will be seen that the limited range of the musket has been so 
great a restriction ujjon the defensive combinations for the defence of 
extended positions, that no possible arrangement could be contrived 
to render lines, even theoretically, strong ; flne natural advantages of 
topography and the genius of a great general have been the main 
strength of such dispositions. 

At the present time, however, this restriction is entirely removed 
by the invention and introduction into all services, as the habitual 
arm of the soldier, of the rifle-musket with the Minie (or its equiva- 
lent) projectile. 

Lines may now be constructed of great extent and defensible by a 
not extraordinary force, and in localities which it would. formerly have 
been considered impossible to defend. 

The demonstration of this assertion, which has not before been 
made, follows naturally at this point of the argument. It can be 
shown that lines can now be combined so as to fulfil all the requisites 
of a continuous line and still permit of the defending force being 
chiefly concentrated at a few points, leaving, besides, a large enough 
proportion of troops to form a powerful reserve ; in other words, all 
the advantages of any lines that were ever constructed may be pre-* 
served, while the former inherent and inevitable deficiencies are 
eliminated. ******* 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 77 

Fourth. Of the proper location and nature of enclosed works in lines. 
The enclosed works of a modern system of lines should be — 
Ist. Located as far apart as possible, to conform to the other essen- 
tial conditions ; because the fewer they are the more pains can be 
taken with each one to strengthen it, and also, the more troops can 
be stationed in each, out of the total number that can be spared for 
the garrisons. 

Hence, each work could be stronger in itself to resist a separate 
assault, and also would give a more formidable flanking fire upon the 
approaches to and ditches of the intervening entrenchments. 

2d, The works should not, however, be so distant as to prevent 
their sweeping, by their musketry as well as their artillery fire, all 
the ground between them, including the immediate vicinity of the 
curtains which join them, and the enfilading of the ditches of the 
latter. 

As I propose to confide the flanking of the entire system to the 
inclosed works specified, and as the necessity of a thorough flanking, 
both of the approaches and ditches, of all entrenchments, is an uni- 
versally admitted military principle, no more need be said on this 
point. 

It is evident that the basis, according to which must be determined 
the intervals in question, is the effective range of the regulation musket 
in the hands of the private soldier ; this element for the rifle-musket, 
with which all the United States infantry is to be armed, is 600 yards. 
As the distance specified is not obtained from any published or 
official authorities it will be as well to state my reasons for adopting it. 
In the first place, it will be recollected, as was quoted from St. Paul, 
that the smooth-bore musket was expected to kill at 300 yards ; the- 
Aide Memoire du Genie says that at 300 yards musket bullets begin to- 
give fatal wounds. The line of defence has accordingly been fixed at 
from 160 to 200 yards, so as to give, upon the approaches to the 
flanked angles, a cross fire, for, say, a hundred yards in advance. For 
about this distance the assaulting columns would therefore be under a 
more or less effective fire, which would continually increase in accuracy 
as they approached the ditch, and would produce about its maximum 
destructive effect upon the troops while they should be accumulated 
in the latter and occupied in climbing the scarp. 

Let us therefore find the range at which the Minie ball will produce 
a mortal wound, and see whether it can be assumed as the correlative 
of the 300 yards for the smooth-bore. 

At 300 yards the musket bullet will penetrate 3| inches into white 
pine wood ; this is an ample estimate,, as it is from the French "Aide 
Memoire du Genie," which, if I am not mistaken, refers to heavier 
bullets and a larger charge than our percussion muskets carried. 
With regard to the latter, it appears* that at 300 yards none of their 
shots penetrated into oak, and only ^-^i\\ part stuck where they hit. 
Now, the range at which the rifle-musket will give an equal penetra- 
tion is at least 1,000 yards. f 

*Ord. Manual. 

t Tables of experiments in "Report on small-arms," or table 12 of my Memoir on Fort/- 
ficalion, 1858. 



78 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

As to accuracy, all the published tables go to prove that the new 
piece is more exact at 1,000 yards than the musket at 300. For ex- 
ample, one series * of trials has found the mean deviation of round 
musket balls, at 300 yards, to be 3| feet vertically by 6 feet hori- 
zontally. Of the whole number of balls fired in this trial 12 per 
cent missed the target_, of 5 by 10 yards. 

A similar trial f showed that the mean deviation of the elongated 
projectile, from the rifle-musket, at 900 yards, was 2 feet 10 inches 
vertically and 1 foot 9 inches horizontally, while only 2 per cent, of 
the shots failed to hit the target, which was 5 by 6 yards. 

It must be considered, however, that for firing at early dawn, or on 
a dark day, or at a company dressed in grey or blue, there is not as 
good a chance to aim as is always the case at trials, which are conducted 
in fine weather, and where the mark is a white, conspicuous object ; 
and these drawbacks would be much more important at 1,000 yards 
than at GOO. It must also be taken into account that the undulations 
of the ground, in any position likely to be advantageous for entrench- 
ments, would probably pi event an uninterrupted view of 1,000 yards 
in extent ; and, in addition, the flanking work must be of an exces- 
sive size to be formidable enough to check, by its fire, the body of men 
which could advance through the interval of 2,000 yards, which would 
separate the supporting inclosed M'orks, if each were expected to de- 
fend a length of 1,000 yards In order, therefore, to be on the safe 
side, I have adopted the figure of 600 yards as the effective range of 
the neiv piece, considered as the arm of the private soldier. 

The deadly fire of the Russian rifle pits at Sevastopol, at from 600 
to *J00 yards distance, and the sharp shooting at 900 yards during the 
siege of Boraarsund, are confirmations, which I regret not having 
space to enlarge upon, of the correctness of my conclusion. 

The range of grape shot is 600 yards also ; a circumstance which 
had an influence with me in fixing the line of defence at that distance. 
The two requisites, with regard to relative location of the inclosed 
ivorks in a line, will then bo satisfied by placing them at intervals of 
1,200 yards apart, counting between their flanks, or 1,400 yards from 
centre to centre. Of course, if the nature of the ground should re- 
quire it, they might be placed closer ; the system would thereby gain 
more rapidly perhaps in strength than would be counterbalanced by 
the expense, for the redoubts need hardly ever be so close as to incur 
the defects (of numerous works) mentioned on page 76, which are not 
important, until they get within 700 yards of each other. * =)- * 

Fifth. To place the inclosed works in conformity with the locality and 
topography, the following principle should be kept in view. 

They should be seated upon commanding spots, which lie also 
rather in front of the line of continuous works; thus situated, they 
will be difficult of access themselves, and will, moreover, gain a 
plunging and reverse fire upon the lower ground, in front of the in- 
termediate curtains, and upon the ditches of the latter. 

The range of both artillery and musketry will be greater from 
these high points, and also there will a greater number of shots 

* Table 3 of same memoir. f Table 9, idem. 



. DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 79 

tell in an enemy's column, which must appear larger than if viewed 
from a level. 

The moral eifect is, besides, worth noting, as soldiers invariabl}^ 
dislike to pass under the fire of commanding works. 

This condition is, after all, one that needed only to be stated ; and 
I have discussed it more for the sake of uniformity than anything else, 
as it has always been followed in actual lines. * * * 

Sixth. The size ot the inclosed works 

They should be large enough to deliver a very heavy flanking fire 
on the approaches, &c., of the entrenchments. 

This fire should be of both artillery and musketry ; in fact all the 
artillery disposable for the defence of the lines, except the flying bat- 
teries, should find room in the redoubts. 

In the redoubts, if placed as above recommended, will be the most 
advantageous position for the action of artillery upon the enemy's 
columns, and in them, also, the guns will be most secure from capture. 

It must be recollected, however, that not only does artillery require 
much space on the terrepleins, but that it will not do to crowd the 
latter with pieces to the exclusion of a proper number of troops ; for in 
that case the work would be very liable to be taken by assault ; hence, 
the more pieces the work carries, the greater should be the garrison 
of it. 

Let us suppose that each work carries two six-gun batteries of artil- 
lery, one on each flank, the space required for these and three traverses 
^vill be 45 yards. 

Probably 200 yards of banquette for infantry will suffice, as it is 
about 80 yards greater than the whole length of a bastion face in the 
modern system of fortification. This will altogether give the flank a 
length of 250 yards. 

The flanks are the lines which, according to my system, must fix 
the size of the work, since the latter must positively give a great 
column of fire in both directions to fulfil the pait imposed on it by 
the theory of the defence. 

The flanks being fixed in length and direction, it remains to decide 
on the manner of joining their ends. The front of the work should 
give its fire towards the approaches by which an enemy could march 
to assault it ; hence its best disposition will be in two lines or faces, 
making equal angles with each other and with the flanks. 

This arrangement will, in view of the obtuseness of the angles so 
obtained, permit of all the guns of the two faces, or of a face and 
tlank, being directed along either capital of the work ; so that an 
approach must be under at least the full direct fire of one face. 

The lengths of the faces should vary according to the position and 
importance of the work, say from 60 yards each to 100. 

As to the gorge, I propose to construct it in the shape of a bastion 
front. 

The gorge will in most of the redoubts, that is, in all that are laid 
out on a part of the line which has but little curvature, have a length 
of about 160 yards ; which gives ample room for the trace proposed. 

The object of closing the gorge is purely to make the work equally 
strong in rear as on the other sides, to resist an escalade. It has no 



80 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

view of the collateral works, nor of the curtains ; and, consequently, 
we have only to consider how it can be arranged to defend itself in the 
strongest manner and at the least expense. 

That the entrance gate of the work is in the gorge is another reason 
for desiring to arrange the latter in a manner to make it as defensible 
as possible. 

The bastioned trace is undoubtedly the one best calculated to answer 
the single purpose of the gorge, from its strength and simplicity. 

The garrison of the redoubts just described should be, on an average, 
2,000 men. ******* 

Seventli. In deciding upon the shape and size of the inclosed works of 
a line, we must, besides the action ofeach upon the ground around it, 
consider the necessity of providing for its separate and independent 
defence against attempts at escalade, or even a short siege. 

It is impossible to separate perfectly these two essential points in 
any other sort of ivorh than a redoubt: but in this the lines of rampart 
may have precisely the lengths and directions that will enable them 
fully to sweep the country around, and their approaches, by their fire, 
and to perfectly enfilade the ditches of the curtains, and flank the 
ground in front of them ; this is possible without the slightest inter- 
ference witii the dispositions for the independent defence of the work, 
in front or rear ; and if this second condition has guided me in plan- 
ning the gorge of my proposed works, it is because in this quarter the 
other one goes altogether out of the question. 

The second condition, relating to the individual defence of each 
enclosed Avork depends upon : 

Ist. The arrangements for flanking its ditches ; 

2d, On the profile. 

It is because of the peculiar property of a redoubt, of satisfying the 
above condition separately from the other, that I have chosen it in 
preference to the star fort, or bastion fort, which have generally been 
constructed to defend the more important points of lines. 

The reason has probably been that there have not been the means 
of providing for the individual defence of the work, that become neces- 
sary for a redoubt ; from the same cause, in the field redoubts that 
have been used in actual warfare, there has generally been a neglect 
of flanking arrangements. 

The latter, when introduced, have consisted of — 

1. Galleries of timber, loopholed, along the reverse of the ditches, 
at the salient angles, so as to enfilade, each, the ditch of one face. 

2. Similar galleries running across the ditches at their middle 
points, for firing both ways each, thus enfilading one ditch. 

The timber and plank necessary for these constructions, and the 
time requisite to build them, have often been wanting, and so have 
decided engineers not to adopt the redoubt, but to prefer some trace 
that would enable the garrison of each work to defend it from the 
parapets, without any su})plementary arrangements. It must be re- 
membered also, that, from the causes I discussed at the outset of this 
section, depending on the range of the musket, the second condition 
in question has always been the one most important in an enclosed 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 81 

work, from the impossibility of satisfying the other more than very 
imperfectly. 

The star fort of 8 points certainly satisfies the second condition as 
well as a redoubt, arranged with the timber-flanking galleries in 
question. The former gives a strong fire upon the approaches along 
either capital, from two lines, which are each, a third of the width of 
the work in length. There are dead spaces in the inner ends of the 
ditches, it is true ; but the salient ends are well flanked, and the de- 
fence from open ramparts is preferable to the firing from the detached 
and inconvenient galleries of redoubts. 

These star forts, however, are not adapted to the purpose of my 
proposed line, from the important reason that one third of each of 
the two sides, which would face towards the curtains to be flanked, is 
prevented (by its being broken forwards to flank the ditches of the 
remainder) from giving its fire in the direction of tbe curtain. Be- 
sides, star forts are, not so easily as redoubts, adapted to irregular 
ground ; and after passing a certain size, (say of 8 points, with faces 
of 60 yards, and with a garrison of 600 troops,) a better form will be 
found in the bastioned fort, in which the flanking lines do not bear so 
large a proportion to the main lines of the work as one-half — the ratio 
in the former. Even in the bastioned fort, however, there is too 
much indentation of the rampart, and too much sacrifice of the most 
essential condition that inclosed works ought to satisfy in lines. 

In view, therefore, of all the arguments for the different sorts of 
enclosed works for the purpose in question, I should be inclined to 
choose redoubts, even if made on the plan of flanking by timber gal- 
leries. But when we consider that, in the case in question, these 
timber galleries may be dropped, and a much more convenient, con- 
solidated, and infinitely stronger flanking arrangement substituted 
for them, there can no longer be any hesitation in the choice. * * 

Eighth. In the Brooklyn lines proposed, there is no reason for not 
making the 15 or 17 redoubts that will benecessaryofapermanent nature. 

A revetted, partly detached, scarp would render each one impreg- 
nable ; and then a judicious location of them would render the whole 
line impregnable. I use the word impregnable in consideration of 
the probable length of the attack, and of the supplementary means of 
defence, which I will point out beyond, to resort to, in case of a more 
obstinate attempt. 

The redoubts, if revetted, should have three bastionnets, or recipro- 
cally flanking masonry caponnieres. These should be put at the sali- 
ent and two shoulder angles. There should be two half bastions at 
the inner ends of the flanks, and joining to these would be the two 
half bastions of the gorge front. 

The use of masonry at the three outer angles is here unobjection- 
able, comparatively, with the requirements of the general theory of 
the defence. They cannot be attained and breached, or counterbat- 
tered, by any sort of artillery firing, except from batteries placed on 
the edge of the ditch ; for, being close to the counterscarp, (which is 
only the width of the ditch from them in the direction towards any 
other location of the enemy's batteries,) they cannot be reached by 
the most curved of ricochet fire ; and as to the breach batteries re- 
6 



82 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

ferred to, they cannot be placed until after a siege, and I believe not 
then, if the supplementary defence I will mention is adopted. 

To describe briefly the bastionnets specified, it will be sufficient to 
state that they are casematedcaponnieres, which are placed something 
like the tours bastionnes of Vauban's second and third systems. They 
are armed with howitzers for firing cannister and small grape, and 
completely enfilade the ditches by a grazing fire. Their shape is 
bastioned_, so as to prevent any dead angles being occasioned at any 
part of the scarp. They do not extend above the coping of the scarp, 
and are consequently hidden from all exterior views by the crest of 
the glacis. 

The half bastions, which flank the outer half of the flanks of the 
redoubts^ are preferable to bastionnets, because the ditches they enfi- 
lade, lead towards the front, and thereby oifer a chance to the enemy 
to open a curved fire along them which would breach casemates or 
any detached scarp of flanks at their inner ends. 

With regard to the profile, the redoubts in question ought to have 
their ramparts and parapets of the usual dimensions ; though the last 
perhaps had better be twenty-five feet thick on the flanks and faces. 

The scarp for its entire circuit should be twenty feet high ; but of 
this the upper eight feet should be a thin detached wall, arranged 
with a banquette three and a half feet high. This detached wall 
should follow round the coping of the bastionnets. 

On the gorge side the scarp might be detached in the same manner 
on the faces and flanks of the half bastions ; the curtain would most 
likely bo formed of a range of bomb-proofs, for shelter, and to hold 
powder and stores. 

It is certain from the experience at Sevastopol, in 1854 and 1855, 
that mortars will form a preponderating element in future siege 
trains ; their shells will demolish and level thin parapets, and will 
render uninhabitable any works not profusely supplied with bomb- 
proofs. 

There should be, consequently, enough of the latter in each redoubt 
to suffice for holding all its stores of powder and a fair supply of pro- 
visions, with a surplus depending on the money disposable for the 
purpose. The three bastionnets, it will be noted, are bo :ib-proof. 

If the enemy should make his preparations, before any part of the 
line, for shelling it, the redoubts of that portion should immediately 
be filled with laborers, and a great number of temporary bomb-proofs 
of beams and earth be constructed at the foot of its terreplein slopes,* 
or under the rampart, or entirely under ground. 

The parapets are made thick enough to prevent their being blown 
away by the bursting in them of large shells, which would otherwise 
open a view into the interior for the enemy's artillery. 

Several reasons concur to recommend the partial detaching of the 
scarp, so as to form a chemin-des-rondes and breast-height wall. 

In the first place, there will be a considerable saving of expense 

•"■ The expcriincc of Sevastopol shows that the army defending lines, or an entrenched 
cam}), can, by the assistance of a few works to prevent inimt-diate attack, so fortify any 
one menaced point as to put it in a condition not to be taken without a siege. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 83 

effected by the diminution of masonry, wliich amounts to about a 
cubic yard for every lineal yard of wall. 

2d. The work is rendered thereby much more secure against attacks 
by storm, because the banquette in rear of the thin wall may be lined, 
during the assault, by two ranks of troops, who can open a direct and 
plunging fire on the assailants, crowded together in the ditch below. 
The short range at which this fire will be delivered will cause it to be 
exceedingly effective. These troops can also take hold of the ends of 
the scaling ladders which the enemy may rear against the scarp and 
cast them off and dash them to the ground before any stormers had 
time to mount them. 

3d. In order to give the space necessary for the banquette, and for 
a free communication behind it, between the thin wall and the exte- 
rior slope of tlie parapet, the mass of earth forming the latter must 
be set back a certain distance from the edge of the scarp. 

There is thus a little room subtracted from the interior area of the 
work, and the parapet is a trifle shortened ; but, in redoubts of the 
size I recommend, neither of these consequences are at all objection- 
able. It is only in the diminutive two and three story forts of our 
sea-coast, that every foot of space has to be studiously economized, and 
want of room is an insuperable obstacle to the use of the chemin des 
rondes. 

There is, however, a great and solid advantage which is consequent 
upon thus setting back the weight of the parapet from the sustaining 
wall. 

The latter may be breached and tumble in ruins into the ditch, 
without the earth of the parapet even tending to slide down after it; 
while the parapet, in case it does rest close to the scarp, is entirely 
undermined when the latter falls, and caves in, together with some 
of the rampart on which it rests, so that not only is there an easy 
ascent provided for the enemy by the earth assuming over the ruins 
of the wall its natural slope, but the interior of the work is opened 
to the enemy's marksmen and artillery, which will render it difficult 
to make a hand to hand defence of the breach. 

Take the case, however, of the partly detached scarp, and suppose 
it to be breached ; there is less wall to fall in, and the earth which 
follows it in its fall is a small triangular prism, which slides off on a 
plane which is nearly the prolongation of the exterior slope of the 
parapet ; the latter is, therefore, not even reduced appreciably in 
thickness, and, as a covering mass and as a breast-work, remains as 
good as ever. 

All the enemy gains, therefore, in this case, by breaching the 
scarp, is creating a steep slope to ascend by, without diminishing the 
offensive powers of the work or preventing the adoption of all sorts of 
arrangements for the close defence of the breach. 

These are the main advantages secured to the defence by the adop- 
tion of the chemin des rondes and its covering wall. It will be seen 
that it is especially suitable for the isolated redoubts proposed for the 
Brooklyn lines, and that the simplicity of the latter, and their con- 
siderable area, render the introduction of this arrangement uncom- 
monly free from any counterbalancing objections. 



84 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

There are one or two of the latter which it may he well to mention, 
though they are of much less weight in the case of these redoubts 
than as applied to extensive fortresses ; and even in recent examples 
of these in Europe we find many instances of the use of the chemin- 
des-rondes. 

The chemin-dcs-rondes is ?aid to give a facility to the enemy, after 
he has gained the top of the wall at any point, to extend his troops to 
the right and left so as to mount at the same time a wide extent of 
the parapet. However, the garrison has also a better opportunity of 
preventing the first lodgment, and of reinforcing more promptly 
the troops defending the point where the enemy succeeds in gaining 
a footing. 

Another defect attributed to the thin covering wall is, that it may 
be knocked down very soon by the enemy's artillery. This is not, 
however, so much the case if it is hidden from exterior view by the 
glacis, as it can then be reached only by curved fires, which are un- 
certain. 

Another consideration is, that probably only a short extent of the 
wall, on the faces, will be demolished, Avhile that on the flanks and 
gorge will remain intact. This will also be the case only for the one 
or two redoubts that may be bombarded, while the eighteen or nine- 
teen others enjoy all the advantages of the arrangement, without being 
subjected at all to this drawback. 

Now, even supposing that a considerable length of the wall, on the 
faces of one or two redoubts, should be ruined, the chemin des roudes 
would still have effected, for these redoubts, all it was intended to 
perform. 

If the enemy had tried to storm them before deciding to take the 
time and pains to plant his heavy guns and wait their effect, he will 
have been repulsed with severe loss — a result, in a good measure, at- 
tributable to the detached scarp ; and it is certain that the knowledge 
of this construction would tend to prevent the experiment being tried, 
and thus occasion the delay necessary to construct batteries and arm 
them. 

There would thus be gained by the defenders several days, which, 
they could turn to profit by putting the redoubts attacked into a per- 
fect state of defence by the construction of fougasses, mines, jialisades, 
and all sorts of obstacles, and by crowding them with men, and 
sheltering the garrison with a great number of bomb-proofs. 

In the rear and on each flank new field works and batteries could 
be thrown up and armed ; while the interior preparations were in 
progress, the former should bear upon the approaches to the redoubt, 
and strengthen it by their fire. 

It will be recollected that the flanks and gorge remain intact, and 
that 12 feet of scarp, at least, remains on the faces throughout, and 
there is, consequently, if the work has a large garrison, no probability 
of the work being surprised^ a contingency that scarps are intended 
especially to prevent ; hence an assault ought to be frustrated with 
certainty, considering the time and means that have been disposable in 
preparing for it. 

As the redoubts I propose are the main feature of the line, I have 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 85 

discussed them at much length ; the strength of the system, however, 
depends, not so much on the individual strength of these works, but 
on their acting in concert and harmony with the earthworks which 
form the continuous barrier. 

With regard to the efficacy of inclosed forts in strengthening a line 
of field works, we have any amount of testimony from history. The 
employment of strong redoubts and forts on the summits of all the 
hills which formed salient portions of the lines of Buntzelwitz is an 
example. The number and magnitude of the redoubts in the lines of 
Torres Vedras, and their heavy armaments of cannon, show that Well- 
ington placed great confidence in them. The vigorous defence of the 
signal redoubts in the lines of the Nivelle, which did not surrender 
till the open works had been forced, goes to show that with all the 
disadvantages of a false position and incomplete communications, 
these lines might have held out if they had been more frequently 
garnished with similar works. 

At the entrenched camp of Drissa, the main reliance was upon 
redoubts, which were palisaded with care, and so placed that the 
enemy could not force the general line by merely overrunning the in- 
termediate entrenchments ; he was obliged to take two or three 
redoubts ; a certainty which warranted the Russians in fortifying 
these points as they did. 

The efficacy of inclosed works was strongly exemplified at the battle 
of Borodino, where the single redoubt of Chewardino, situated 2,000 
yards in front of the line, on a hill, after being assaulted and taken 
three times, was not securely possessed by the French, till 10 o'clock 
at night, after a sanguinary struggle of sixteen hours. To gain this 
point was of the highest importance in the eyes of Napoleon, who 
designed to refuse his left, pushing his right forward. This single 
redoubt therefore, (says M. De Sellon,) permitted the Russians to 
dispute the decisive point for a whole day. In the same battle the 
Russian left was protected by some works in advance of the heights 
of Semenofskoi, and it is due to these, that this part of the line held 
out as it did, for six hours, against the enormous masses which Ney 
and Davoust had accumulated upon this point of attack, which was 
subjected also to the fire of near four hundred pieces of artillery. 

The great redoubt of Borodino was not taken till towards 3 o'clock 
in the afternoon, after having cost the lives of several thousand 
soldiers ; it was the resistance of this redoubt to the assaults of the 
viceroy, that prevented the latter from effecting (as Napoleon intended,) 
a break between the centre and left wing of the Russian army. 

The small redoubt, on the British left at Inkerman, had a great 
share in influencing the result of that battle, enabling the guards to 
hold out till reinforcements arrived to their support, and these, like- 
wise, resisted long enough to give the French an opportunity to 
discover that the demonstration in the right was a feint, and to re- 
pulse the enemy by their rapid movement, which attacked the Russians 
in flank. 

The French lines (the 2d line) before Sebastopol, exhibits almost the 
identical arrangement of pentagonal redoubts, and curtains that I 
propose to adopt; the location of the redoubts upon the advanced and 



86 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

elevated portions of the site, and the junction of them by nearly 
straight lines of entrenchments, are features worthy of imitation. 

In the advanced line of the Allies, reaching from Balaklava to 
Inkerman, we also find redoubts occupying some of the most im- 
portant points of the topography. 

The consequences of relying upon open field works, that is, either 
of continuous lines or lines with intervals, made up of elementary 
works which are open behind, and which can consequently be turned 
and rendered useless by an army who can gain a foothold in any 
quarter of the line, are exemplified in the fate of the French lines at 
Mayence, at Turin and at Maiplaquet. 

The same causes led in each of these cases to the loss of the position; 
they each exhibit a dissemination of the troops, rendered necessary 
by the nature of the works, which require that every yard of parapet 
shall be manned from one end to the other ; the consequent weakness 
of the whole line at every point, and the inevitable yielding of the 
thin rank of troops, guarding the points assailed by overwhelming 
columns of the enemy, are seen in each instance ; this succession of 
events is rapidly followed by the advance of the consolidated forces, 
wlio have penetrated the line, upon the dei'ending troops who have 
not had time to Ibrm, in order to meet an attack in the rear, which 
completely spoils all previous plans for a successful resistance. * * * 

Ninth. The entrenchments connecting the redoubts should be 
deiended by a line of skirmishers only, to accord with the general 
theory of the system ; they should not therefore be revetted lines, but 
earthworks, thrown up on the anticipation of a descent on the island, 
and strengthened by abattis and trous-de-loup on the slopes in front. 

The ditch and parapet should run in a direct line, or a re-entering 
angle, from one redoubt to the other, and in such a manner that the 
reverse or inside of the latter could be enfiladed from the redoubts. 

The position this curtain must occupy being known in advance, 
there is a very cheap obstacle which might make the approach to the 
line quife difficult. I allude to thorn hedges, which should be planted 
as thickly as possible, where circumstances admit. 

The curtains thus laid out and strengthened, would offer sufficient 
impediment and sufficient cover for a line of skirmishers to oblige an 
enemy, who might endeavor to pass them in preference to assaulting 
the redoubts, to make his attack in heavy columns ; for any other 
disposition ot his troops would be too weak to force the skirmisher* 
to retire. 

But the numbers and compactness of a column render it a mark 
that is difficult to miss, and the columns of attack in question must 
advance under a double or triple fire, both from the redoubts, which 
open with artillery, (the nearest one with an effective musketry also) 
and from the skirmishers in front, sustained by the reserve. 

Under these circumstances, the probable losses would be excessive, 
and would appear sufficient to frustrate the attempt to pass between the 
redoubts; so that even the temporary field works recommended would 
probably necessitate the siege of one or more of the latter ; should that 
be found to be the case, the entire duty of the intermediate entrench- 
ments, in the general scheme of defence, would be fully accomplishedj 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. « 7 

and I think there woukl no longer be any doubt of the complete effi- 
cacy of the system; for I have already shown that the redoubts are 
proof against surprises or escalades, or attack by storm, preceded by 
bombardments, and that consequently a siege is necessary to gain pos- 
session of them. 

But while the batteries, parallels, and approaches of an attack in 
form are being constructed, there can be at least as many hands em- 
ployed on this side of the lines in strengthening them, and throwing 
up additional redoubts and batteries in rear of them, so that it may 
safely be assumed that the new works will render the first line as 
impregnable to a siege as it was at first to a precipitate attack. * * 
Tenth. An easy and rapid communication from one wing to the other 
is an essential requisite of a good system of lines ; the advantages of 
it appear in many of the examples I have adduced, and the results of 
a neglect of arrangements for this purpose, or of localities which 
prevented such arrangements, are evident in others. 

For instance, the lines of Buntzelwitz were thought to owe much 
of their strength to the free communication, from one point to another, 
afforded by a fine plain, which was adapted to the manoeuvres of all 
arms of the service ; and the existence of a wood which concealed the 
movements of the troops, in part from the enemy, was considered to 
be an additional advantage. 

The left of the lines of Torres Vedras was much strengthened by 
being posted in advance of a good road, which ran for about ten miles 
parallel to the fortifications. 

According to Napier, Soult owed his defeat, at the lines of the 
Nivelle, in a certain measure, to the want of roads or communications 
of any kind along his position. 

In the case of the Brooklyn lines, there should be a hard wide road 
leading the whole length of them in their rear, and in addition to 
the already existing plank and other roads, two or three roads might 
on occasion, be improvised, leading from some central position in the 
rear, where the resetrve would be posted; for besides parallel manoeuvres, 
there should be every facility for the latter to march directly upon 
either quarter of the line that might be menaced by the enemy, and 
it can be shown, beyond doubt, that it is the judicious management of 
the reserve which will constitute the safely of the system. 

Some of the roads specified would have the great advantage of being 
completely hidden from any views of the enemy, who must therefore 
remain partly in ignorance of the movements of the reserve: while 
on the contrary, every manoeuvre of the latter would be discovered, 
from the parts of the lines situated on the summits of the hills which 
overlook the country all the way to the sea shore. * * * * _ * . 

Eleventh. Transmission of intelligence and orders: There is in 
a fixed position, which is occupied long beforehand in expectation of 
attack, every facility for making perfect arrangements for conveying, in- 
stantly, information to the headquarters and to the posts interested, 
of every movement of the enemy : and the rapidity and certainty 
which a proper organization will impart to combined movements of 
different divisions, are so valuable, that no pains should be spared to 
insure them. 



88 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

The means usually resorted to have been the semaphore, and for 
night use, rockets ; but in foggy weather both are rendered useless, 
and the rockets are apt to be confounded with shells thrown by the 
enemy, or the similar signals of the latter ; besides, rockets can only 
be a very meagre reliance. 

On these accounts it will be found worth while to establish an 
electric telegraph along the line as a check on the former methods, 
and even as a main reliance, for its scope is much greater than the 
semaphore, which is limited to a set of preconcerted signals ; it is also 
less liable to great errors. 

Besides some semaphores there should, therefore, be telegraph wires 
laid along the line, having stations in the redoubts; and similar lines 
should run along the radial roads to the general headquarters at the 
central position. They need not, of course, be established till the 
necessity occurs. ******* 

Twelfth. Convenient debouches should be arranged to permit the re- 
serve to attack the enemy in turn, in case he should be repulsed so as 
to warrant the attempt. ****** 

T/mieenth, and lastly : Not only the construction of the lines should 
be correctly planned, but the manner of defending them must be in 
harmony with the nature of them. 

The redoubts are proof against assaults, and consequently, against 
the most violent siege ; for the trenches and batteries of the enemy 
can be responded to by superior works thrown up by the garrison 
during the siege ; there is however a remote jjossibility of an assault 
giving the enemy a temporary footing on the curtains, which are, 
from economy, of earthwork. Instead, therefore, of posting all the 
troops, not required for the garrisons of the enclosed works, along the 
curtains, the greatest solicitude should be to maintain a strong reserve, 
which, being in constant communication with the line, by means of 
signals, should continually manoeuvre so as to be opposite the main 
point of attack. 

Should the enemy break through the line between two redoubts, he 
will have suffered greatly from the fire of the troops in the entrench- 
ment, and likewise from the redoubts on each side while advancing to 
it, removing or breaking down the abattis and other obstacles, and 
climbing the ditch and parapet. On attaining the rear side of the 
breastwork, he will find that its defenders have taken shelter behind 
the redoubts on either side, and that they are firing upon his flanks 
from their new position, which is reinforced, perhaps, by the gar- 
risons of the adjoining lines of curtain. All the time the artillery 
and musketry fire of the redoubts will continue, and the enemy must 
experience considerable losses while amassing his troops to march 
against the reserve, which will now be at hand, to take part, either 
ofi'ensively or defensively, in the combat. 

It might happen that the general in command might see an oppor- 
tunity of sallying out beyond the line during the attack, and throwing 
his whole force on the flank of the enemy. 

I have .-aid enough, however, to make clear the general method 
which alone would be suitable to the defence of such a line as I pro- 
pose for the defence of New Yor k. 



DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 89 

With this fundamental idea, the rest must depend, as in all battles, 
on the time, place, and opportunity. No perfectly elaborated arrange- 
ment can be followed out strictly, and as many battles have been won 
by the inspiration of the moment as by preconcerted plans. * * * 

This appears to be a proper place to allude to a plan for the defence 
of Brooklyn, which resulted (some 15 years ago, I believe,) from the 
conferences of a board of engineers. This plan, however, has never 
been made jiublic, nor has it, to the best of my information and re- 
search, ever been offered, officially, even to the Chief Engineer, much 
less to the Secretary of War, or to Congress : hence the fact of such 
a plan having been discussed does not conflict with my assertion in 
the preface, that the government has never been warned of the danger 
to New York from descents upon Long Island, and still less been pre- 
sented with any plans for their prevention. 

This plan I have not been able to find in any printed or written 
documents, and have heard it stated differently by the officers who 
have mentioned it. One account is that Brooklyn was to be isolated 
from the rest of Long Island by a " chain of permanent redoubts," 
extending from Willet's Point, along the hills, to Fort Hamilton, (a 
distance of 21 miles,) to be connected, in time of war, by a line of 
field works. Another account states that permanent redoubts are to 
be used, but that they are not to constitute a line, but merely to 
occupy the important points along the ridge in question. 

Applying the principles elucid;'ted in the foregoing general discus- 
sion on lines to these plans, the defects of the latter become manifest. 

In the first place, however, let us inquire what sort of redoubts 
would be used, and the answer may be guessed, if we observe the 
nature of that one which lies at present at the right flank of the pro- 
posed line. I refer, of course, to the redoubt of Fort Hamilton. 

This redoubt is insignificant in size, being 32 yards square on the 
outside. It has 8 guns in barbette, which take up about half the 
room on its contracted terreplein, leaving space for perhaps 30 or 40 
men, in two ranks, to fire in either direction. Its parapets are but 4 
feet thick, and are of masonry, which a short cannonade would knock 
down, leaving the terreplein open to a rifle fire, which would soon 
clear it of its defenders. 

If these redoubts are to be used merely as auxiliary defences, that 
is, as strengthening particular important points, and are intended to 
hold out only against an attempt at storming, they will be less objec- 
tionable than in any other point of view ; but they are too small to 
hold a garrison whose fire shall be of any hindrance to the passage of 
a strong column in their vicinity — an inconvenience which might also 
be avoided by the enemy, as they would be very far apart ; and if 
subjected to a cannonade they must certainly fall. 

Besides, this hypothesis involves necessarily that of an active defence 
of the position by an army in the field, and I have already shown that 
all defensive plans which rest on the basis of an army of militia must 
calculate to place the latter behind entrenchments of some kind, so as 
to neutralize the immense advantage which veteran troops have over 
them, if they have a chance to manoeuvre against them in the field. 

If, on the other hand, the redoubts were intended to strengthen a 



90 DANGEES AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

continuous line of field works, the plan of the hoard appears in a still 
worse light ; for how can a line of 21 miles in extent, open to attack 
at all points, he defended by any number of works of this weak de- 
scription? 

It must he recollected that the plan under discussion was proposed 
hefore the invention of the Minie rifie, or rifie musket, and hence the 
redoubts must have been calculated to occupy intervals of 600 yards 
at the maximum ; this involves the construction of over 60 redoubts ; 
(a number that will appear great when compared with the 15 or 17 
redoubts of my plan ;) now, if made strong, each of these redoubts 
would want a large garrison, and an entire army of 50,000 or 60,000 
men would be required to hold them all, without counting the 100,000 
men or more that would be needed to garrison the line of field works 
and furnish a reserve ; if the redoubts were, on the contrary, intended 
to be of the same size, and to have an equal garrison with the one at 
Fort Hamilton, then the line would certainly be broken through by 
a determined assault, or by several simultaneous assaults, which, on 
so long a line would prevent any relief being sent from one wing to 
the other. 

I hardly think, however, that any officer will be found to advocate 
the plan just criticised ; for, if any should satisfy himself that a Jine 
21 miles long could be defended by either system of redoubts and 
entrenchments that could have been meant by the board, he must at 
least concede that a line 14 miles long is much easier guarded ; and 
that when the latter is so located that only 6 miles of it can be attacked 
at a time, and arranged to correspond with a defence by the new rifle 
musket, it may be regarded as impassable, and a hundred fold superior 
to that of the board. 

Finally^ the west half of the site that was proposed for this line, 
by the board, is now laid out in streets, built up, occupied by ceme- 
teries and reservoirs, or otherwise appropriated for other purposes 
than military ones. 



CHAPTEK VI. 

SUMMARY OF THE MEMOIR. 

It is the intrinsic military advantages as a defensive position, of the 
line I propose to fortif}'', that render the defence of Brooklyn feasible, 
and these advantages are independent, in a great measure, of the 
system according to which the works are projected. 

I, therefore, invite particular attention to the following comprehen- 
sive tableau of the line, in which its grand properties, extent, and 
merits are set forth, disembarrassed of minutiae of topography, and 
not confused by reference to the means or mode of its defence. 

1. The line extends from the head of Flushiug bay to Fort Hamil- 
ton. It thus isolates Brooklyn from any point of Long Island where 
an expedition can land ; for no fleet can pass the forts on the East 
river, and these are below Flushing bay ; nor can a fleet pass the 
batteries on the Narrows where Fort Hamilton is situated. 

2. The line is 15 miles in extent, involving the fortification of a 
length of 144" miles, and comprises three grand divisions of nearly 
equal length. 

The first division is of 6 miles, and runs from Fort Hamilton, 
east, to Jamaica bay. This division fronts towards Gravesend bay 
and Coney Island. 

The second division borders the marshes of Jamaica bay, running 
northeast for 4 miles, and opposes any landing on this shore. 

The third division is 5 miles long ; it runs north from the shores 
of Jamaica bay to the head of Flushing bay, and stands in the way 
of any approach from any point on the Sound or Atlantic shores of 
Long Island. 

3. The principal merit of this line, which renders its defence a 
matter of certainty, and which follows from the fact that each of these 
three divisions rests both flanks upon the water, is, that whatever 
part of Long Island an expedition might land at, the latter would be 
checked in its advance by a single division of the line, and would be 
restricted to the attack of this one. 

In other words the three divisions are isolated from each other, and 
it is impossible to march around the exterior of the line from one 
division to another. 

This extraordinary natural property of the line has this inestimable 
consequence ; that althoucjh the line is 15 miles long, only 5 miles of 
it, or 6 miles at most, will ever need to be defended at a time. The 
entire force behind the lines can therefore be concentrated upon either 
division the moment that the news of the debarkation of a foreign 
force upon the island is telegraphed to Brooklyn. ***** 

A similar condensed description of my plan for fortifying this line, 
and a brief exposition of its advantages, are as follows : 

1. The two divisions facing the south and east to be made the 



92 DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 

strongest, because they are the longest, and liable to regular land 
attacks, aided by artillery. 

The division fronting on Jamaica bay to be calculated to resist 
gunboat attacks, and a debarkation within effective cannon range. 

2. The fortifications on each division to be an uninterrupted line of 
earthwork entrenchments, but with arrangements for sorties, and 
flanked and otherwise supported, at distances of 1,400 yards, by 
detached redoubts with masonry scarps, which shall be impregnable 
against any assaults or attempts at storming. 

3. The heavy artillery to be placed in the forts, where it shall 
sweep all the country in front, and take in flank an enemy marching 
to the assault of the lines of earthwork between the forts. 

The light artillery to be placed, on the day of battle, wherever it 
may seem that it is most wanted, behind the earthworks. 

The defending army to be stationed so as to form two ranks for the 
entire length of the earthworks, and to furnish the forts with garri- 
sons of 2,000 men each : the remainder of the troops to form a reserve 
to march to the assistance of the point most violently attacked. 

4. Estimates. — Thus posted an army of 50,000 men would defend 
Brooklyn against any army that could be brought against it ; 20,000 
men would guard the earthworks, and 15,000 would hold the forts, 
while there would be left a reserve of 15,000 to aid in the defence at 
the decisive point of attack. 

It will be seen that the above calculation provides for the defence 
of only 6 miles in length, or of only a single division, though the 
largest of the line ; but it will be recollected that only one division 
can be attacked at a time. No general would split an army, however 
large, to land half of it to the east and half of it to the west of the 
lines ; to divide an army into isolated corps, without concert or com- 
munications of any sort, in order to attack a consolidated enemy, would 
be a gross military blun;;er. 

It is true that a gunboat attack upon the centre division might 
take place simultaneously with the assault on the division on the 
right or left, and in view of that, the estimate for the garrison of the 
lines may be increased by 5,000 men, and to guard against all pos- 
sible attempts on the remaining division which might take place as 
diversions to distract the defence, we will allow for the remaining 
division a garrison of one-third the full quota, say 10,000 men, which 
may be regarded as constituting a second reserve. The total number 
of troops that can ever be required to man the lines, allowing for a 
reserve of 25,000 men, is, therefore, 65,000. This number of troops 
can be furnished at a few days' notice, and fully armed and equipped, 
from the city and State of New York alone ; and I believe that they 
are equally well suited to defend the above projected works as the 
works themselves are to the defensive position which I indicate. 

To utilize the valour and marksmanship of our militia, their general 
should place them so that each man's duty will be simply to defend 
his post ; in this way the advantage that foreign armies would other- 
wise enjoy, that of outmanoeuvring our troops in the field, would be 
neutralized. 

This has been my leading principle in selecting the defensive posi- 



\ 

DANGERS AND DEFENCES OF NEW YORK CITY. 93 

tion, and in deciding on the nature of the works which should render 
it impregnable. 

It is this principle also which renders absurd the lines of detached 
redoubts, proposed by some engineers, to extend from Fort Hamilton 
to Willet's Point ; and doubly absurd the scientific ''rule and com- 
pass" arguments of others, who prove that no attack will ever take 
place on Brooklyn, because, they say, the enemy's rear, flank, or com- 
munications, might be cut off should he attempt one. 

I regard it as an important advantage of the proposed lines, that, 
being convenient of access to the city, the redoubts can be made the 
rendezvous of militia and volunteer regiments and companies, for the 
purposes of drilling and target-firing. 

Let each regiment have its station assigned to it in the line, per- 
manently, so that in practicing and marching, in and to that vicinity, 
it may become acquainted with the face of the country, the roads, and 
the ranges at which artillery and musketry will begin to be efiective 
from the particular redoubt, to which it belongs. 

The redoubts would, I believe, be accepted by the New York regi- 
ments with pleasure, if offered to them to use as armories, and store- 
houses, and places of rendezvous ; and the government would, by such 
an arrangement, have the works taken care of free of charge. 

The lines would in this manner be, very probably, made a popular 
resort for pleasure excursions, and as a pleasant drive, and so form an 
additional attraction in the vicinity of the city. 

It would be premature, in this memoir, to present any estimate of 
the cost of such a line of fortification as I propose ; but I must, at any 
rate, anticipate the possible objection that its expense would be out 
of proportion to its value to New York. 

The line can, in fact, bo constructed with extraordinary economy. 
The land which must be bought for the sites of the redoubts will not 
cost much, for no part of the line is located in built districts, or within 
the corporate limits of Brooklyn, or even upon valuable farm land ; 
on the contrary, the plats of ground which the government will 
require, lie either on bare and stony or wooded hill tops, or on sandy 
and cheap cultivated ground, or on meadows and marshes. 

As to the building of the redoubts, I respectfully propose that the 
City of New York should take the contract for the entire work, and 
that it shall use in the execution of it the forced labor of all the con- 
victs in its City prisons. 

If this arrangement were adopted, the City would be benefited by 
having the expenses of its convicts paid by the federal government, 
while the latter would get its work done at an absolute minimum of 
expense : seeing that the cost of it would amount to no more than the 
bare wholesale value of the materials, and the actual expense of board- 
ing and lodging the masons and laborers ; the profits of the workmen 
being in this case lost by them, and paid by neither party of the? 
contract. 



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